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Abstract
This thesis answers two questions: to what extent do older people in Europe differ 
from younger people in terms of their participation in politics, and why? It tests an 
age-centred model of political participation that is theoretically supported by prior 
knowledge about political-psychological thinking processes and the social behaviour 
of older people. The empirical innovation lies in a combination of quantitative survey 
analysis and the qualitative analysis of interviews with older people. The evidence 
comes from 21 European countries that were in the European Social Survey 2002/3, 
from British and West German national surveys of the post-war era and from 
interviews with older English protesters. The thesis focuses on voting participation, 
party choice and non-institutionalised political participation outside of organisations.
Older people participate differently from younger people in politics because 
they have a different endowment of resources and motivation as well as of 
opportunities and exposure to mobilisation. This fact is due to a mixture of cohort 
effects, which are linked to the specific generation that the individuals are members 
of, and life cycle effects, which are grounded on varying social circumstances across 
the life cycle. Furthermore, older people benefit from a larger pool of political 
experience and possess a greater commitment to comply with social norms of 
political behaviour. Their political preferences are primarily shaped by their 
generational membership, whereas life cycle variations in political preferences are 
minor.
There is also exploratory evidence that older people suffer from social 
stereotypes about their role in participatory politics. They internalise societal images 
about older people, one of which is that they should be passive in some forms of 
participation, such as protest activities. Thus, their participation level is lower than 
that of younger people even when all other age-related effects are held constant.
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1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental social changes occurring in contemporary European 
democracies is the growing number of senior citizens. It is worthwhile to ask how 
this demographic shift could affect politics and public policy. There are several ways 
in which one might expect the increasing presence of the elderly to have a political 
impact. One of them is the political participation of older people themselves.
Being older involves many different things that might also affect political 
behaviour: for example, relative to younger people, seniors have more life 
experience, other generational experiences, such as the memory of World War n, or 
are at a different position in the life cycle, such as being retired. In this thesis, I 
attempt a comprehensive analysis of political participation of the elderly in Europe 
and seek to answer the following questions: to what extent and why do older people 
in Europe participate differently from younger people in politics? The evidence 
comes from 21 European countries1 that were part of the European Social Survey in 
2002, from British and West German national surveys of the post-war era and from 
interviews with older English protesters.
The vast majority of European countries, which are experiencing the most 
pronounced development of population ageing in the world, have by now adopted 
some form of political system that is based on the belief that the citizenry should rule 
itself by means of mass participation. Citizens ought to express their political 
preferences by voting for representative bodies in regular and fair elections, by 
giving support to parties and candidates, by demonstrating, and by pursuing other
1 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West/East), Great Britain, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
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legal activities within the political system. This belief is supported by normative 
arguments. It is claimed that without regular political participation a democratic 
system becomes hollow and inefficient because it cannot take up the political 
preferences of its citizens; and secondly, it becomes illegitimate because its elites 
lack popular support to govern the demos.
Older people above 60 make up the largest and fastest growing social group 
of the European demos. If we accept that political participation is important for the 
political process of a liberal democracy and that older people are a fast growing 
group in many European democracies, we also need to recognise that it is a valid 
empirical project to analyse the political participation of this social group. If older 
people participate in politics in ways different to younger fellow citizens, this can 
lead to a permanent change in the participatory political process of ageing 
democracies. If older people pursue other interests than those of younger citizens in 
their participation, we will also witness different policy outcomes in ageing 
democracies than in countries with a small proportion of older people. This is 
because in the former, older people and their views will have a stronger impact than 
younger age groups and their views.
This thesis is an attempt to draw on insights from political psychology and 
social gerontology in order to amend existing models of political participation. The 
aim is to generate and test an age-centred model of political participation that is 
theoretically supported by our prior knowledge about political-psychological 
thinking processes and the social behaviour of older people as individuals. The 
empirical innovation lies in a combination of quantitative survey analysis and the 
qualitative analysis of interviews with older people. In general, this thesis makes a
13
contribution to the still largely neglected research field of ‘political gerontology’ 
where questions of old age, ageing and politics are researched.
Older people participate differently from younger people in politics because 
they have a different endowment of resources and motivation as well as opportunities 
and exposure to mobilisation. This fact is due to a mixture of cohort effects, which 
are linked to the specific generation that the individuals are members of, and life 
cycle effects, which are grounded on varying social circumstances across the life 
cycle. Furthermore, older people benefit from a larger pool of political experience 
and possess a greater commitment to comply with social norms of behaviour. Their 
political preferences are primarily shaped by their generational membership whereas 
life cycle variations in political preferences are minor. Older people today still suffer 
from social stereotypes about their role in participatory politics. Although their 
endowment of resources to participate in politics has increased over the last decades, 
older people still seem to participate less in politics than younger people. This is 
because they have internalised images about older people, one of which is that they 
should be passive in politics.
This introduction operationalises the research question by defining the group 
of older people and the scope of political participation that I am going to investigate. 
In addition, I will give an overview of the theoretical model and four types of age- 
related effects that are the main conceptual tool of the empirical analysis. Moreover, 
I will explain why I chose to study European countries comparatively. Finally, I will 
lay out the structure of the dissertation.
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1,1 Who a re ‘olderpeople9?
‘Elderly’, ‘seniors’, ‘senior citizens’, ‘older people’, ‘the aged’ -  there is a 
multiplicity of terms for older citizens in everyday English. However, older people 
rarely identify themselves as being old and do not agree on the labels given to them 
by others (see Walker and Maltby 1997: 17-18). Thus, attempts by social scientists to 
use terms of self-identification in survey research have largely failed.
Technically speaking, the elderly are the most advanced in terms of 
chronological age, which is the number of years we have lived. Chronological age is 
only a proxy variable for many other characteristics and does not have a simple 
social meaning (Jennings and Markus 1988: 308). Chronological age is not even 
objective in biological terms. Ageing theorists have therefore introduced the measure 
of biologic age. It is measured by objective standard biomarkers and describes how 
far a person has advanced towards the maximum human life span. In addition, 
chronological age is not culture-free because it depends on the developmental 
circumstances of the overall society one lives in. One year in a pre-industrial society 
like the Amazonian Yanomami culture is not the same as in post-industrial Europe 
(Albert and Cattell 1994: 19-26). Therefore, this study only looks at societies that are 
similar in their stage of socio-economic development, in order that chronological age 
can mean something comparable in social and cultural terms. If we only take post­
industrial societies in Europe, chronological age as a pure number assures us that one 
year of age is roughly the same for everybody in terms of biologic life span.
Whereas the maximum life span of about 110 years has been stable for the 
last 100,000 years, average life expectancy at birth has steadily risen with the socio­
economic development of societies (Albert and Cattell 1994: 26-27). The average 
life expectancy in the 21 European countries under investigation is quite similar in
15
global comparison (see table 1-1). For men the estimated average lay at 74.7 years 
and for women at 80.8 in 2000-2005 (United Nations 2004). The group mean in 
these countries is above the world mean of 67.9 (women) and 63.4 (men). Life 
expectancy is in fact a direct indicator of socio-economic development or 
modernisation as the cause of death in more advanced societies has largely shifted 
away from external causes (such as infectious diseases) to internal causes (senescent 
deterioration) (Avramov and Maskova 2003).
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Table 1-1: Average life expectancy at birth in 21 European and some selected countries from 
around the globe 2000-5
Women Men
World Minimum: Zambia 32.1 32.7
World Average 67.9 63.4
Hungary 76.0 67.7
Poland 78.0 69.8
Czech Republic 78.7 72.1
Denmark 79.1 74.2
Ireland 79.6 74.4
Portugal 79.6 72.6
Slovenia 79.8 72.6
United Kingdom 80.7 75.7
Average 21 European countries 80.8 74.7
Greece 80.9 75.7
Netherlands 81.0 75.6
Germany 81.2 75.2
Luxembourg 81.4 75.1
Austria 81.5 75.4
Finland 81.5 74.4
Norway 81.9 76.0
Belgium 81.9 75.7
Italy 81.9 75.5
Switzerland 82.3 75.9
Sweden 82.6 77.6
France 82.8 75.2
Spain 82.8 75.9
World Maximum: Japan 85.1 77.9
Life expectancy at birth is a proxy for life expectancy at 60, which is not available cross-nationally. 
Source: United Nations (2004).
As a working definition in this dissertation, I will use 60 as an arbitrary (but
conventional) cut-off point to separate seniors from non-seniors. Alternative cut-off
points of chronological age that are used in social sciences are 50, 55 or 65 (see
Walker and Maltby 1997; Walker and Naegele 1999). 60 is in the middle of those
and approximates the mean retirement age in Europe, making it an important social
division point. Instead of a chronological age cut-off point, one could use the
category of retired versus non-retired. But this poses the problem that being retired
17
can mean many things that vary across countries due to policy regimes and 
traditions, such as: being voluntarily retired, being unable to work and at the same 
time above a certain age threshold, or having been forced to retire early. Also, some 
women who belong to older generations have not necessarily been members of the 
employed workforce, making the category of retirement misleading for them. Cut-off 
points of chronological age have the advantage that in countries with similar socio­
economic development status, members of the categories are biologically similar. All 
fixed cut-off points carry a potential risk as they tend to blind the researcher from 
transitional changes related to a certain life stage that are not linked to one specific 
date. I will keep this general shortcoming in mind when using the cut-off point of 60.
With regard to language, I will use the terms ‘elderly’, ‘older people’, 
‘seniors’ and ‘senior citizens’ interchangeably meaning people who turned 60 or 
older at their last birthday. Terminology of social groups in public discourse is often 
a matter of fashion and of what is considered to be ‘politically correct’ during a 
certain period. In 2006, my experience of official British government and NGO 
publications seems to suggest that these four terms are currently en vogue as neutral 
terms for older people without any ageist connotations.
As I define older people as those aged 60 and older, I identify the comparison 
category of the ‘non-older people’ as those who are 59 and younger and will term 
them ‘younger people’. Semantically speaking, this usage is correct as the term 
‘younger’ is always relative. In this thesis, I prefer to employ the term ‘younger’ over 
the very technical term ‘non-older’. Sometimes when it is conceptually appropriate, I 
will make specific comparisons between older (60+), middle-aged (30-59) and young 
people (<30). In those instances, I will state clearly which chronological age I am
18
referring to. In general however, I compare ‘older people’ aged 60 or above with 
‘younger people’ aged 59 and younger.
This thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of political 
participation of the elderly in Europe. Therefore, it is helpful to look at some major 
changes in the social position of senior citizens in Europe that affect their political 
behaviour. First of all, senior citizens today are on average much better off in socio­
economic terms than they used to be. The present senior cohort in Europe is better 
educated, has more income and has occupied higher-prestige jobs than earlier 
generations. This is mainly due to overall economic progress and development after 
World War n. In particular the post-war baby-boomer generation, those bom 
between 1945 and 1955 and who are currently crossing the 60 years threshold, is 
much better off than earlier generations in many advanced industrial democracies 
(see for example for Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom Geschaftsstelle 
Seniorenwirtschaft 2004; Huber and Skidmore 2003; Kunz 2005).
Secondly, today’s older people in Europe find themselves in a social 
environment that has changed to a great extent with respect to the relationship 
between seniors and their families. Whereas the tradition in European societies was 
to take care of parents in a three-generation household, the trend has gone towards 
older people living separately from their family members, either on their own or in 
retirement homes (Tomassini et al. 2004). This can be attributed to a broad process 
of individualisation, which is accompanying the process of societal modernisation 
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1995b: 11). The more modem a society, i.e. the more 
advanced a society in socio-economic development, the more the elderly have lost 
their prestigious status as a group defined by their higher age (Cowgill and Holmes 
1972). The process of changing living arrangements is far from uniform across all
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European societies (for instance Southern European countries show a higher 
likelihood of care giving for the elderly within the family household), but the long­
term general trend is indisputable (Tomassini et al. 2004). As a consequence, senior 
interests are less taken care of within the family because the elderly increasingly tend 
to live and organise their lives individually. This social development could 
potentially have two different consequences for older people’s political behaviour. 
The lack of interest representation through the family could lead to more senior 
participation in politics today as seniors might want to compensate for the loss of 
influence via the family. But it could also lead to a transitional lack of participation, 
as social roles and self-perception about older people’s roles in politics change 
slowly. Thus, older people in Europe might still have the pre-conception that their 
interests will be taken care of by others as used to be the case, meaning that they 
might not become active in politics.
A third point that concerns the elderly as a group is the reconstruction of 
European welfare states. European democracies began to experience increasing 
strains on their state budgets after the two oil crises in the 1970s because of negative 
economic growth, growing mass unemployment and high inflation. Social welfare 
systems that were based on particular assumptions about societies -  like lifelong 
permanent employment, short life spans after retirement and the care-giving social 
net of the family -  are being reviewed. The elderly have become a major target of 
reforming efforts and a change in political discourse. Older people receive expensive 
welfare benefits like public pensions, long-term care and medical treatment. As a 
consequence of rocketing costs, a general trend started to develop with OECD 
countries moving away from public pension provision towards a privatisation of 
pension arrangements (Disney and Johnson 2001; Walker 1999: 9-10). Seen from a
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political perspective, the attempt to deprive the elderly of welfare resources, like 
public pensions and medical care, can have mobilising effects on individuals to 
defend existing welfare provisions through political activity (see for the USA 
Campbell 2003a; Pratt 1976).
1.2 What do we consider to be \political participation ’?
Political science research into political participation revolves around three issues: (1) 
definitions of the scope of the universe of political participation; (2) how the universe 
of political participation is structured from within; (3) what determines political 
participation of any particular form (models of political participation). I will discuss 
the first two points in this section and the third point in the theoretical chapter 3, 
when I will present my own age-centred model of political participation.
What constitutes political participation is a question that needs to be
answered with regard to the underlying interest of the researcher. The answer
depends on the researcher’s normative and conceptual approach. In my case, I am
interested in the potential influence of demographic ageing on politics and public
policy through the individual participation of older people. I limit the analysis to
liberal democracies that give room for voluntary participation. I am not concerned
with political actions that are forced upon the individual, such as in totalitarian
systems, because free and voluntary political actions follow a different logic than
involuntary behaviour. Neither will I occupy myself with paid political activities,
such as those of public affairs professionals or paid party employees, because their
motivational structures can also be assumed to be different. Bearing Max Weber’s
differentiation between politics as Beruf and Berufung in mind (see Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 39), I am disregarding the Beruf sphere of political
participation. There might be influences of demographic ageing on the world of
21
professional political participants, such as the activities of old age interest groups, 
but they stand outside the scope of this thesis.
My analysis is furthermore concerned with the individual level, i.e. with 
political actions of individuals. This perspective is juxtaposed to one which focuses 
on social movements, parties and interest groups, and how these organisations impact 
on the policy-making process. Such an analysis could, for instance, have focused on 
the behaviour of senior interest groups.
Finally, I am interested in individual voluntary political participation that is 
intended to influence political outcomes, to change existing institutional 
arrangements of the political process or to influence the selection of political 
personnel who take decisions thereupon (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 
chap. 2 for a similar definition). Thus, I constrain the analysis to the impact of 
participation on public policies and public institutions. This limitation is normatively 
based on a conception of democracy as a procedure to aggregate preferences, solve 
conflicts and legitimate decisions. I could, of course, take alternative approaches. 
One of which would be to adapt a minimalist conception of democracy (see for 
example Schumpeter 1965 [1943]) and only analyse voting as a form of participation 
as has been done often in the past (see for a critique Leighly 1995). I could also 
broaden the definition of political participation so as to include political actions that 
are ceremonial, such as waving a flag, or being attentive to politics, e.g. following 
political discussions on TV. This latter definition would be appropriate if I stressed 
the societal aspects of democracy, i.e. political participation as part of a process that 
creates solidarity, a common bond and democratic culture. This would be the 
conception of democracy as a ‘way of living’ (Barber 1983). I do not doubt that 
attention to politics or ceremonial political actions have some kind of impact. But
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given my focus on policy outcomes, I will concentrate on the core modes of political 
participation.
Political scientists used to conceptualise political participation as a one­
dimensional phenomenon. The dimension consisted of an ordinal ordering of 
different forms of political participation, ordered from least to most difficult 
(Milbrath and Goel 1977: 11). Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (1972) were the first to 
structure political participation as a multi-dimensional phenomenon (though not with 
orthogonal dimensions) involving different modes of activities, a finding that was 
later corroborated by factor analyses in various countries (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978: 
46-56).
There are numerous ways in which scholars have classified various political 
activities (for example Kaase 1992; Schmidt 1995): whether the activity is embedded 
in the constitution or other legal texts, whether it is aggressive or non-aggressive, 
legal or illegal, conventional (meaning actions that are targeted at the public electoral 
process and have a high degree of public legitimacy) or unconventional, and electoral 
or non-electoral. Another way of structuring the universe of political participation is 
to differentiate the amount of information that is conveyed by the activity and how 
much and what kind of resources are needed (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
For example, petitions transmit very specific political preferences, and signing them 
requires few resources.
In general, it is common empirical practice to analyse summative modes of
political participation (see Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992; Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley
2004; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). This conceptual reduction seems to pose no
problem when studying one country at one point in time, and is still doable when
studying a handful of countries. However, I am looking at 21 countries in a cross­
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sectional way, at two of them across time and am comparing older people with 
younger people. Thus, the stability of any summative modes would need to be shown 
for every country at every point in time and for each group. This poses some serious 
practical problems and is likely to end in incongruent summative modes. Therefore, I 
decided on the analysis of individual political actions.
In the empirical analysis, I am adopting a cautious approach. I will start by 
casting a wide net over all forms of political participation to see where older people 
are different from younger people. In doing so, I can ensure that I recognise all 
potential compensatory behaviours that may be displayed. It would be misleading to 
limit the analysis prematurely because older people might compensate for lower 
levels participation in one form of participation through higher participation levels in 
another form. In an a priori limited analysis, this compensatory behaviour could be 
overlooked, a limitation that would weigh strongly when one considers that the 
whole universe of participation is open to everybody in a liberal democracy. For 
example, older people might not protest in the streets, but be very active in writing 
letters to politicians to express their discontent. The underlying assumption of this 
approach is that, if there are no differences in participatory levels between older and 
younger people, then the causal mechanisms behind them are the same for each age 
group; moreover, they are comparable to the ones that I am analysing and so do not 
need separate investigation.
The thesis focuses on two modes of participation: voting and ‘non­
institutionalised ’ participation outside of organisations, like signing a petition (Kaase 
1999). As I will demonstrate, these are the two areas of participation in which older 
people are consistently more (voting) or less (participation outside of organisations) 
likely to engage than younger people across Europe. These two forms of
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participation are the most common forms of participation and thus belong in the 
realm of mass participation, rather than ‘high-intensity participation’ (Whiteley and 
Seyd 2002b), which is much rarer and describes activities inside of parties or other 
political organisations. Voting is the most fundamental form of mass participation. It 
is the minimal requirement for the legitimacy of representative government. 
Participation outside of organisations (contacting a public official or politician, 
signing a petition, demonstrating, wearing a badge, boycotting or buying a product 
for political reasons) mostly entails non-electoral activities. These activities have lost 
their unconventionality, which had been attributed to them when they arose as mass 
phenomena in the 1960s. Groups like parties, trade unions or voluntary organisations 
can be responsible for the preparation of, for example, street demonstrations. But the 
participatory act as such does not require long-term institutional commitment by the 
participant.
In sum, I define voluntary political participation as all individual political 
actions intended to influence public policy, to change institutional structures of the 
decision-making process or to affect the selection of personnel taking decisions 
thereupon. The empirical analysis will deal with single political actions and not 
summative indexes. Within this universe of political participation, I make a 
distinction between institutionalised participation within and non-institutionalised 
participation outside of organisations.
1.3 A framework to study the political participation of older people
This section sketches the main characteristics of my theoretical model that I will
explain in greater detail in chapter 3: its theoretical tradition, main causal factors and
crucial assumptions. The aim of this dissertation is not to produce a full-fledged
model of the various forms of political participation. Instead, I will put forward a
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model that concentrates on the impact of age-related effects on political participation. 
Some factors of political participation do not explain differences between older and 
younger citizens. For example, recent political science research has demonstrated the 
importance of genes for political preferences that can be consequential for political 
behaviour (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005). Ceteris paribus, genetic material can be 
expected to vary as much within age groups as between age groups and can therefore 
be neglected for this dissertation. Thus, I will only analyse factors that I expect to be 
different between age groups on the basis of my model and the existing literature.
The theoretical model of this dissertation stands in the tradition of the Civic 
Voluntarism Model of Verba and colleagues (1995). However, as the next section 
will show, I am supplanting the general political participation model with concepts 
from political psychology and social gerontology that have not been used in this 
context before. I am going to analyse voting and participation outside of 
organisations in a framework of resources and incentives. As part of my model, I 
assume that a political action is the result of a decision on the form and the content of 
political participation after a cost-benefit calculation. The decision to engage in a 
certain form of political participation takes intrinsic and extrinsic factors into 
consideration.
Intrinsic factors from within the individual include resources and motivation. 
This reflects the fact that political actions are contingent on attitudinal predisposition 
and on the resources needed to commit a particular political activity. We do not 
participate in politics when we are not able to or when we do not want to. Citizens 
are motivated not only by their personal material interest, but also by altruistic 
motivations or the expressive benefits of taking part in a political action.
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Extrinsic factors that influence the calculation are the opportunities that one 
has to participate as well as mobilisation factors. For example, citizens in rural areas 
have more difficulties demonstrating in the streets, as street marches usually take 
place in bigger towns or cities. Mobilisation by friends, families and organisations 
that one is a member of can decrease one’s costs of participation and increase the 
benefits that one can gain (for instance, through social gratification when we act 
according to the valued expectations of other individuals). Intrinsic and extrinsic 
factors have simultaneous influence on the individual. Both kinds of factors can 
facilitate or hinder the probability of committing a certain type of political action.
In addition to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, the decision-making process that 
leads to a political action and guides the individual during the performance of that 
action is characterised by the limited rationality of the individual. This assumption 
derives from the acknowledgement that in order to deal with our complex 
environment, we take cognitive short-cuts, such as drawing on our own past 
experience -  through schemas and heuristics -  to shorten the decision-making 
process. This procedural characteristic lowers the perceived costs of a political action 
because the individual can assess all possible options more quickly by using these 
short-cuts.
Finally, the individual tries to maximise personal outcome according to 
political preferences. Individuals have certain political preferences about policy 
outcomes that are shaped by the social context that they are in. Thus, individuals in 
similar social situations may share political preferences. For example, retired people 
have a common interest in the maintenance of pension payment levels. But 
preferences can also be shared by individuals due to shared socialisation experiences 
at a young age. For example, as I will demonstrate, first-time German voters during
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the era of Konrad Adenauer tended to develop strong preferences for the Christian- 
Democrats, which they maintained throughout their lifetimes.
1.4 Age-related effects on political participation
This section summarises the four main age-related effects that can influence political 
behaviour and that represent the main conceptual framework of the thesis. A detailed 
discussion will follow in chapter 3. It is helpful to see age differences in political 
behaviour as the sum of four different types of effects: political generation, shared 
social characteristic cohort, life cycle and individual ageing. Together, these effects 
give the answer to the following question: why should an older person behave 
differently in politics from a younger person? This conceptualisation extends the 
conventional discussion of age effects in order to get a better understanding of 
underlying causal mechanisms. Traditionally, differences between age groups are 
being explained by the classification of age-period-cohort effects and their 
interactions. A period effect is the impact of the context during which a survey was 
conducted that affects all respondents (and -  standing on its own - is thus not helpful 
to explain differences between age group at a certain point in time). A cohort effect 
is shared by a group of people bom during a certain period and comes up in surveys 
at different points in time (either in panels or in repeated cross-sectional surveys). An 
age effect is shared by the group of people who are in the same age group. It can also 
be measured at different points in time. My definitions of the ‘political generation’ 
and ‘shared social characteristic cohort’ effects fall into the category of ‘cohort 
effects’. My ‘life cycle’ and ‘individual ageing’ effects must be placed into the 
category of ‘age effects’.
A ‘political generation effect’ stems from the shared experience by a group
that was bom during a certain period. Cohort membership is important because the
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early period of our adulthood is so decisive in terms of political socialisation. We are 
much more open to political influences between 15 and 30 (the ‘impressionable 
years’) than between 50 and 65. This early political socialisation leaves an imprint in 
citizens’ heads as it shapes our early political preferences. Since socialisation 
influences stem from political circumstances at the time of young adulthood, such as 
differences between parties in catching first-time voters, political preferences differ 
between cohorts. This cohort effect is based on the shared historical, political 
experience of a cohort, not the social experience that is captured by the shared social 
characteristic cohort effect.
Allow me to introduce two exemplary people to whom I will come back 
throughout the thesis. One is 75 years old and called Adam, the other 35 years and 
called Henrietta. The elderly Adam was bom in 1931 and experienced political 
socialisation between about 1946 and 1961. The younger Henrietta was bom in 1971 
and socialised between 1986 and 2001. For example, with regard to street 
demonstrations, a West German Adam would not have seen many of them during his 
early socialisation period. In contrast, a West German Henrietta would have heard 
about many street demonstrations in the media and maybe even seen some in the 
streets on a regular basis, such as the anti-nuclear, peace and other demonstrations. 
These differences in early experience are engrained in the early preferences 
concerning political participation and are likely to shape later behaviour.
The ‘shared social characteristic cohort effect’ stems from the varying 
probabilities of attaining certain social characteristic between cohorts. De- 
unionisation and changes in the class structure and educational composition of the 
population affect generations differently and must thus be taken into account. These 
generational changes tend to go in one direction only when the period under
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investigation is just a few decades. Education is the most important case of a shared 
social characteristic cohort effect. The probability of Henrietta having finished 
secondary school is much higher than Adam’s because they grew up in different 
times, the elderly Adam before the mass expansion of secondary and higher 
education. Higher formal education stimulates higher levels of political participation. 
Educated individuals also tend to have a better understanding of the political process 
and live in social contexts in which political participation is valued more strongly. 
These generational changes are correlates of long-term social changes, such as 
economic development. This uni-directional development separates this effect from 
the political generation effect, the influence of which can be different even between 
two decades. Political generation effects capture the effects of political history at 
youth rather than those of macro social changes.
‘Life cycle effects’ on political behaviour derive from changes of our social 
situation over the life course. Each life cycle stage like youth, adolescence, middle 
and old age puts the individual into social contexts with rather different demands on 
them. For example, young adults often struggle to succeed in their professional lives, 
are occupied with starting a family and with securing their family’s income. Older 
people can suffer from deteriorating health, have settled down in a certain area and 
do not usually need to support children anymore. These different social stages are 
contexts that create differences in political interests as much as in available resources 
to participate in politics. Health for instance deteriorates with age due to the 
combined effects of the accumulation of unhealthy lifestyles and the physical effects 
of ageing. Physical ability can be important for various forms of political 
participation. Adam is more likely to suffer from physical constraints than Henrietta 
and thus in this context less likely to participate in politics. This age effect is rooted
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in the social experience associated with (and often constructed around) a certain age. 
It is thus dependent on the social and cultural circumstances.
As a final age effect of political behaviour, ‘individual ageing’ can entail two 
universal human mechanisms that can affect the likelihood of political participation: 
accumulation of past experience and growing adherence to social norms. First, past 
participation experiences influence the future probability of participation. If you 
learn that something brings some kind of gratification to you that outweighs your 
costs, you will do it again. If something does not give you enough gratification, you 
will not do it again. Over a lifetime, our repository of situations that we know (and 
also believe we know) grows steadily. The older we are, the more likely we are to 
‘know the show’. Drawing on our own experience is one type of cognitive short-cut. 
Adam can fall back, for instance, on many more elections than Henrietta and can use 
that experience to cast the vote again. Issues, candidates and the procedure of voting 
are more familiar to him than to Henrietta giving him lower costs to perform that 
political action. Secondly, growing adherence to social norms as we age is the result 
of a complex transmission process between a social norm and our individual 
behaviour. At the level of the individual, we are motivated to behave in a certain way 
by our own subjective norm. The subjective norm is our perception of the social 
norm in our personal environment. This subjective norm is the sum of social pressure 
and gratification that we expect to receive from people who we know. Thus, it plays 
an integral part of any cost-benefit calculation of political action. The social 
gratification that one receives increases the benefit of one’s action. As we age, the 
perception of the social norm changes because we are more and more likely to have 
followed societal rules in the past and identify with the society that produces the 
social norm. Adam has held many social roles in his life -  maybe as father,
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employee, grand-father, retiree, etc. -  and has been subjected to many social 
expectations. Thus, the social norms of that society have become increasingly part of 
Adam’s personal, subjective norm. For example, as voting represents a social norm 
in liberal democracies, the older Adam feels more obliged to comply with that norm 
than the younger Henrietta. This age-related effect is psychological in nature and 
exists independently from social contexts.
1.5 Analysing European countries
This study uses data from European liberal democracies in the post-war era. There 
are three different sources of evidence: cross-sectional survey data from 2002 in 21 
countries, longitudinal survey data from Britain (1958-2001) and West Germany 
(1961-2002) and material from interviews that I led with older English protesters in 
2005.
The European Social Survey 2002/3 contains 21 countries that are similar (1)
in their socio-economic development, (2) in the relative size of the proportion of
older people and (3) in the dominant social perception of the life course. They are
different, however, with regard to their political history. With the countries being at a
similar stage of the socio-economic development, we can ensure that the biological
meaning of chronological age is similar as I explained in section 1.2. Figure 1-1
looks at the proportion of citizens aged 60 and older in the European countries in
comparison to the world mean from a longitudinal point of view. These countries
were already ‘older’ in 1950 in terms of the proportion of the population that is 60 or
older. Since then, the figures for Europe and the world have risen and are projected
to rise even more. Europe rose from 12.9 % in 1950 to 20.3 % in 2000. It is projected
to rise to about 36.3 % in 2050. That means the percentage will have tripled by 2050
compared to 1950. The world average rose from 7.6 % in 1950 to 9.6 % in 2000 and
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is forecast to rise to 22.4 % in 2050, which also represents three times the percentage 
of 1950.
Figure 1-1: The percentage of older people in Europe in comparison to the world 1950 - 2050
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Numbers before 2000 are estimates, after 2000 average projections, Europe includes 21 countries, 
source: UN Common Database (2004).
These demographic shifts are realistically inevitable, no matter how strong 
the attempts to attract more young immigrants and increase national reproduction 
rates. The elderly of the next decades are already bom. The numerical proportion of 
older people is and will be much higher than it used to be a few decades ago. 
Thereby Europe is the part of the world where the proportion of the elderly as part of 
the populace is largest and thus the demographic change most pronounced (Me 
Pherson 1998: 110). That means that in all European countries the elderly are of 
increasing political importance through their sheer numerical size. This is an 
argument that has already started to surface in politics. The European Union platform 
for old age interest groups AGE, for example, greeted the new EU member states on 
their web site stressing that now 150 out of 450 million EU inhabitants are above 50 
(AGE 2004).
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Within the Group of the 21 European Countries there is little variance as 
figure 1-2 shows.
Figure 1-2: The percentage of national populations aged 60 and older in 21 European countries 
in 2000
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Europe includes 21 countries that are in the European Social Survey, source: UN Common Database 
(2004).
The proportion of people 60 years old and older ranges from 15.2 % in 
Ireland to 24.1 % in Italy. Thus the 21 countries under closer scrutiny are very 
similar in demographic terms if one considers that most countries in the world are 
well below the minimum in Ireland. The world minimum lies at 3.0 % in Kuwait, the
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maximum at 25.5 % in Japan and the mean at 9.9 % (United Nations Common 
Database 2004).
The European cultural notion portrays the life course as a linear progression 
from death to birth. It puts emphasis on the individuality of everybody. Furthermore, 
ageing is discussed in medico-scientific terms. The ‘objective’ markers of health play 
a dominant role. By consequence, the chronological age of a person is given great 
importance in Western ageing discourse (Wilson 2000: 27). So we can expect a 
similar pattern of life cycle stages across Europe in the countries under investigation. 
One illustrative contrasting example to the European experience might be the Hindu 
image of a ‘cyclical life plan’, according to which older people are expected to hand 
over resources to the young. In turn, their needs in this life are taken care of, and they 
can prepare for death and reincarnation (Albert and Cattell 1994: 64-65). The 
similarity of the social life cycle across Europe is important since we expect life 
cycle effects to impact upon political participation. For example, if the presence of 
grand-children in the household affects an individual’s resources that are needed for 
participation, e.g. less free time, this effect should be similar across Europe as the 
occurrence of three generation households is comparable.
In addition to these similarities, these 21 European democracies differ in their 
political history after World War n. Each country has seen a differing chronological 
sequence of governments, policy regimes and economic development. Looking at 
such a range of countries, similar in their socio-economic development, demographic 
composition and social perception of the life course, but dissimilar in their political 
history, opens new opportunities for research. On the one hand, we can carve out 
universal aspects like the individual ageing effect that must exist in all countries. On 
the other, we can also look how different country-experiences, via the socialisation
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experience, can influence differences between age groups. Thus for instance, 
totalitarian experience for senior citizens at a young age can have a lasting impact on 
their political behaviour across their life span. We can use this variation in political 
history while holding life cycle and ageing effects constant.
Alternatively to this set-up, one could have chosen a classic most-dissimilar 
design. One could have selected democracies that are extremely diverse in the age 
compositions, are at different stages of their socio-economic development and have 
different conceptions of the social life course. This design, which has for instance 
been used in Nie et al. (1974), would allow one to look at universal aspects of old 
age, such as the ageing effects. However, it would not have allowed me to separate 
conceptual life cycle and cohort effects at the same time, and get a sense of their 
relative strength vis-a-vis each other.
Besides the comparative, cross-sectional analysis of 21 European countries, I 
also use evidence from two other sources. Out of the 21 European countries, I 
selected Britain and West Germany for a longitudinal analysis of party choice. The 
reasons for this lie in the availability of long series of national surveys and the 
different structures of party competition and electoral systems within the two 
countries. For example, if the life cycle affects voting, for instance if the tendency to 
vote for the incumbent increases with growing age, such effects should be visible in 
different countries if the underlying mechanism, like status-quo conservatism, is 
independent of the country studied. I will show that similar voting choice effects 
persist, despite differences in party system characteristics.
Finally, I interviewed older English protesters who were active on the
Council Tax issue in 2004/5. The protests were temporally close to the European
Social Survey from 2002, so that findings from the European Social Survey should
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be applicable to these protesters as well. Britain also has a historical tradition of 
pensioners’ protests and -  as I will demonstrate -  represents an extreme case of old 
age culture where the general attitudes towards older people are comparatively 
positive. According to the logic of the crucial case study (Eckstein 1975), the 
discovery of old age stereotypes even in these circumstances gives some confidence 
that they should exist in other contexts as well.
1.6 Research question, thesis structure and main findings
This thesis addresses the following questions:
To what extent and why do older people in Europe participate differently from 
younger people in politics?
This question asks for a comparison between older and younger people at the 
individual level. Differences in preferences and in the endowment of resources, 
motivations, opportunities and mobilisation are expected to account for differences in 
participatory behaviour.
To trace these differences will be the primary objective of the thesis. Once 
the hypotheses are tested and findings established, we face the challenge of 
discussing the implications of the empirical findings on the political system. It is a 
challenge because the impact of political participation can be manifold and diffuse. If 
senior citizens are more likely to vote and to vote for one particular party, the effects 
on politics in terms of the stronger vote-winning of that party are quite clear. Voting 
shows little about the preferences of the voters, but puts a lot of pressure on political 
elites to assess policy decisions in the light of electoral repercussions. However, if 
seniors are less likely to protest in the streets, this finding does not directly tell us 
anything about the possible repercussions. In general, the link between protests and
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the established political process is less clear. Mass participation in private 
associations and organisations is generally believed to reveal a lot about the 
preferences of the political participants, but its impact is also contingent on many 
other factors (see for example Hill and Matsubayashi 2005). Because of all these 
difficulties, we need to draw on argumentative reasoning about the nature of a 
specific type of political action (with the help of prior knowledge from the literature), 
as well as empirical evidence about its determinants in order to assess the impact of 
the political participation of older people.
The thesis provides original research into explaining old age participation in 
several ways. Firstly, the research design is comparative: internationally in a cross- 
sectional manner and across time in two countries. No study to date deals with older 
people’s political behaviour from a comparative perspective. Secondly, I approach 
political participation from a holistic point-of-view, looking at the whole universe of 
senior participation based on my conceptual definition, and not at a sub-set of 
political actions. Thirdly, I use newly collected data. I have put together various 
election study data for time series analysis in new data sets and have conducted a 
series of qualitative interviews. Fourthly, I combine quantitative and qualitative 
analyses in a mixed approach thereby acknowledging the merits and limitations of 
each.
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis is to the empirical, 
comparative literature on political participation. I have tried to develop further some 
existing concepts and approaches, and adapt them to the question of old age 
participation. Most importantly, my findings stress the importance of sociological 
and psychological determinants of political participation in explaining the differences 
between younger and older people.
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The thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 2 is the literature review 
where I critically assess the existing literature with regard to my research question. In 
chapter 3, I put forward a theoretical framework of resources and incentives as 
conditions of political participation that can be empirically tested. In the 
methodological chapter 4 ,1 support the combination of several approaches: a large N 
cross-sectional analysis in many countries, single-country studies from a longitudinal 
perspective and a qualitative case study. Chapter 5 looks at all forms of political 
participation in 21 European countries in the European Social Survey 2002. I 
compare the group of 60+ with those 59 and younger, and argue for the focus on 
voting and non-institutionalised participation outside of organisations, having 
confirmed some other known findings, like the greater occurrence of party 
membership among older cohorts in some countries.
As chapter 6 shows, older people in Europe are more likely to vote because of 
a combination of psychological and sociological factors experienced through 
individual ageing. As we age, we habituate voting and become more deeply 
entangled in the social fabric of a liberal democracy. Thus, we are increasingly 
exposed to the social norm of voting and feel growing gratification from it. 
Furthermore, social factors like the duration of residence or the lack of living with a 
mobilising partner are the most important determinants for the difference between 
younger and older citizens. Political factors like politicisation or generational factors 
like educational differences do not play a major role.
In chapter 7, I focus on the content of the voting decision by looking at 
longitudinal data for party choice in Britain and West Germany. The findings suggest
2 Parts of this chapter were published as a journal article (Goerres forthcoming [2006]).
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that older people vote differently from younger people in terms of party choice. This 
difference depends on a complex interplay of the characteristics of the party system 
and a combination of generational and life cycle factors. In more de-aligned party 
systems, older people tend to vote for the incumbent party as a means to avert 
unforeseen changes. In more aligned systems, older people vote differently because 
of their generational membership: on average, their party choice mirrors the party 
fortunes of their young adulthood. Furthermore, in more proportional electoral 
systems, older people tend to vote more for established, large or governmental 
parties.
Chapter 8 presents an analysis of non-institutionalised participation in 
Europe. I find that some forms of participation outside of organisations, like 
contacting a politician, do not show any residual differences between age groups 
once all measurable differences between older and younger people are controlled for. 
By contrast, other forms, like signing a petition or protesting, show strong residual 
differences. This explanatory gap can be partially closed by measuring the old age 
culture of each country through various proxies in the form of public attitudes about 
motivations for helping older people: the more old age friendly a country is (i.e. the 
more the average citizen is willing to do something for older people), the more older 
people are likely to participate, ceteris paribus, and the smaller is the gap between 
older and younger people as to these forms of participation.
Chapter 9 is a further exploration of the experience of protest-related 
activities at old age. I use evidence from 22 interviews that I led with older English 
protesters who took part in the Council Tax protests in 2004/5. The findings suggest 
that the images and self-perceptions of both old age and the roles of older people are
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an important impact factor in the cost-benefit calculation that an older person 
conducts when deciding whether to participate.
In chapter 10, I conclude the dissertation by putting the findings in 
comparison with each other, discussing the limits of the investigation, suggesting 
avenues for future research and relating the findings to the broader debate about the 
implications of population ageing.
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2 Existing Research on Political Participation of Older 
People
This chapter gives a critical overview of those existing studies that put forward the 
elderly as a study group or give age as a substantive variable. Surprisingly little has 
been written in the area of senior political activism. As early as the 1970s, Neal 
Cutler (1977) demanded the opening of a new research agenda to study the elderly 
and politics: political gerontology. Especially in the USA, research into senior 
citizens found strong advocates among increasingly powerful old age interest groups, 
such as the American Association for Retired People. Demographic changes across 
the world, and in particular in Europe, have made Cutler’s demand for political 
science research into older people’s political behaviour even more pressing, because 
their influence on the political process, both in terms of its input and output, could be 
immense.
In general, we can detect three strands in the literature, all of which attempted 
it deficiently to explain political participation at old age comprehensively. (1) Some 
studies focus on the elderly and politics in a general sense, so that political behaviour 
is only studied as a side issue. These studies are often carried out by social 
gerontologists from an interdisciplinary point-of-view. Their discussions of older 
people’s political behaviour are mostly insufficient from a political science 
perspective. Findings are descriptive and not put into the context with political 
science frameworks and literature. (2) Political scientists have studied age (either as 
life cycle, ageing and/or generational aspects) as one influential factor of political 
behaviour. These approaches often lack a holistic view by not looking at a variety of 
modes of political participation. (3) A small but growing body of literature studies 
the elderly from a rigorous political science perspective. Problems mostly lie in their
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single-country focus on the USA or Canada. These analyses have not been carried 
out from a comparative point-of-view, let alone with a European focus.
2.1 Social gerontology and political participation
The gerontological strand sees politics as a wider aspect of society. The most 
prominent sociological theory about senior social participation suggests the 
‘disengagement thesis’. Seniors disengage themselves from society, so the thesis 
goes, once they leave the workforce as much as society retreats from its older 
members (Cumming and Henry 1961). Overall, the theory does not hold up to 
empirical tests in the political realm - mostly concerning voting participation, but 
also campaign activity (Glenn 1969; Rollenhagen 1982). Norval Glenn and Michael 
Grimes (1968) refined the disengagement theory. Becoming a senior, they argue, 
might be accompanied by selective withdrawal, i.e. senior citizens withdraw from 
some spheres of society and remain active in others, politics being among the latter.
Another sociological approach is continuity theory, which claims that seniors 
just continue doing what they learnt when they were younger (Atchley 1989; Tirrito 
2003: 123-4). Middle-aged and older individuals make ‘adaptive choices’ to maintain 
and preserve their personal psychological and social structures. They do so in order 
to support and reinforce their own self-image. This hypothesis has not been tested 
empirically with regard to political participation. This theory resembles the 
discussion within political science of lasting influence of political socialisation at 
youth, to which I shall return.
Social gerontologists take some interest in the development of old age interest
groups and their political power, especially in the USA, Britain and Canada (Gifford
1990; Pratt 1976, 1993; Vincent, Patterson, and Wale 2001). Social gerontologists,
however, have rarely researched mass political participation. The few attempts that
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do exist lack concise political science approaches (Kohli and Kiinemund 2001; 
Schaal 1984; Vincent 1999; Walker 1999). However, the work being done by social 
gerontologists is extremely important for our endeavour. This is because it provides 
us with theoretical hypotheses that are based on the influence of social ageing on 
political participation. Moreover, we can test these hypotheses in a rigorous political 
science framework.
2.2 Age as an independent variable
The second strand of literature is firmly embedded in political science. One can make 
a distinction between the study of political attitudes and values as antecedents of 
behaviour, and the study of single modes of political participation.
Generational value change
The only available long-term panel study (spanning 50 years) predicts that political- 
ideological attitudes are very stable through the ageing process, although they are far 
from monolithic. Attitudes acquired at a young age are usually maintained, although 
specific personal later experiences can change them (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 
1991). Thus, family experiences at a young age form us and crystallise over our life 
times, which has also been confirmed qualitatively in biographical studies (such as 
Thomas 1991).
Whereas the process of attitude formation seems to be the same for all 
cohorts, the content of early socialisation is not. One prominent body of writing 
emphasises long-term generational value change from materialism to 
postmaterialism: older people show a more materialist predisposition because they 
were socialised at times when basic material needs had not been satisfied (Abramson 
1989; Abramson and Inglehart 1987; Inglehart 1971, 1990). A recent study looks at
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the generational changes on the libertarian-authoritarian divide. Elderly Britons, the 
study claims, are more authoritarian because they were socialised before the elite- 
level libertarian change towards libertarianism in the 1970s (Tilley 2005). Different 
values might thus lead to different political interests and even different forms of 
preferred participation among older people today. Also, older people in the future 
might have values unlike older people today as they belong to another generation.
Party identification
Party identification is a major concept in the sociological and psychological school 
of voting research and has been refined and tested in numerous countries (Butler and 
Stokes 1983 [1974]; Campbell et al. 1960; Cassel 1999; Claggett 1981; Converse 1969, 
1976; Glenn and Heftier 1972; Gluchowski 1983; Markus 1983; Niemi et al. 1985). The 
bulk of the evidence suggests that we acquire the direction of party identification at a 
young age, most importantly through family influences. According to the Michigan 
School, the intensity of our party identification grows over our lifetimes because we 
perceive the political world through the schematic lenses of our identification, so that 
new information only reinforces this frame. Recent cohorts develop less strong party 
identification at a young age compared to precedent cohorts (possibly as a correlate 
of de-alignment). However, other studies that used panel data from various decades 
demonstrated that party identification of earlier generations might not have been as 
strong as had been suggested previously (Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley 2001). Thus, 
with respect to the intensity of party identification, older people as members of an
3 According to the alternative view of Morris P. Fiorina (1981), party identification is just the sum of 
past evaluations o f a given party that is updated at every election. This view, however, is less relevant 
for the differences between younger and older voters.
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older cohort might not have been that much different when they were young from 
younger people today.
Another hypothesis about age and party identification, which remains 
untested, can be derived from Samuel Barnes (1989). Older people are more inclined 
to vote for parties that are large and/or regularly part of government. These parties 
can leave a repetitious impression on ageing voters over their lifetimes by being 
members of government or the leading opposition (and the greater media coverage 
that goes along with it). As we age, we develop a stronger large-party bias. Smaller 
parties are consequently at a disadvantage among older voters because their 
sustainable legacy in ageing voters’ minds is less well established.
Overall, older people are different from younger people because (a) they have 
overall a stronger party identification that might favour large parties and (b) they 
might have been socialised in a party system that differed from the present one and 
distribution of party preferences among the elderly might thus be different from that 
of younger cohorts.
Conservatism
Growing conservatism with age (first put forward by Crittenden 1962; Glenn 1974)
is another prominent hypothesis that exists in three different variations: (1) voters
become economically more conservative as they age because they accumulate more
material goods that they want to preserve, i.e. older people want lower taxes
(Binstock and Quadagno 2001); alternatively, research on welfare benefits
(Campbell 2003b) would suggest that older people favour ‘big state’ policy positions
that they are likely to benefit from, i.e. older people want higher taxes that fund
welfare programmes for them; (2) older people favour the status quo, to which they
have adapted, because they want to minimise the insecurity of any changes
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(Williamson et al. 1982, ch.5). This could be the result of biological processes, such 
as the decay of brain tissue that leads to resistance to change and cautiousness (Glenn 
1974: 180); (3) older people become more authoritarian in their political attitudes 
(see Danigelis and Cutler 1991; Tilley 2005).
Campbell and Strate (1981: 591) looked at various definitions of 
conservatism and concluded that older US Americans ‘are very much in the 
mainstream of American opinion’ and not generally more conservative. Whereas the 
early findings of more pro-Republican voting in the 1960s were refuted as cohort 
effects in the 1970s (Campbell 1971; Cutler 1977), more recent empirical studies 
have used more elaborate statistical techniques to separate cohort and life cycle 
effects. These studies found small tendencies to favour the conservative Tories in 
Britain or the Christian-democrats in Germany on top of generational effects (Falter 
and Gehring 1998; Gehring 1994; Rattinger 1992; Tilley 2002, 2003). However, this 
effect was measured as being much smaller than generational variations. 
Furthermore, the effect is sensitive to research methodology used to overcome the 
statistical identification problem with age, period and cohort.4 In addition, favouring 
conservative parties does not reveal the reason for this preference, given that there 
are several contending notions about ageing and conservatism.
Older people might be more conservative in the sense that new ideas or 
values have not been part of their set of values that they have grown up with. If 
society has moved in some direction, the senior population might on average possess 
a different ideological position (Williamson et al. 1982: chap. 5). US evidence that 
seemed to show growing authoritarianism among older people was re-assessed as a
4 For example, cohort effects can always be due to an interaction between ageing and period effects; 
see chapter 4.
47
cohort effect, as the attitudes in these issue domains generally shifted towards the 
progressive side (Danigelis and Cutler 1991). James Tilley (2005) comes to a similar 
conclusion looking at British data.
Examples of elderly cohorts being more progressive in economic terms 
would be today’s Cuba where the elderly have been socialised in the early Cuban 
Revolution, and Sweden where younger cohorts are less enthusiastic about the 
Social-Democratic values that inspired their grandparents’ generation in the 1930s 
and 40s (Williamson et al. 1982:112-3).
Voting participation
Differences between age groups regarding actual political behaviour rather than
attitudinal predisposition have been most thoroughly investigated in relation to
voting participation. There are two recurrent themes. One is generational difference
in the inclination to vote. Cohorts that were affected by the lowering of the voting
age when they were young show a relatively lower turnout probability than precedent
or subsequent cohorts. The newly enfranchised group of 18-20 year olds at the time,
as with women in the first elections when they gained universal franchise, did not
vote with the same probability as the already enfranchised 21+ group. This lower
likelihood of voting is maintained in relative terms throughout the life course
(Franklin 2004). More generally speaking, socialisation at a young age has an
influence on the individual pre-disposition to vote. Mark Franklin’s research is
rigorously comparative across countries and gives strong evidence for this line of
reasoning. Today’s elderly can be more likely to vote because they did not share the
experience of the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18, which occurred in most
countries in the 1960s and affected cohorts that are younger than 60 today. This
point-of-view reflects some of the notions of the sociological continuity theory that I
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outlined above. It states that older people just continue doing what they learnt at a 
younger age. Further cohort explanations of turnout based on the same logic are 
referred to in the literature to explain overall decline of turnout, for example in 
Canada (Blais et al. 2004).
The second major explanation for differences between age groups in terms of 
turnout is life experience. The first to suggest the importance of life experience for 
voting participation was John Crittenden (1963) who undertook a cohort analysis of 
party identification and turnout, which had been suggested in The American Voter 
(Campbell et al. 1960). Raymond Wolfinger and Stephen Rosenstone (1980) 
established the finding of the higher likelihood of older voters to vote, once 
demographic variables have been controlled for, with US census data. They also 
found an interaction effect between age and education, which they explained with the 
function of life experience. Thus, not only does formal education impact on voting 
participation, but also the accumulation of life experience as one ages.
Other authors suggested that the accumulation of various resources like 
political knowledge over the lifetime increases the likelihood of voting (Jankowski 
2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Strate et al. 1989). Franklin (2004) also 
proposed the importance of habituation over the life time. The more often we vote, 
he claims, the higher the likelihood to do so next time. Older people go to the polls 
more often because they have more past experience than younger voters. The 
explanation of life experience, however, tends to be ad-hoc in nature in order to 
make sense of the recurring, robust empirical findings of a positive coefficient of 
age. The underlying causal mechanism for that coefficient has not yet been 
rigorously tested in the way the research design of the existing studies has been set 
up.
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Party choice
There are only a few descriptive studies that look at the voting behaviour of older 
people. These attempts were not able to make rigorous statements about the 
determinants of older voters’ behaviour, but just reported and described cross­
tabulated survey data (Burklin 1987; Stadie 1986; Vincent, Patterson, and Wale 
2001).
David Butler and Donald Stokes (1983 [1974]) showed that young people are 
susceptible to political forces during their impressionable years, i.e. when they first 
go and vote. The dominance of a party leaves its mark on the youngest cohort of new 
voters. Over the lifetime, this impression is strengthened through growing 
identification with that party (see the section on party identification above). These 
voters perceive all upcoming political events through the glasses of their party 
identification. Thus, at old age the cohort as a whole can potentially be different from 
younger cohorts that do not share the same socialisation experience. For example, 
Warren Miller and Merril Shanks (1996) demonstrated the pro-Democratic tendency 
among the American New Deal generation that was young in the early 1930s.
In more general terms, sociologists and historians speak about ‘political 
generations’, referring to a cohort that is collectively shaped due to a specific set of 
political experiences that separates them from preceding and subsequent cohorts. 
This school of research goes back to Karl Mannheim (1997 [1928]). Although the 
concept is not without its problems (Braungart and Braungart 1986; Spitzer 1973), 
the membership of a political generation can impact on electoral preferences. For 
example, David Butler and Donald Stokes (1983 [1974]: 232) identified the ‘pre- 
1885 cohort’, ‘pre-1900 cohort’, ‘pre-1918 cohort’, ‘inter-war cohort’, the ‘1945 
cohort’, the ‘1951-66 cohort’ and the ‘post-1966 cohort’ in their study of the British
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General elections of 1964-74 with regard to party preferences. Another generational 
hypothesis deriving from the value change that I described above demands that older 
cohorts are less inclined to vote for New Politics parties like the Green parties, 
because they represent postmaterialist values that are less common among 
generations bom before World War II (Inglehart 1990; Klein and Arzheimer 1997; 
Kohler 1998).
Richard Rose and Ian McAllister (1990) refined the Butler and Stokes model. 
In a hierarchical model, they added a series of lifetime experiences to early 
socialisation that shape voters’ loyalties to parties. They rejected the thesis that early 
socialisation is frozen in the voters’ minds by comparing different cohorts for 1964 
and 1987. However, they did not use multivariate regression techniques to control for 
annual swings. Annual swings could affect cohorts differently, as the political events 
and issues of each election might be more relevant for one cohort than for another. 
To some extent, the two authors combined the generational explanation with the 
process of life experience. According to them, older voters differ in their voting 
behaviour from younger voters in the extent to which they could build up an 
allegiance.
There have been some attempts to separate the generational experience of the 
cohort from life cycle changes with regard to party choice. It seems plausible that 
changes over the life cycle can change personal interest, which in turn can lead to a 
different party preference. Hans Rattinger (1994) analysed West German election 
ballots (1953-1990) for about 3-4 % of the population. The ballots were marked as to 
age group and gender. He found, for example, that ageing made male voters less 
likely to vote for the Christian-democrats until they were aged 35, but after that age 
chances of voting CDU increased again. This finding has been confirmed again with
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German election studies (Falter and Gehring 1998; Gehring 1994). However, 
Rattinger is only able to come up with some ad-hoc explanations for the life cycle 
difference. This inductive approach is not rooted deeply in any theoretically sound 
explanations and would need re-testing, which is difficult given the uniqueness of his 
data source.
Another life cycle hypothesis would be that smaller or non-governmental 
parties are less likely to be voted for among older people because ageing voters 
cannot as easily build up a party allegiance over the lifetime. This might be due to 
the fact that the media tend to report more about larger or governmental parties (see 
the section about party identification before).
Finally, it is interesting to note that there is no analysis of the choice for ‘grey 
parties’ yet, i.e. parties that are labelled and set up to appeal to senior citizens. These 
parties appear in many countries. Pensioners’ parties could represent the 
organisational attempt to campaign on older people’s interests. These parties should 
benefit from an ageing electorate if older voters vote for old age interests first.
Non-institutionalised participation outside of organisations
There has been almost no direct assessment of the differences between age groups 
regarding participation outside of institutions. Michael Delli Carpini (1986) looked at 
the impact of US American socialisation in the 1960s on a range of political attitudes 
and political participation. For participation outside of institutions, he found a 
generational, but no life cycle or ageing effects. A German study described the 
differences in preferences for various participatory modes (among which are the 
non-institutionalised ones) between age groups in the 1980s (Biirklin 1987: 118-19). 
It is young voters (younger than 35) who are described as preferring the participation 
outside of the established channels.
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In contrast, there has been some interest in some antecedents of non-electoral 
participation, such as political trust. These authors argued that there is a generational 
change in attitudes towards the institutions of representative government that could 
explain the differences between age groups in these attitudes. Relatively recent 
research looks at changes in the political processes, e.g. political support and trust 
(Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Assessing the consequences of the decline of the 
aggregate levels of support and trust in the last years, these authors analysed effects 
on political participation, such as protesting. Russell Dalton (2004) found some 
modest generational differences in the political trust in government. He evaluated 
four US American cohorts (pre-1910, 1910-29, 1930-49, post-1950) and found that 
there was an increase in trust in political institutions, followed by a decline. Thus, 
today older cohorts are more trustful then younger ones. He detected similar patterns 
for Australia, Britain, Canada, Finland and Germany. Since he also argued that less 
political trust can lead to more political protest, he implicitly presented a generational 
explanation for why older people today protest less.
Another generational explanation is societal modernisation that leads to both 
a change of political values toward postmaterialism, and new participation demands. 
New generations favour non-institutionalised over institutionalised participation 
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1995b; Topf 1995b, c). This hypothesis can be confirmed by 
looking at aggregate changes over time, but without looking at differences in age 
groups by controlling specifically for other variables. From this perspective, the 
elderly have consistently become more active in non-electoral participation over the 
last 30 years (Topf 1995b). Other authors spoke therefore of a ‘normalisation of 
protesters’:
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‘The protest level depends less on their age, gender.. .than on the context 
of the mobilisation’ (see also Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005; Van 
Aelst and Walgrave 2001: 481).
These generational explanations stand in juxtaposition to the earlier Political 
Action study. Its authors put forward a life cycle explanation for why younger people 
in their 1974 data were engaging more in non-institutionalised forms of participation:
‘Young people enjoy the physical vigor, the freedom from day-to-day 
responsibilities of career and family, and have the time to participate in 
the pursuit of the energetic kinds of political activity implied by high 
protest potential. Protest potential is therefore held to be primarily an 
outcome of the joie de vivre of youth itself’ (Barnes, Kaase, and others 
1979: 101).
The generational explanations imply that the elderly participate differently 
from younger people only because of generational differences that shrink over the 
decades. The life cycle explanation, in contrast, associates the intrinsic characteristics 
of younger people (like their elite-challenging predisposition and impatience) with 
their high protest potential. Older people are less active in protest activities, because 
they lack these traits.
Party membership
Accounts of party structures and organisations suggest that older people are more 
likely to be party members in a country when the young are not as attracted to the 
parties of the time. German parties were good at attracting young cohorts in the 
1970s and got worse in later decades. As a consequence, party members are more 
likely to be older in Germany today. Britain’s biggest parties were unsuccessful in 
attracting young cohorts since the Thatcher era (see Scarrow 1996; Seyd and 
Whiteley 1992: 32; Whiteley and Seyd 2002a; Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson 1994: 
43). Age group differences in party membership are the result of present or past 
fortunes of parties to attract voters. Young party members who once attracted to the 
party usually remain in it. Thus, party membership in most European countries (with
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the notable exception of Spain) declined over the last decades (see Mair and van 
Biezen 2001; Scarrow 2000) and led to a higher likelihood of older people being 
party members today.
The fortunes of parties can also go the other way. For example in Germany, 
the Netherlands and France, Green parties emerged at the beginning of the 1980s and 
attracted young party members, meaning that older people are less likely to be green 
party members today (Kitschelt 1990). Green parties often represent ‘new’ 
postmaterialist values. We can see this generational shift as a consequence of 
generational value change that I have already touched upon.
2.3 Comprehensive analyses of older people’s political behaviour
The last strand of the literature is the smallest of the three. It includes research that 
deals with older people’s political participation directly from a political science point 
of view. Richard Jennings and Gregory Markus (1988) analysed individual-level 
change of political participation with a three-wave panel study that covered 17 years 
of the later life span (starting at the age of parents whose children were at high 
school). Ageing individuals in their sample showed an overall decline in all 
participation other than voting. They compared changes within their panel with 
overall changes of the national population and found that two thirds of the changes 
are due to the historical circumstances of the times, and one third to ageing factors 
like the decline of internal political efficacy. The only form of political participation 
that remained constant over time was voting. They attribute this rigidity of voting to 
early habituation. This study is one of the few long-term panel studies. We cannot be 
sure, however, to what extent the findings are particular to the cohort and period 
Jennings and Marcus studied. In addition, the sample was biased towards the
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respondents with higher socio-economic status. Other long-term studies find the 
imprecision of the personal recall (Himmelweit, Humphreys, and Jaeger 1985).
Andrea Campbell (2003a; 2003b) analysed the political behaviour of 
recipients of social security in the US (state pension and old age health benefits) who 
are normally 65 and older. She found that threats to their welfare tradition can 
mobilise older people. Older people are mobilised into political participation of all 
kinds even if their socio-economic status does not give them the initial resources. 
However, she only took an interest in older people as welfare recipients, not as being 
different in age from other groups.
2.4 Summary
All in all, the three strands of literature provide us with a flurry of hypotheses and 
piecemeal evidence. There are four classes of explanation that recur: (1) long-term 
generational changes make the elderly different from younger cohorts e.g. with 
regard to postmaterialist values; (2) generational experiences at a young age, which 
can go up and down as far as participation levels are concerned, make cohorts 
different from earlier and later ones; (3) life cycle changes in attitudes and interests 
make older people different from younger people in their political behaviour; and (4) 
ageing gives the elderly life experience and time to habituate political behaviour to 
an extent that younger people do not share. The evidence is mixed, however, on all 
these accounts.
No study has yet tried to answer to what extent older people participate
differently from others in politics in an integrated analysis. In the introduction, I have
argued that demographic changes make it more and more important to analyse older
people’s political behaviour in comparison to other age groups. After all, this social
change could alter the political process itself and the political outcomes of it. I will
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now put forward a theoretical model for analysis that I will test in 21-22 European 
countries in a cross-sectional manner and in two European countries in a longitudinal 
one.
57
3 An Age-centred Model of Political Participation
This chapter presents a testable model to explain differences in political participation 
between age groups. For illustration purposes, I introduced the 75 year old Adam and 
the 35 year old Henrietta in chapter 1. Instead of trying to explain the entire political 
behaviours of Adam or Henrietta, we only ask why their behaviour is different 
because of their age difference. Thus, we will not take a particular interest in the fact 
that Henrietta might belong to an ethnic minority and Adam to the ethnic majority. 
This (socially constructed) difference could shape their political behaviour, but 
would not be a derivative of their age difference.
Firstly, I will start with basic assumptions about human nature and how it 
affects the origins of political preferences and decision-making. Secondly, I will 
present a general, resource-based model of political participation that is in the 
tradition of Verba and his colleagues (1995), and demonstrate how my model relates 
to other models of political participation. Thirdly, I will discuss in detail the four 
main age-related effects that I expect to play a role in political participation: political 
generation, shared social characteristic cohort, life cycle and individual ageing. 
Fourthly, I will merge my model with the four types of effects to create an age- 
centred model of political participation. Fifthly, I will further aggregate the model 
from the individual to the macro level to include explanations for between-country 
differences that are derived from the nature of the age-related effects. The final 
section six will then summarise the model’s hypotheses that will be tested in the 
empirical chapters.
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3.1 Assumptions about human nature
The research question asks to what extent and why older people participate 
differently from younger people in politics. A theoretical model to investigate this 
question must start at the level of the individual. An analysis of the ‘group’ of older 
people would be prone to failure because as Christine Day (1990) showed for the 
USA, older people are a very heterogeneous group with various potential division 
lines, such as class, race, gender and others. When looking at the level of the 
individual, we need some notion about the motivation of individuals to act politically 
and the characteristics of their decision-making process that leads to political action.
I will make four starting assumptions that I will discuss in detail: (1) 
individuals in post-industrial democracies have relative freedom to decide because 
their basic needs are satisfied; (2) individuals are motivated by personal material and 
expressive benefits; (3) individuals share political preferences because they are in the 
same social situation, i.e. preferences can be similarly structured across individuals 
because they are in the same social context. Individuals also share political 
preferences because they experienced similar political socialisation during early 
adulthood; (4) individuals make a cost-benefit calculation when deciding to commit a 
political action and when performing one; they are constraint therein by limited 
rationality. In other words, the assessment of a situation depends on cognitive short­
cuts to simplify complex reality.
This thesis has a limited scope because it concentrates on political individuals 
in a post-industrial (high levels of socio-economic development), liberal-democratic 
context and does not claim to infer about other contexts. Living in a post-industrial 
liberal democracy makes it -  generally speaking -  possible for individuals to take 
many decisions relatively freely compared to individuals in other regions of the
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world, or compared to individuals in other times in history. The room for individual 
political manoeuvre in such a context is comparatively large. This is not only due to 
the fact that political liberties are available, but also because more basic human 
needs5 like hunger and safety are by and large satisfied in post-industrial societies, 
meaning that a political action can follow the pursuit of other-than-survival needs. In 
non-democratic countries or in countries at other stages of socio-economic 
development, individuals are driven by the same desire to maximise their personal 
outcome. But this desire does not matter for politics because the scope of their 
decisions in politics is so small. For instance, a person working 14 hours a day to 
secure enough bread for her family is unlikely to have much choice concerning 
political participation, because the concerns for survival are more pressing than those 
regarding political activities. Although it would be possible to integrate constraints 
like this into the model, I prefer to limit the scope of my model to cover post­
industrial democracies only. Thus, individuals - on average - can be assumed to have 
a reasonable chance of a free decision that is not limited by the exigencies of 
everyday survival.
Within the context of relative personal freedom in political decision-making, 
I assume that citizens try to maximise their personal outcome according to their 
personal preferences. What can structure those preferences? The interests or 
motivations that are most easy to measure are material, like financial resources that 
are unequivocally grounded in egoistic selfishness. Most economic theorists reject as 
non-parsimonious the notion that we can be motivated by the pursuit of more general 
goods, like the expression of allegiance to the political system, or the expression of 
solidarity with a certain group involving no personal material gain. However,
5 See for the theory o f hierarchical needs (Maslow 1987).
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individual political participation is one area of political science where the ‘hard’ 
economic approach does not suffice. Pure material interests can, for example, neither 
explain the motivation to vote nor the motivation to protest (see Blais 2000; 
Dowding 2005; Green and Shapiro 1994: chap. 4; Opp 1996; Sanders et al. 2004). As 
Jon Elster (1990: 45) noted about the importance of non-selfish reasons to explain 
social behaviour and the inadequacy of the economic approach: ‘Sometimes the 
world is messy, and the most parsimonious explanation is wrong.’
Thus, I settle for a wider definition: individuals can be motivated by personal 
material interest as well as expressive benefits to take part in a political action. 
Expressive benefits include all those benefits that the individual gains from the 
process of participation. This can be the pleasure of participation, the feeling of 
doing the right thing or the personal satisfaction received from doing something in 
line with felt grievances regardless of the actual outcome (Chong 1991: 74-80). 
Expressive benefits are particularly important with regard to social norms that give 
individuals gratification from complying with a social standard in their social 
situation. Compliance with a social norm gives immediate expressive benefit, just by 
taking part in a socially desirable action.6
A third assumption is the origin of our political preferences, which sets this 
theoretical model further apart from economic theory. The economic approach
6 There might also be some long-term material benefits from compliance with social norms. For 
example, a local shop-keeper who visibly goes to the voting booth will have an interest in maintaining 
a good reputation as a political citizen because people who see him vote might be the customers of the 
next day. Dennis Chong (1991) calls this kind of political behaviour ‘socially instrumental’. For this 
dissertation, it is primarily o f relevance to allow for interests that are not selfish. The distinction 
between selfish and altruistic behaviour is an unsolved one (Mansbridge 1990a) and poses serious 
problems because very often selfish reasons and altruistic reasons are intermingled. If one is to 
disentangle the root o f the motivation within many social actions, both kinds o f motivation are often at 
hand at the same time. Also, altruistic behaviour tends not to be proven as such. Instead, researchers 
show empirically that an action is non-selfish by demonstrating that individuals act against their own 
material interest, so that the altruistic category is in danger o f being the left-over category o f narrowly 
defined self-interest (Mansbridge 1990b).
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usually cannot say anything or little about the nature of preference formation. They 
are assumed to be exogenous to the model. Gary Becker (1986: 110) wrote:
‘Since economists generally have little to contribute ... to the 
understanding of how preferences are formed, preferences are assumed 
not to change substantially over time, nor to be very different between 
wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in different societies 
and cultures.’
The existing literature on older people suggests that socialisation and its 
impact on preferences are important to explain differences between generations (see 
for example Vincent 2005). To exclude that process from the analysis would seem to 
be inadequate. We would disregard our prior knowledge about the topic. Besides 
sharing common human traits of decision-making and an incentive system that 
includes material as well as expressive benefits, groups of individuals can also share 
political interests. Individuals share certain political preferences because of two 
reasons. Firstly, they are in similar social situations. This is the idea behind 
sociological studies of party voting behaviour where, for example, voters of the same 
social class, reinforced by their political elites, will perceive their personal interest 
through the lenses of their social group membership (Butler and Stokes 1983 [1974]; 
Evans 1999). Someone’s social experience at time tm will shape the preferences (and 
the decisions) of that individual at the same point tm. In this context, political actors 
such as parties can play a crucial role in shaping individual political preferences (see 
Dunleavy 1991: chap. 5). It is, for example, very plausible that older people share 
political preferences due to their social situation of receiving state pensions, of care- 
giving or receiving (mostly to/from partners), or of grand-parenthood.
Secondly, individuals are not equally receptive at all times for their 
preferences to be shaped by their social situation. The political socialisation literature 
(Allen Renshon 1977; Dawson and Prewitt 1968; Hyman 1959; Jennings and Markus
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1984) suggests that we are much more open to be socialised when we are younger, 
i.e. about 15 to 30 years of age, than when we are older. Therefore, social situations 
at a younger age are important in giving us a first set of political preferences; the 
social experience at time t\ will still shape the individual’s preferences at point ti+n 
even if the nature of the social experience has changed between the two points in 
time.
As a consequence, at any point tm an individual can be under conflicting 
pressures. She might need to reconcile the earliest political preferences stimulated at 
time ti and the ‘ideal’ preferences of time tm. These latter preferences would have 
been stimulated by the hypothetical social experience solely at point tm (if the 
individual had been thrown into that situation without prior history). For example, 
someone from a rich family might grow up in a social situation where high income 
taxation is seen as a nuisance. This is because the members of that person’s social 
situation, family, friends, and colleagues, are likely to have high incomes and keep 
lamenting about the high income taxes that they pay. Let us assume that the 
individual internalises this policy preference, as the literature on early political 
socialisation proposes. However, the social situation of that individual can then 
change. Once retired for example, that person’s material benefits might be served 
better by high levels of free public services that are financed by high income 
taxation. This would be because that person will not pay (or pay much less) income 
tax and can benefit fully from free public services. Having been socialised into 
believing that high income taxation is bad, however, that person will need to come to 
terms with the conflicting pressures when she commits a political action. The 
individual takes into consideration whether she cares about some other individuals,
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like her children, who might be affected by the levels of taxation and give way to the 
pressures accordingly.
If there are no links between a person and individuals in other socio­
economic circumstances, the likelihood is higher that the person will develop 
political preferences that are a reflection of her personal, material considerations. An 
example of a situation where older people’s personal material interests prevail over 
altruistic concerns is US American high school spending, which is determined 
locally. US school districts with elderly populations that recently migrated to them, 
for instance in Florida, have less high school spending than districts with long­
standing elderly populations (Berkman and Plutzer 2004). This finding could be put 
down to the lack of local, intergenerational ties that are needed to create policy 
preferences in favour of young age groups.
The social situation can not only shape political preferences, but also 
influence an individual’s social identity. The current social situation can then create 
an awareness of other people being in the same social situation and other people not 
being in that social situation. If there is a common concept to unite individuals in the 
same social situation, they can share a social identity (see Hogg and Abrams 2003). 
Social categories of old age that could determine social identities could, for example, 
be pensioners, care-givers/care-receivers or old age itself.
The final assumption is that individuals make cost-benefit calculations in 
order to maximise their outcome according to their preferences. The individual 
perceives a certain scope of possible actions and chooses among those. Thereby, 
‘limited rationality’ (March 1986) restricts human beings. Individuals tend to 
simplify decision problems because of the difficulties of anticipating or considering
all alternatives and information. We do so via various cognitive short-cuts.
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We start by looking for familiarity. Thus, we look into our own past for 
experience. If we consider the new situation to be like one that we have already 
experienced and in which we have taken a decision that we still perceive to have 
been successful, we will take the same decision again. Cognitive psychologists 
successfully employ the concept of heuristics to explain how individuals can take a 
decision in a complex environment. One of the most important ones is the 
availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahnemann 1974). It postulates that a judgement 
on, for example, unknown proportions or frequencies is guided by the ease with 
which the individual can recall similar instances from her personal experience. Thus, 
experience plays an important role to deal with uncertainty. The easier the individual 
can retrieve instances from personal experience, the easier a decision under 
uncertainty can be taken. It is a robust empirical finding that prior knowledge 
facilitates the process of encoding the new information of the present situation, and 
thus makes a decision easier (Fischer and Johnson 1986: 63). If the search in our own 
experience in a political context does not give us any cues, we simplify the situation 
by further cognitive short-cuts: we get recommendations from sources we trust, or try 
to apply partisan and ideological schemata, i.e. reference systems that help us to 
process the new piece of information on the basis of organised prior knowledge (Lau 
2003).
This assumption about heuristics and the prior knowledge of the decision­
making process is relevant to this thesis: as I will show, older people rely 
systematically more on their past experience and on their recall as a heuristic short­
cut than younger people (Kennedy and Mather forthcoming). They are therefore in a 
position to discard irrelevant information more quickly through the use of 
experiential schema (Tentori et al. 2001). Summed up, older people find it easier to
65
come to a decision in the social world, all other things being equal, because they 
have a richer set of schema and personal experience to draw upon in order to deal 
with the complexity and uncertainty of the real world.
In sum, I assume that individuals in an advanced post-industrial democracy 
can act politically with a certain degree of freedom because their basic needs are 
satisfied. When doing so, individuals maximise their personal outcome according to 
their preferences. The benefits of political action that can be accumulated for the 
personal outcome can be material as well as expressive. Individuals can share 
preferences with other people in a similar social situation. Preferences at any point in 
time are a combination of ‘ideal’ preferences stipulated by the social situation of the 
time and earlier preferences. These can conflict with each other, so that individuals 
need to take other people’s personal outcomes into consideration. When taking the 
decision to act in the political sphere, individuals commit a cost-benefit analysis 
under the restriction of limited rationality, meaning that they look for cognitive short­
cuts, such as their own past experience, to deal with the complex, social reality. The 
following section will describe the next theoretical level, from the intrinsic dynamics 
of the individual to political participation in the outside world.
3.2 A modified resource-based perspective on political participation
Empirical studies of political participation usually try to generate new models that 
are better than previous ones. Testing rival models is desirable in order to assess the 
relative explanatory power of each. In statistical terms, the aim is to get an R2 that is 
as large as possible with as few degrees of freedom as possible, relative to other 
available models.
In contrast to empirical tests of general models of political participation, I
want to assess the relative differences of two groups, older people versus younger
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people, with regard to political participation. As I have shown in chapter 2, this has 
not been attempted in a comprehensive manner, so that a relative assessment of rival 
models is not a straightforward exercise. It seems therefore advisable to learn from 
the existing models of political participation in order to create a first full age-centred 
model of political participation. With that knowledge we can build a model that 
allows us to test how many of the various social and psychological differences 
between younger and older people impact on participation levels, which does not 
pose a technical problem due to a large data set. I will do so by starting from the 
Civic Voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), which is one of the 
most comprehensive models that has recently been put forward, and add some 
modifications to it. Alternatively, I could have set up a test of seemingly rival 
models. For example, I could have constructed a test of a ‘life cycle model’ that 
predicts that older people of all generations become similar versus a ‘generational 
model’ that predicts that all generations are similar, no matter what their current age 
is. However, prior evidence suggests that both models can explain part of reality and 
are not contradicting each other. Testing rival theories only makes sense if they are 
mutually exclusive in their underlying causal narrative. If we assume that causality 
means A increases the probability of B (Gerring 2005), both life cycle and 
generational models can be true at the same time.
There are only a limited number of general models of political participation. 
Most scholars reduce their interest to one political mode, most frequently voting 
participation (for example Franklin 1996, 2004; Franklin, van der Eijk, and 
Oppenhuis 1996; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and protest activities (for 
example Eisinger 1973; Marsh 1977; Opp 1989, 1992, 1996, 2004; Opp and Finkel 
2001; Sanders et al. 2004; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Historically, there are two
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schools of general models of political participation. The first school is based on the 
traditions of rational choice and collective action. Its scholars are pre-occupied with 
the collective action problem that political participants face. This problem was 
outlined by Mancur Olson (1971 [1965]) who argued that there is a high incentive 
for individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others to secure public goods. These 
researchers try to model the various types of incentives directly, rather than the social 
location or other personal characteristics of the participants (Finkel and Muller 1998; 
Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Liidemann 2001; see also Whiteley 1995).7 For 
example, Steven Finkel et al. (1998) made a distinction between selective benefits 
and collective interests. The former are benefits that are only accessible to those who 
participate, such as entertainment from political action. The latter are a combination 
of one’s individual interest in the goal of action and one’s perception of individual 
and collective efficacy.
The second school, the resource-based approach, is founded in work by 
Verba and colleagues. Each new model built upon earlier models of that tradition, 
incorporating most of their variables and adding new ones. The basic socio-economic 
status model (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) started from the 
postulation that one’s social position in society was a main determinant of one’s 
political attitudes and resources, and thus finally of one’s political behaviour. The 
Political Action Study (Barnes, Kaase, and others 1979), which was the first explicit 
comparative model including unconventional participation, added values, satisfaction 
and trust to the social location. The next step was to give explicit attention to group 
membership and its effect on resources and mobilisation. Also, scholars introduced
7 Steven Finkel and colleagues mainly test their models on protest activities, but the gist o f their 
models is that it should apply to any collective political action.
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explicit measures of the current context -  the current opportunity structures -  and the 
mobilising efforts of elites (Conway 1991; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992; Rosenstone 
and Hansen 1993). The importance of social networks, groups and trust is also 
stressed by social capital scholars (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1999; Putnam 2000; 
Teorell 2003) who hold that high levels of trust and involvement in social networks 
raises the levels of political participation. In contrast to the other resource-based 
models, the social capital approach has its primary focus on broader society rather 
than on the individual.
All these models of the second tradition share the assumption that political 
behaviour is not only defined by narrow instrumental and material interests, but also 
other kinds of non-selfish benefits. The Civic Voluntarism Model is the culmination 
point of this series of cumulative research in the area of political participation 
models. I have chosen the Civic Voluntarism Model as a starting point because it is a 
comprehensive model that tries to explain all kinds of political participation. The 
authors (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: chap. 2) used a definition of political 
participation that is very similar to the one that I apply in this thesis. With the 
assumptions in mind that I made on sources of motivation in 3.1, it would not have 
been advisable to start from a narrow rational choice model. However, I maintain 
some of the characteristics of the rational choice approach, such as the assumption of 
the cost-benefit calculations of the individual. Generally speaking, the latest findings 
on political participation suggest that an integrated approach of the two traditions can 
be a fruitful way forward (Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004; Sanders et al. 2004; 
Whiteley 1995; Whiteley and Seyd 2002b).
The Civic Voluntarism Model starts with the simple question of why citizens 
do not participate in politics. Verba et al. give three different answers: they cannot
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because they lack necessary resources, do not want to because they lack the 
psychological engagement in politics, or finally, because nobody asks, meaning that 
people are not in the networks that recruit people to participate in politics (Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman 1995: 271). Resources are reduced to only include time, skills 
and money, those resources that the authors perceive to be most open to 
measurement.
My theoretical model contains three modifications of the Civic Voluntarism 
Model. In this thesis, Verba et al.’s model would not suffice to explain the 
differences between age groups with regard to political participation. As the next 
chapter will show, it is low-intensity forms of participation, i.e. those that are 
characterised by low levels of necessary resources, where there are perceptible and 
systematic differences between age groups. Verba and colleagues started from the 
assumption that the broad universe of political action can be structured according to 
the necessary levels of resources. For example, party activism is much more 
demanding in terms of time and civic skills than voting is. However, the political 
activities that will be the main focus of the thesis (voting and non-institutionalised 
participation) do not differ a lot in the amount of necessary resources. One needs 
some degree of physical ability, little time and few skills to each. But the two forms 
of participation differ as to the kind of driving motivation. For voting, this motivation 
might lie in a sense of duty, expression of allegiance or habituation. For non- 
institutionalised participation, the motivation might lie in frustration with party 
politics or the desire to express oneself more individually compared to, for example, 
voting. Thus, it seems advisable -  as a first modification -  not to omit motivations 
from the model.
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A second modification of the Civic Voluntarism model is to give up the 
differentiation between motivation and resources, even though this differentiation 
makes sense from a social-psychological point-of-view. First one needs to be 
motivated to consider doing something, and then one makes one’s action contingent 
on the availability of necessary resources. But it is doubtful whether this sequence 
actually matters. The sequence can definitely not be empirically shown with cross- 
sectional data. Another point is the difficulty in typifying a certain social 
characteristic as resource or motivation. Take for example political interest. Political
o
interest is -  as intuition suggests -  a strong predictor of political behaviour. Is 
political interest a resource or motivation? It is certainly motivation because the 
higher one’s political interest, the more one knows the importance of political 
participation for a sustainable democratic political system. But also, the higher one’s 
political interest, the higher one’s (subjective) understanding of the political 
dynamics. Therefore, one finds it easier to vote or engage in non-institutionalised 
forms of participation as one can judge the consequences better. This makes political 
interest also part of one’s resources (and would fall into the category of skills 
according to Verba et al.).
As a third modification, I suggest maintaining the category of mobilisation to 
which I add opportunities. ‘Nobody asked’ a person to participate can be quite an 
important explanation for a lack of participation. Politics (and even more so 
participatory politics) has a low priority in most people’s lives. This is more 
important for non-institutionalised forms of participation because -  in contrast to 
voting -  the particular context can provide or not provide opportunities for
8 Political interest and participation are probably reinforcing each other rather than one causing the 
other. But this does not matter for my argument here.
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protesting, signing a petition and preparing a badge to wear. Summed up, it is 
meaningful for our task to differentiate between factors of participation that are 
resources and motivation on one side (intrinsic to the individual), and opportunities 
and mobilisation on the other (extrinsic to the individual).
So far, the model specifications have been general, and the model could still 
be used as a general framework to explain political participation. I will now 
introduce in depth four types of age-related effects on political behaviour that I will 
then merge with the general model.
3.3 Age-related effects on political behaviour
Why should an older person behave differently in politics from a younger person? It 
is helpful to see age differences in political behaviour as the sum of four different 
types of effects that can be found in various contexts in the social science literature.
(1) A ‘political generation effect’ stands for the political socialisation
experience of a certain generation at young adulthood; (2) the ‘shared social
characteristic cohort effect’ describes the social experience of a particular generation
that is due to macro social changes; (3) ‘life cycle effects’ stem from the insight that
our social life course can be separated into different sociological life stages; (4) the
‘individual ageing effect’ represents the accumulation of experiences, the habituation
of certain behaviour patterns throughout our lives and the growing compliance with
social norms. These four age-related effects are a refinement of the statistical effects
of age, cohort and period that are often used in the quantitative literature (see also
section 4.4 for a methodological discussion). A period effect is the impact of the
context during which a survey was conducted that affects all respondents. A cohort
effect is shared by a group of people bom during a certain period and comes up in
surveys at different points in time (either in panels or in repeated cross-sectional
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surveys). An age effect is shared by the group of people who are in the same age 
group. It can also be measured at different points in time. The age-cohort-period 
literature is rooted in disentangling a methodological problem of perfect 
multicollinearity between these three effects. My suggested four effects, in contrast, 
are conceptualised to capture certain causal chains rather than just dealing with 
statistical techniques. In terms of the terminology of age-cohort-period, my first two 
effects represent sub-types of cohort effects. My third and fourth effects belong to 
the group of age effects.
Political generation effects
A ‘political generation effect’ stems from the shared experience by a group that was 
bom during a certain period (Mannheim 1997 [1928]). Cohort membership is 
important because the early period of our adulthood is so decisive in terms of 
political socialisation. We are much more open to political influences between 15 
and 30 (the ‘impressionable years’) than between 50 and 65 (see Dawson and Prewitt 
1968; Hyman 1959; Sears and Levy 2003). This early political socialisation leaves an 
imprint in citizens’ heads as it shapes our early political preferences. Since 
socialisation influences stem from political circumstances at the time of young 
adulthood, such as differences between parties in catching first-time voters, political 
preferences differ between cohorts.
Allow me to remind you of the two exemplary citizens that I introduced in
chapter 1. One is 75 years old and called Adam, the other 35 years and called
Henrietta. The elderly Adam was bom in 1931 and experienced political socialisation
between about 1946 and 1961. The younger Henrietta was bom in 1971 and
socialised between 1986 and 2001. For example, with regard to street
demonstrations, a West German Adam would not have seen many of them during his
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early socialisation period. In contrast, a West German Henrietta would have heard 
about many street demonstrations in the media or maybe participated in some, such 
as the anti-nuclear, peace and other demonstrations in the last 1980s. These 
differences in early experience are engrained in the early preferences for political 
participation and likely to shape later behaviour.
Although political attitudes that are acquired in early political life are not 
monolithic, they are very stable over a lifespan (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991). 
These preferences can affect the content of political participation as much as the 
participatory mode. For example, citizens who experience a strong occurrence of 
protests at a young age, like the 1968 generation in some countries like West 
Germany, should be more participatory than other generations in later life. In Britain, 
citizens that came of political age during the Thatcher and Blair eras tended to be 
disenchanted with formal conventional politics and will carry part of this 
disenchantment through their lives (Clarke et al. 2004; Henn, Weinstein, and Wring 
2002; Russell, Johnston, and Pattie 1992).
Shared social characteristic cohort effects
The ‘shared social characteristic cohort effect’ stems from the varying probabilities 
that cohorts have of attaining a certain social characteristic. Whereas I introduce a 
new label for this age-related effect to separate it clearly from the others, the 
underlying notion is not new. For instance in research of long-term partisan de­
alignment (see for example Mueller 1999; Pappi and Mnich 1992), long-term social 
changes that affect generations differently are taken into account, such as de- 
unionisation, changes in class or educational composition of the population. These 
generational changes tend to go in one direction only when the period under
investigation is only a few decades. For example, after World War II there was -
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broadly speaking -  a decline, not an increase in religious practice in Western Europe. 
These effects are correlates of long-term social changes, such as economic 
development. The uni-directional development separates these effects from political 
generation effects, the influence of which can be different even between two 
decades. Political generation effects capture the effects of political history at youth 
rather than macro social changes.
Education is the most important case of a shared social characteristic cohort 
effect. The probability of Henrietta having finished secondary school is much higher 
than Adam’s because they grew up in different times: the elderly Adam grew up 
before the mass expansion of secondary and higher education. Higher formal 
education stimulate higher levels of political participation. Individuals tend to have a 
better understanding of the political process and live in social contexts in which 
participation is valued more strongly (Leighly 1995).
Life cycle effects
‘Life cycle effects’ on political behaviour derive from changes in our social situation 
over the life course. Each life cycle stage like youth, adolescence, middle and old age 
puts the individual into social contexts with rather different demands on them as 
individuals. The life cycle stages stand for certain societal roles the individual is 
taking, such as spouse, parent, employee, or retiree (Steckenrider and Cutler 1989). 
The notion of a social life cycle finds wide application in political science (Plutzer 
2002; Stoker and Jennings 1995) and other social sciences: in economics with regard 
to spending and saving patterns (Borsch-Supan and Stahl 1991) and in sociology 
with regard to well-being, gender experiences and other questions (Moen 1996; 
O'Rand 1996).
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Social roles associated with the life cycle are not the same for all individuals. 
Instead, the social experience carries a certain likelihood of being shaped by 
particular experiences. Therefore, these effects can only have a probabilistic 
character. For example, young adults struggle to succeed in their professional lives 
and are occupied with founding a family and securing their family’s income. Older 
people suffer from deteriorating health, have settled down in a certain area and do 
not need to support children anymore. These different social stages are contexts that 
create differences in political interests as much as in available resources to 
participate in politics. Health, for instance, deteriorates with age due to the combined 
effects of the accumulation of unhealthy lifestyles and the physical effects of ageing. 
Physical ability can be important for various forms of political participation. Political 
interests that vary across the life cycle could, for instance, be the demand for certain 
policy programmes. Parents with young children might have a stronger interest in 
schools and nurseries than parents with older children.
The social construction of the life cycle is much more stable across time than 
cohort effects. However, it is imaginable that across long periods of time, such as a 
century, changes in the stages of the social life course do occur. For instance, due to 
a steady increase in life expectancy and increasing usage of methods of birth control, 
child-bearing is nowadays often consciously restricted to a small number of years in 
advanced industrial societies.
Life cycle and cohort effects can also be confounded. Take income for 
example. Income is on average lower for all the elderly of different generations 
compared to younger age groups. This is due to the fact that pensions are always 
below average earnings -  a clear life cycle aspect. But at the same time, the income 
of the elderly goes up relative to earlier elderly cohorts because recent retirees have
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accumulated more wealth and higher pension entitlements during their lives. This 
allows them to benefit from higher income at old age -  a cohort aspect.
In the group of life cycle effects, it is important to consider that the stage of 
the life cycle can influence the social identity of the individual. Psychological studies 
of middle-aged to very old participants showed that there are systematic differences 
in what defines the self across the life course. For example, very old people, i.e. 85 
years and older, tend to describe themselves more homogenously via their external 
physical constraints. The young-old, i.e. 70-85 year olds with better health status, 
showed a more multi-faced description of their selves (Dittmann-Kohli 2005: 287). 
Those Individuals who describe themselves as old do so combined with a sense of 
loss in comparison to their reference groups, due to widowhood or ill health. 
Generally speaking, the age identity of a person is strongly linked to the social roles 
she fulfils at that given moment (Logan, Ward, and Spitze 1992).
Out of that social age identity, it is imaginable that a political age identity 
could develop. Senior age could be the fundament of a political group consciousness 
(Miller et al. 1981). A political age identity would be a special form of a life cycle 
effect because of its self-conscious nature. A senior person can actually perceive 
herself to belong to the group of the elderly and see shared senior interests as a 
common goal and motivating factor (e.g. senior education, pensions, social care). 
Senior interest groups are likely to play a role in stimulating this kind of political 
identity and consecutive political action. For example, older people who identify 
with the Gray Panthers in the USA are more likely to take group-related political 
action than those who do not (Simon et al. quoted in Huddy 2003: 526). A political 
identity based on old age or some sub-group of it would thus become a type of 
cognitive short-cut to assess politics. The cost-benefit calculation of whether and
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how to participate in politics would take into account the interest of other members 
of the group.
Our present day and age might be a time at which the elderly are more likely 
to identify with their fellow seniors. Old age might be more important to political 
identities in times of pension reforms, for this is when the group of the elderly as 
recipients of pensions has its greatest salience. During times of economic difficulty, 
attacks on economic benefits are likely to strengthen the group consciousness, which 
could be shown with regard to Social Security, the state pension after 65, and 
Medicare, free public health provisions after 65, in the USA (Day 1990: 39).
Individuals can be motivated by the fact that they are doing something for 
other members of the same group with whom they have a common bond of identity. 
A collective identity becomes politically relevant, for example in the context of 
social movements, if an antagonism between the social movement and another group 
develops. This happens under the condition that ‘collectively defined grievances that 
produce a “we” feeling and causal attributions that denote a “they” which is held 
responsible for the collective grievances are needed for transferring ingroup- 
outgroup dynamics into political conflict’ (Klandermans 1997: 41). For example, it is 
plausible to hypothesise that pensioners, as a sub-group of older people, might build 
up a common political identity by creating the image of the other ‘them’ as equalling 
the government that is not protecting their real income.
In contrast, there are also reasons to expect that senior age identity is not
strong enough to develop into a political identity. Old age identity is inherently
transitional in juxtaposition to, for instance, ethnic identities that are by and large
stable. After all, the most senior members of the old age category are naturally most
likely to die soon. Furthermore, group identification of old age is prone to cross-
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pressures from other identities like class, religion, ethnicity or gender. Since these 
other identities are much ‘older’ in terms of an individual life course, old age identity 
has to fight its way through the long-held identities:
‘Though an individual of a certain age is likely to associate intimately 
with people of the same age and be influenced by these associations, 
common age is not the focus of their relationship. It is not considered the 
reason for association, nor is there a sense of unity with unknown 
individuals of the same age in other parts of the country’ (Campbell et al.
1960: 473).
In sum, we can expect the position in the life cycle to play a role in the 
resources and motivation of individuals to act in politics. The position in the life 
cycle can lead the individual to have certain political interests linked to it, and can 
even create a political identity based on age that can be another motivating factor to 
participate in politics.
Individual ageing effect
As a final age-related effect of political behaviour, ‘individual ageing’ can entail two 
universal human mechanisms that can affect the likelihood of political participation: 
accumulation of past experience and growing adherence to social norms. First, past 
participation experiences influence the future probability of participation. It is widely 
acknowledged that the repetition of the same behaviour leads to an increasing 
probability of performing that behaviour again (see for a review Ajzen 2002). If you 
learn that something brings some kind of gratification to you that outweighs your 
costs, you will do it again. If something does not give you enough gratification, you 
will not do it again. Over a lifetime, our repertoire of situations that we know (and 
also believe we know) grows steadily. The older we are, the more likely we are to 
‘know the show’. Drawing on our own experience is one type of cognitive short-cut 
to deal with the constraints of limited rationality (see Lau 2003). Habituation in
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political behaviour has been studied with regard to voting participation (Franklin 
2004; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003).
Secondly, growing adherence to social norms as we age is the result of a 
complex transmission process between a social norm and our individual behaviour. 
A social norm affects us differently depending on our social context. At the level of 
the individual, we are motivated to behave in a certain way by our own subjective 
norm. The subjective norm is our perception of the social norm in our personal 
environment. This subjective norm is the sum of social pressure and gratification that 
we expect to receive from people who we know (Ajzen 1991; Ajzen and Fishbein 
1980; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Thus, it plays an integral part in any individual’s 
cost-benefit calculation regarding political action. The social gratification that one 
receives for doing something increases the benefit of one’s action.
Empirical studies of tax compliance show a positive relationship between age 
and tax compliance, i.e. the older an individual is, the more likely she is to pay taxes 
regularly (Mason and Calvin 1978; Tittle 1980; Wenzel 2002). Tax compliance is 
often seen as an example of individual behaviour being driven by social norms rather 
than self-interest. This is because the risk of being detected is minimal and the 
personal gain from cheating is immense. However, this systematic finding has not 
yet been translated into studies of political behaviour.
Since voting is a widespread social norm in a liberal democracy, many people 
are likely to subscribe to the view that we ought to vote. As we age, the more we 
become part of a society through widening social networks, interactions and social 
role-taking, and the higher the number of people is in our environment whom we 
believe to hold that view. As we get older, we can count more people who we think 
might want us to vote.
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This is, of course, a probabilistic statement. It is possible to live in a social 
context where few people vote, meaning that one cannot see anyone go to the booth 
or feel social gratification by voting and then talking about it (although one would 
still be exposed to the voting norm in the media). However, as we age, we are 
unlikely to feel increasing social pressure not to vote. Non-voters do not care about 
voting. They do not hold that we ought not to vote. In other words, getting older in 
such a social context implies getting to know a growing number of people who do 
not care about voting and some people who do maintain that voting is desirable. Thus 
over a lifetime, the subjective norm to vote is likely to increase even in these extreme 
circumstances because the non-voters in this environment will not affect our 
subjective norm, whereas the few voters will.
In summary, I differentiate between four different types of age-related effects 
that influence political behaviour and that I will test in the empirical chapters. The 
political generation effect makes older people different from younger people as their 
political preferences were shaped in a certain historical context that varied from what 
younger people experienced. The shared social characteristic cohort effect gives 
credit to the fact that cohorts attain social characteristics that are important for 
political participation with varying probabilities. These probabilities differ due to 
macro social changes, such as the expansion of mass education. The life cycle effect 
stems from differences in interests, identities, motivation and resources over the 
social life cycle. The individual ageing effect is grounded on two psychological 
processes: the older individuals are, the more they habituate social behaviour, and the 
more they are likely to adhere to social norms.
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3.4 The development o f an age-centred model o f political 
participation
We can now bring together the general conceptualisation of age-related effects on 
political behaviour and our adapted resource-based model of political participation to 
design an age-centred model of political participation (see figure 3-1). In order to 
remain accessible, this synthesis will not yet look at differences between countries -  
I will discuss them in the next section.
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Figure 3-1: Age-centred model of political participation
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The graph contains two major elements. The black boxes and causal arrows 
represent a general model of political participation that is independent from the age- 
specific research questions and results from my explanations in section 3.2. 
Individuals have political preferences at any point in time. These preferences are a 
result of their early political socialisation and the social situation they find 
themselves in. When considering an act of political participation, individuals 
maximise their personal outcome that can be constituted of material and expressive 
benefits. During this maximisation process, they are restricted by their limited 
rationality, which prevents them from comparing all possible outcomes. The 
experienced outcome of a decision to participate feeds back into the next decision­
making process where it can serve as a heuristic short-cut for the individual. The 
decision on the form and content of political participation is contingent on a set of 
intrinsic factors (resources and motivation) and extrinsic factors (opportunities and 
mobilisation).
The annotations with intermittent lines demonstrate where the four different 
age-related effects come into the model that I explained in section 3.3. They are part 
of the general model of political participation. I have indicated some examples for 
illustration.
Political generation: older people normally9 belong to a different political 
generation than younger people. This has an effect on their preferences for the range 
of participatory activities that they perceive to be subjectively available. Although 
older people are free to protest in the street, they are less inclined to do so as it was 
not common during their impressionable years. As political generations share a
9 It is theoretically conceivable that one political generation stretches over 40 years or so, so that older 
and younger people belong to the same political generation.
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certain pool of political experiences, they are likely to share some political 
preferences. These political preferences could make their participation content 
different from younger people. For example in West Germany, the generation that 
was young during the Social-Democratic era of Willi Brandt (1969-1974) and 
Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) should be distinctly more pro-SPD than its preceding 
generation. This is because the party managed to catch the young electors of the time 
after decades of CDU/CSU dominance.
Shared social characteristic cohort: a cohort shares the average probability of 
attaining a certain social characteristic that is higher or lower for other generations. 
For instance, more recent cohorts have a higher likelihood to be postmaterialist as 
they grew up during times of economic prosperity. This has an effect on their 
motivation to participate as self-fulfilment ranks higher in their personal value 
system. Also, the content of participation is affected. For example, caring for the 
environment is more widespread among postmaterialists. Mobilisation factors also 
vary between cohorts. For example, membership of trade unions or political parties is 
more common among older cohorts in some countries, such as Britain. This is due to 
a decrease of the fortunes of these organisations among members of more recent 
cohorts.
Life cycle: older people are at a different stage of their social life cycle, which 
influences their resources/motivation and their mobilisation/opportunities. For 
example, decreasing physical fitness lowers the available resources of individuals to 
participate in politics. Decline in social networks due to dying friends and the lack of 
replacement with new acquaintances (Wagner, Schiitze, and Lang 1999) leads to 
individuals having less mobilisation to participate by friends in various networks. 
The life cycle also shapes our preferences due to specific interests associated with a
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certain life cycle stage. An example of an issue of relevance to pensioners would be 
the Council Tax in Britain. It is a local property tax that weighs heavily on those 
pensioners with a small fixed income living in expensive properties.
Individual ageing: this complex learning process affects future decisions to 
participate as more experience means lesser costs to do something. It also influences 
the decision as to which mode of participation to take, as the experience can teach us 
to do or not to do something again (effect I). In addition, it also makes older people 
more likely to adhere to social norms. This is because the expressive benefit they 
gain is higher due to the fact that they are more strongly connected to that society 
through networks, social roles and experience (effect II). Before I summarise the 
testable hypotheses of this model, I will discuss the implications of the model for 
inter-country variations.
3.5 The model-implicit expectations for variations between European 
countries
So far we have only looked at differences between seniors and younger age groups at 
the individual level. However, depending on the nature of the age-related effects, we 
can expect differences between countries to play a role. The four types of age-related 
effects differ in their level of universality (see figure 3-2). Empirically, we can use 
some of the variations between countries as additional independent variables to 
explain differences between age groups in individual countries. I will discuss the 
operationalisation of this notion in chapter 4, which covers methods.
Political generation effects are due to varying period effects when a cohort is 
impressionable in early adulthood. These effects are strongly shaped by the political 
history that a cohort experiences. There are a few historical events and processes that 
can potentially determine generational experiences at a young age across national
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borders, and which have an effect on the decision to participate and which create 
similar lasting influences at a later age. Examples might be the experience of the 
World Wars or the fall of totalitarian regimes. For instance, the experience of a 
totalitarian system with its lack of participatory opportunities at young adulthood 
influences attitudes towards participation in later life. To that extent, the participatory 
predisposition of a Polish older person should he similar to that of a Slovenian older 
person. By and large, however, political generation effects should vary between 
countries and should be due to national circumstances. This is especially true with 
regard to electoral preferences, as the experience of parties is national in character.
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Figure 3-2: Different types of age-related effects and their level of universality
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If cohorts differ in the probability of attaining a certain social characteristic, this 
difference is largely due to broad societal processes that tend to go in one direction (in 
the periods under study) only. For example, many sociologists such as Bryan Wilson 
(1966) claim that socio-economic development and declining religiosity are correlates of 
modernisation. Older cohorts are more likely to have lower degrees of formal education 
and be more religious. The differences between cohorts can vary across countries, but is 
likely to be qualitatively similar between countries, because European societies follow 
comparable socio-economic trajectories. For example, die difference in religiosity 
between older and younger age groups is larger in Spain than in Germany. This is 
because in Spain the older generations are strongly religious and younger generations 
less so whereas in Germany, there is only a modest generational difference, because 
older generations are already less religious than their fellow generational members in 
Spain.
Life cycle effects depend on the cultural perception of the life course. This 
perception is very similar across Europe. Thus, the social demands and expectations, 
resources and identities vary similarly across the life cycle. So if life cycle factors play a 
role in political participation, they should do so in a similar way across Europe. This is 
not to say that there are no differences between European countries as to the social 
position of older people. Indeed, one of the findings will be that there are differences in 
the ‘old age culture’ of a country, which determine the activity levels of older people. 
But overall the social projection of the life cycle is similar across Europe.
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Individual ageing is the sum of accumulating life experience as well as the 
habituation of certain patterns of political behaviour. These two are genuinely human 
processes that should be the same in all countries regardless of cultural context.
3,6 Hypotheses
This section summarises the main hypotheses that we can derive from the theoretical 
framework in this chapter and the findings in the literature in chapter 2. It spells them 
out in specific terms that will be tested in the empirical chapters with evidence from 21 
European countries in 2002, Britain and West Germany across the post-war era and 
further explored in interviews that I led in 2005 with English Council Tax protesters.
Political generation hypotheses
HI: Older people are more likely to direct their organisational engagement towards 
political parties and are less likely to direct it towards single-issue organisations than 
younger people.
H2: Older cohorts are less likely to commit non-institutionalised forms o f participation 
than more recent cohorts.
H3: The lack of experience o f a free, liberal democracy at young adulthood decreases 
the likelihood o f non-institutionalised participation.
If political socialisation at young adulthood matters for citizens’ attitudes and behaviour 
in later life, older people should show a pattern of political behaviour that is different 
from more recent cohorts. This pattern should also be to some degree predictable from
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the knowledge of the political history of the country during the period when they were 
young adults.
The composition of the participatory process has changed in the last few decades 
in Western Europe. Conventional forms of organisational participation, such as through 
parties and trade unions, has declined in favour of a rise in single-issue activities and 
social movements (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999, 2002). If socialisation at young adulthood 
matters to determine the repository of political actions, the composition of repository 
should vary between cohorts. Older people -  as members of older generations -  should 
still mirror the ‘fashion’ of political, organisational engagement of the times when they 
were young adults and most open to political impressions. Younger adults develop not 
only political preferences with regard to political issues, but also with regard to the 
feasible trajectories of political participation. Thus, older generations in most European 
democracies should prefer parties over other organisations and have a lesser interest in 
using non-institutionalised forms of participation, compared to younger generations. In 
addition, in recently democratised countries, the lack of experience of other than voting 
activities should make older citizens less likely to participate in other than voting 
activities.
H4: Older people belong to a cohort that shares party preferences that are stable across 
time.
Party fortunes vary across time. If a party is particularly successful during a certain
period, it predominantly captures the young voters of the time. If voters are more
susceptible to developing their party preferences at young adulthood and maintain these,
various electoral political generations must be detectable. An older voter therefore
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differs from the younger as to her membership to another ‘electoral’ political generation. 
As much as political history is uneven, so is the sequence of political generations that 
shared a common electoral socialisation experience. These cohorts are likely to be of 
unequal size. Drawing from knowledge about the historical-political circumstances, 
party fortunes and election results during the early elections in the life of a cohort, one 
can make predictions about the attraction of a particular party to a specific cohort 
relative to the preceding cohort. For example, in 1969 the German government 
leadership changed from the Christian-Democrats to the Social-Democrats who 
introduced a flurry of new policy ideas that historians said influenced the young 
generation of the time. Thus, the political generation that first went to the polls in 1969 
and subsequently can be expected to be more pro-SPD than the cohort who first voted 
under the Christian-Democrat Konrad Adenauer. I will present the detailed predictions 
of the proposition H4 in chapter 7.
Shared social characteristic cohort and life cycle hypothesis
H5: Older people differ on predictors o f political participation from younger people. 
They are less endowed with or less likely to have: education, religiosity, postmaterialist 
attitudes, income, trade union membership, a bigger town/city to live in, number o f 
children living in the same household, (self-)employment, health, political efficacy, 
social networks, living with partner.
They are more endowed with or more likely to have: duration o f residence, pension as a
main source o f income, political trust, political satisfaction, general satisfaction, right-
lenience (not in post-communist countries), party identification, party membership,
sense o f duty to vote, political interest, usage ofpolitical information.
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The theoretical framework portrays political participation as an action based on an 
assessment of intrinsic factors (resources and motivation) and extrinsic factors 
(mobilisation and opportunities). Older people differ systematically on a whole range of 
these factors that are rooted in life cycle and/or cohort differences. It would be desirable 
not only to check cross-sectional relationships, but also to follow cohorts through time. I 
am unable to do so due to limitations in my primary data. However, I will make use of a 
large pool of secondary sources to categorise the effects as cohort or life cycle effects.
If predictors of participation vary between cohorts, older people can have 
different participatory levels as members of a different cohort. Mostly, these social 
characteristics make older cohorts less likely to participate. For instance, nowadays 
lower levels of formal education give older cohorts less resources to understand the 
political process. Since the underlying process is similar across countries, we should see 
similar differences between the participatory levels of age groups.
If predictors of participation in politics vary along the social life cycle, so will 
the participatory levels of the average senior citizen in comparison to younger people. 
For example, older people are on average less physically able than younger people due 
to the accumulation of unhealthy life styles and physical ageing. There are other 
examples that work in contrast to this. For example, the longer a person has lived in a 
certain area, the higher her motivation to participate in politics. This is because she 
possesses more knowledge of local issues that are of political relevance. I will describe 
the theoretical justification for each predictor in chapters 6 and 8.
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Shared social characteristic cohort hypothesis
H6: Older voters have a different endowment o f social characteristics that are 
predictors o f party choice. In West Germany, they are less well educated and more 
religious. Thus, they are less likely to vote for the FDP and the Greens than younger 
voters.
In party systems in which the social characteristic of voters define their voting decision, 
a decline or rise in the availability of social characteristics across cohorts can make older 
cohorts differ in their party choice. The socialisation effects of that cohort characteristic 
will have a lasting influence. The decline in religiosity and rise in education favours the 
FDP and Greens in West Germany. This is because these social characteristics 
summarise a particular socialisation into a party preference, often conveyed through 
parents (see Butler and Stokes 1983 [1974]). This prediction is different from the 
socialisation experience in political generations that is due to the historical ups and 
downs in party fortunes.10 The CDU/CSU and SPD cannot be expected to benefit or 
suffer unambiguously from the change in social composition because a decline in 
religiosity is conducive whereas the rise in education is disadvantageous for the SPD 
vote (and vice versa for the CDU/CSU vote).
Life cycle hypotheses
H7: Senior parties become successful in countries with growing proportions o f older 
people.
10 I will not test the analogous implication for Britain. There, a stronger process of de-alignment than in 
West Germany accompanied the rise in education, so that education as one proxy for class became a less 
strong predictor for party choice in general. Thus, the different social composition of older cohorts 
mattered less. Also, the British data is not as suitable for over-time comparisons due to the limited 
equivalence of variables.
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If older people define their political preferences through their old age, they should vote 
for parties that explicitly represent these interests. I will look at the fortunes of senior 
parties across Europe that define themselves as representing old age interests.
Competing hypotheses
H8a: Economic conservatism - Older people are more likely to vote for the most 
economically conservative party. Older people are less likely to vote for the least 
economically conservative party.
H8b: Pro-state-spending - Older people are more likely to vote for the least 
economically conservative party. Older people are less likely to vote for the most 
economically conservative party.
The social situation puts pressure on the individual to change her policy preferences in 
such a way that the material interests of that individual are best served. But what are 
these material interests on average among older people? There are two conflicting 
notions in the literature. One says that older people have more to preserve and thus want 
to give less to the state. They should support parties that favour a lean state with little 
taxes. The other says that older people want as many free public services as possible, 
and thus a strong state that raises a lot of tax money and diverts it towards them. As 
parties can be ordered along a spectrum, the most extremely positioned parties at both 
ends should make preferences by older people visible. For example, if older voters vote 
in a way that is more economically conservative than younger voters, the most 
economically conservative party should have an edge among older voters and be less 
popular among younger voters.
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H9: Older people are more likely to vote for the incumbent
One of the psychological changes across the life cycle is a growing concern for security 
or a growing aversion towards risk (Deakin et al. 2004; Williamson et al. 1982). Older 
people become conservative in their being reluctant to change. By voting for the 
incumbent, an older voter can minimise the impact of potential unforeseen changes. 
When voting for the incumbent, they can easily use their assessment of the incumbent’s 
performance. If they vote for the challengers, they can just rely on the projected 
performance of the challenger. Parties in government also have an incentive to obfuscate 
the costs of policies that they want to implement in order to lose as few votes as possible 
and gain as much resources from specialised interests as possible (Magee, Brock, and 
Young 1989). If older people have a higher preference for less insecurity, they should 
find it easier to vote for the incumbent.
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Individual ageing hypotheses
Habituation
H10: Ceteris paribus, older people are more likely to vote than younger people. In the 
cross-sectional analysis with pooled data from all European countries, the residual 
variation between age groups (from young to old) follows a concave curve in contrast to 
the single country analyses.
Older people find voting easier due to their past experience of voting and politics. The 
methodological idea behind this hypothesis is that cross-sectional data can be ‘cleaned’ 
of political generation effects if the data comes from countries that are very different in 
their political history. This means that political generation effects will cancel each other 
out. The habituation effect should be visible in a pooled analysis as a smooth learning 
curve because all country-specific distortion will be taken out and only the universal 
ageing effect will be present. In a single-country analysis, the ageing effect will, in 
contrast, continue being tinged by political generation effects.
HI 1: Older voters are more likely to vote for larger parties or smaller parties that are 
regularly part o f government.
Older people accumulate deeper party schema about larger parties. Larger parties and 
smaller parties that are regularly part of the government have more influence on the 
public through the media and leave more of an impact on electors’ minds. As individuals 
update their partisan schemas at every election, these repetitious impressions lead to 
more detailed schemas of these kinds of parties among older voters. For younger voters,
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in contrast, the party schemas are less distorted in favour of larger parties due to the lack 
of accumulative experience of this bias in the public sphere.
Compliance with social norms
HI2a: The higher the average turnout in a country, the smaller the gap is between the 
voting probability o f older and younger people, ceteris paribus.
H12b: The higher the formal education and expressed sense o f duty to vote, the smaller 
the gap is between the voting probability o f older and younger people, ceteris paribus.
HI 2c: Among citizens with high education and low sense o f duty to vote, older people do 
not have a higher voting probability than younger people, ceteris paribus.
If a certain form of political participation is an established social norm, older people are 
more likely to use it because their own bond with that society is stronger than that of 
younger people. Older people are on average more exposed to the social norms of the 
society than younger people, as they have taken more social roles in that society (e.g. 
employee, parent, uncle/aunt, neighbour etc) with these roles meaning exposure to a 
given set of expectations. Thus, they have a larger social gratification to gain from 
complying with that social norm than younger people. The average turnout in a country 
is a proxy for the strength of that voting norm. If such a norm is high, younger voters 
already have a high incentive to comply with it. Thus, there is little to gain in terms of 
increasing voting participation across the lifetime. Also, formal education raises the 
level of cognitive engagement for politics (Dalton 2002). Political information can be 
processed more easily by the more educated, and more educated citizens are generally 
more aware and critical of political events. If voters express a high level of a personal,
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subjective norm to vote and are also cognitively engaged, there should be no effect from 
growing older as the level of compliance is already very high. However, if the expressed 
norm is low and individuals are also cognitively engaged, there should be no systematic 
relationship between age and voting participation because the individuals know what 
voting is about and have a low sense of the social norm. This means that growing 
entanglement with society through ageing should not have an effect.
From a methodological point-of-view, it would be desirable to make predictions 
about the relative strength of each hypothesis. As the model is set up in probabilistic 
rather than deterministic terms, some of the hypotheses could be equally true in the 
sense that they change the probabilities of committing a political action. For example, 
the life cycle and generational predictions about party choice could be equally true in 
terms of changing the probability of voting for a particular party. Unfortunately, I am 
not able to make these predictions from the theory because most of the predicted effects 
are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. Therefore, it could be that all effects 
are equally important. It is one of the contributions of this thesis to make a first estimate 
as to the relative importance of each perspective, but strictly methodologically speaking 
these judgements about relative power are exploratory.
Assessing the model
When would the model not be a good description of reality? I tried to present a set of 
hypotheses that are falsifiable. I did so under the assumption that a general age-centred 
model of political participation to explain differences between age groups in advanced
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industrial democracies is possible. However, since I do not engage in a comparison of 
rival models, I need to be able to assess the model that I put forward.
There are two general aspects of the model open to falsifiability that stem from 
the fact that I am comparing two social groups in terms of their political behaviour. To 
illustrate the point, one can say that my hypothesised effects have two causal arrows. 
First, there is a causal relationship for the correlation of a particular characteristic 
between age groups. Then, there is a second causal relationship between that 
characteristic and political participation. The model would need alteration if any one of 
these arrows did not withstand empirical testing.
I would be wrong (a) if predictors of political participation (preferences, 
resources/motivation or opportunities/mobilisation exposure) do not vary between age 
groups as the theory predicts. For example, I expected higher levels of political trust in 
conventional political institutions among older cohorts, a strong negative predictor of 
protest behaviour. The theory predicts that early socialisation determines political 
preferences that are stable into later life and can only be altered by experiences of social 
situations that are a correlate of a person’s age. I will, however, find no systematic 
variations between age groups as to political trust. Thus, the cohort variation that is part 
of the model expectations could not be demonstrated with empirical evidence.
I would be wrong (b) if a theoretically predicted impact factor of political 
participation that varies between age groups is not systematically related with political 
participation. For example, co-habiting with a partner does not have a mobilising effect 
for non-institutionalised forms of participation -  an effect that I had been expecting.
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More generally, the model would be wrong if one kind of age-related effects did 
not matter altogether, e.g. if cohort differences had no or only a negligible impact, but 
life cycle and individual ageing effects would have. Cohort effects are rooted in 
differences in socialisation as young adults. If they did not matter, socialisation would 
not play a role in explaining differences in political behaviour between age groups. The 
differences between age groups would only lie in sociological and psychological 
processes associated with the social life cycle and individual ageing. Along the same 
lines, the model would also be a bad description of reality if no life cycle or individual 
ageing effects mattered.
Generally speaking, all four kinds of age-related effects play a vital role in 
explaining reality. As I will demonstrate, the model needs to be refined with regard to 
the macro context. The structural macro context seems to determine under which 
circumstances generational or life cycle effects are more important for party choice. I 
also find some predictors of political participation to be irrelevant, so they can be 
omitted in a new model.
3.7 Summary
I assume that human beings try to maximise their personal outcome, which consists of
benefits that can be personal material as well as expressive. In advanced post-industrial
democracies, high welfare standards and relatively high standards of living allow
citizens to experience a certain degree of freedom to be active or inactive in politics
because their basic needs are satisfied. Political preferences are the same across
individuals because they are in a similar social situation, or because they have
experienced similar, early political socialisation that has a sustainable impact in later
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life. Individuals make a cost-benefit calculation during which they can only make use of 
limited rationality and will resort to cognitive short-cuts to deal with complex political 
reality.
Political participation is an action based on a decision on the mode and content 
of that action. Individuals consider the motivation and resources they have, and the 
mobilisation and opportunities factors they face, in order to make the cost-benefit 
calculation. Older people can be different from younger people (a) because they belong 
to a different political generation that has got collectively differently shaped political 
preferences. These preferences can affect the choice and content of political 
participation, (b) because they have a different set of resources/motivation and 
mobilisation/opportunities compared to younger people. These differences arise from the 
social circumstances of the stage of the life cycle or the varying degrees of exposure to 
certain social characteristics across cohorts, (c) because older people have more 
participatory experience to go back to and are more likely to adhere to social norms. 
This is because older people are more deeply embedded in the social context that holds 
these norms.
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4 Research Methods
In the empirical analysis, I will use a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. This chapter presents the general methodological approach and the strengths 
and weaknesses of the methods. Firstly, I will review the problems with and the 
methodological demands of studying age-related effects. Secondly, I will discuss the 
reasons for doing a comparative study of contemporary European democracies (section
4.2), and choosing Great Britain and West Germany for a longitudinal analysis (section
4.3). Thirdly, I will review the details of the quantitative (section 4.4) and qualitative 
methods (section 4.5).
4.1 Research design in the absence o f ‘ideal9 data
The empirical investigation into the differences of political behaviour between age 
groups is hampered by the lack of well-suited data. In an ideal world, the researcher 
should have access to long-term panel data that covers at least two decades. This kind of 
panel data could ensure that the long-term effects of ageing on the individual level, such 
as the hypothesised impact of habituation, could be directly measured, because we could 
follow the intra-individual change over time. Unfortunately, there is almost no panel 
data like this available. To my knowledge, there are the British Household Panel Study 
(15 years) and the West German Socio-Economic Panel (20 years). But both cover 
relatively few acts of political participation. It would also be necessary not only to have 
one long-term panel study, but also several of them in different countries and during 
different periods. This would ensure that measured ageing effects are not due to an 
interaction between cohort and period effects. The ageing effects should be similar in all
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panel studies if they are grounded on psychological processes. The effects of ageing that 
are measured in one panel survey could be idiosyncratic to the cohorts that are being 
followed through time and the specific period effects of the time. For example, if I had 
data for someone bom in 1920 that was collected in 1970 and 1990,1 could demonstrate 
how that individual changes as she ages. But is this change of the individual due to 
ageing or due to the fact that those bom in 1920 respond in a certain way to the political 
circumstances in 1970 and 1990? One panel study alone cannot give me the answer.
The few panel data sets that are available (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; 
Jennings and Markus 1988; Sears and Funk 1999) suffer from additional problems. They 
tend to over-represent higher socio-economic backgrounds, as these respondents are 
more likely to be re-interviewed. In addition, respondents are generally biased in their 
own answers as they remember what they answered last time rather than giving answers 
as if they heard the question for the first time. Long-term panel studies that are 
representative are very expensive and obviously time-consuming. I do not see any 
possibilities of concerting efforts to co-ordinate long-term panel studies internationally, 
which is probably due to the short-term horizon that researchers have in terms of having 
to publish as quickly as possible. Therefore, it does not seem to be useful to wait for 
better data before analysing age-related effects on political participation given the 
improbability of these data sets being put together and the pressing demographic 
development. In the absence of well-suited data, I have to use less straightforward 
techniques to make sense of the various kinds of age-related effects.
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4.2 Reasons for studying Europe
There are four reasons for concentrating on Europe: stage of socio-economic 
development, demographic profile, historical diversity and the culture of life cycle. In 
the theoretical model, I assumed that post-industrial democracies are similar in terms of 
giving individuals a certain scope of freedom in political decisions. This is because in 
these countries the basic needs of individuals are satisfied. The 21 European countries 
are similar to the extent that they have welfare states that can guarantee all citizens a 
minimum standard of living. This characteristic satisfies the condition of giving citizens 
some scope for political decisions.
As mentioned in the introduction, the countries under investigation are most 
similar with regard to average life expectancy and the proportion of older people. 
Thereby, we can ensure that (a) one year of lifetime has the same social meaning and (b) 
any macro influences of demographic pressures on political actors are held constant 
across these countries. Because the demographic weight of older people is very high in 
global comparison, it is also desirable to analyse the political behaviour of older people, 
as they make up such a large proportion of society in European countries.
As much as these European countries are similar to their demographic profile, 
they are they dissimilar in terms of democratic-historical experience. The democratic 
experiences of, for example, Poland, Sweden, Italy and Spain are very different, so that 
generational differences within countries vary to a large extent. As a consequence, it is 
much easier for us to study age-related effects that are not peculiar to a particular 
country, but that are similar across countries.
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Finally, the culture of the life cycle is similar across Europe. The social and 
cultural perception of the life course is the same in Western countries. I already 
described the reasons for this assumption in chapter 1.
4.3 Choosing Great Britain and West Germany as country case studies 
I will analyse Britain and West Germany in chapters 6 and 7 to study voting behaviour 
and in chapter 9 will undertake a qualitative analysis of older Council Tax protesters in 
England. In addition, I use Britain as an example for a descriptive longitudinal analysis 
of turnout in chapter 6. Studying party choice in Great Britain and West Germany has 
practical and theoretical reasons behind it. Firstly, both countries have a long tradition of 
high quality surveys that can be used in a pooled analysis, and I will talk more about the 
data in the next section.
Secondly, the two party systems are very dissimilar with regard to over time 
changes with respect to the main parties. Since 1945, Britain had a party system that was 
dominated by two major parties, the Conservatives and Labour (Norris 1997), which 
regularly alternated in single-party government. While the patterns of government 
formation were relatively stable since World War II, there have been two major changes. 
One is the increase of the voting share of the Liberals/Social-democratic party/Liberal 
Democrats (the Liberals henceforth) since the 1970s; the other is the emergence of 
regionalist parties from Scotland and Wales.11 West Germany was a two and a half party 
system for three decades, in which two ideological blocs (the Social-democrats [SPD] 
and the Christian-democrats [CDU/CSU]) and one pivotal party, the liberal FDP,
11 Northern Ireland is excluded from the analysis because of its different party system.
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dominated voting choice. From 1980s onwards, the party system changed as the Greens 
entered the Bundestag}2
Thirdly, the main sociological dimensions of party competition are different. 
British party competition is dominated by one dimension, namely the socio-economic 
since class is the only salient political cleavage between the major political parties 
(Siaroff 2000: 17). However, there are two dimensions in German national politics. One 
is the classical left-right socio-economic dimension. The second dimension is religion 
where one end can be termed secular and the other religious.
Parties can be ordered in one or two-dimensional spaces. However, over time, 
they can shift their ideological stance. These shifts can sometimes be so radical that one 
party overtakes another on a given dimension. In Britain, the Tories were always more 
conservative than Labour. Therefore, given a choice of these two parties, the 
Conservatives were always the more conservative option. The Liberals shift then- 
relative position over the years on the left-right continuum. This is due to the decline, 
fusion with the Social-Democratic Party and the re-positioning of the Liberals over the 
last 50 years. In the 1950s, the Liberals were to the right of the Conservatives, in the 
1960s and since 1997 they are to the left of Labour (Budge 1999: 5).
In West Germany, the picture is more complicated because of its two- 
dimensional nature. Socio-economically, the FDP is the most conservative party, 
followed by the Christian-democrats, the SPD and finally the Greens from the 1980s
12 The post-communist Socialists (PDS) did not play a role for West Germany before 2005.
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onwards. On the religious dimension, the CDU/CSU is more towards the religious end 
of the axis whereas the others are secular parties (Siaroff 2000: 17).
Fourthly, de-alignment, the process through which social characteristics lose 
their explanatory power for voting, affected both countries differently. Britain is thought 
to be more advanced than Germany today and has started earlier with the de-alignment 
process (Franklin 1992). The question of de-alignment is crucially important in the study 
of generational effects. If de-alignment takes place, socialisation effects at youth should 
become less important because social characteristics and early electoral experiences 
wane in importance. Instead, candidate evaluation, issue position and mobilisation 
strategies gain in influence for the voting choice.
Finally, the two countries have different electoral systems. Britain uses the first- 
past-the-post system with a low degree of proportionality, while Germany uses a mixture 
of first-past-the-post and proportional representation with a high degree of 
proportionality. As I will demonstrate in chapter 7, the unique combination of different 
paces of de-alignment and stable electoral systems allow us to put forward new findings 
with regard to the macro factors of the party system.
England was further chosen as a country context to study the protesters of the
Council Tax protests in 2004/5. The reason for the study is the temporal closeness of the
protests to the time the European Social Survey was conducted. Thus, the characteristics
of the British population that we can infer from the Survey must be relatively similar to
the population in 2004 and 2005 when the interviewees took part in the Council Tax
protests. The British context also represents characteristics of a crucial case study
(Eckstein 1975). Britain has a history of old age protests (Thane 2000) and a generally
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high level of political participation. Also -  as I will demonstrate -  the indicators for old 
age culture for Britain show that the average citizen values older people relatively high. 
Thus, conditions for older people being active in politics are very good in Britain. The 
findings about images around old age and passivity in politics -  despite the good 
conditions -  suggest that we should expect even stronger images elsewhere where there 
are less favourable context conditions for older people to participate in politics.
4.4 Research methods I: quantitative analysis
Large parts of this thesis (chapters 6 - 8 )  rely on multivariate regression techniques. The 
large-N statistical analysis allows for rigorous testing of hypotheses. It can test several 
factors at the same time and assess the relative importance of each one of them. The use 
of high quality samples allows statistical inference on the underlying population, the 
citizenry aged 18 and older in 21 European countries. The techniques are very reliable as 
each (properly trained) researcher would come to the same results. Replication is easily 
possible.
However, there are also some underlying assumptions that go hand in hand with 
these statistical techniques. (1) The unit of analysis is the individual, and the basic 
determinants of behaviour are the same for all individuals. The danger of this 
assumption is to see citizens as atomised individuals who behave according to internal 
characteristics or outside forces, very often without any reference to their wider social 
context (see Dunleavy 1996). (2) All characteristics can be measured by categorical, 
ordinal or interval scales. So the social experience of having friends, for instance, in a 
given network is assumed to be consistent across individuals and can be reliably 
measured and quantified.
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In order to countervail some of the disadvantages of individual-level analysis, the 
second case study uses semi-structured interviews with protesters in order to understand 
their personal experiences that are not open to standardised survey questions. I will 
describe these methods in section 4.5.
Data
In chapters 5, 6 and 8 ,1 will use the European Social Survey (version 5, round 1). It is a
broad survey that has been co-ordinated between European countries. The data became
11public in January 2004 and is freely accessible on the internet. The sampling period 
covers spring 2002. There are 21 European countries in the survey: Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. If necessary from a theoretical point-of-view (e.g. to control 
for differences in totalitarian socialisation), I will split Germany in East and West for the 
sample to consist of 22 countries. The survey is cross-sectional only, i.e. we only have 
data from one point in time albeit in a multitude of countries.14 The countries cover a 
whole range of cultural regions, welfare systems and democratic experiences. All 
countries are functioning liberal democracies that have had regular elections and 
changes in government by democratic means.
Overall, the European Social Survey has superb sampling properties. They differ 
by country depending on the availability of population frames. For instance, the Danish 
sample uses simple random sampling, the Austrian three-stage stratified probability
13 At http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
14 The second round became available in autumn 2005.
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sampling, or the Czech Republic two-stage stratified probability sampling. The research 
team adopted a flexible approach where they wanted to get the best probability sampling 
design that is available in each country. This depends on the experience of the sampling 
experts in each country. The target response rate was a minimum of 70 %, which was 
reached in most countries. Interviews were carried out face-to-face, and at no point were 
substitution or quota sampling allowed.
In chapter 7 ,1 will look at party choice in West Germany and Britain across time. 
To that end, I will use national election studies (the British Election Studies 1964-2001, 
the German Election Studies 1961-1998) and monthly surveys (Gallup 1958 and 1959 
and Politbarometer 1977-2002). In the case of the British Election Studies, I created a 
new accumulated data set where I put together data from each survey year for repeated 
cross-sectional time series. For West Germany, I use the already accumulated 
Politbarometer. In addition, I run single-year models for control purposes. These data 
sets can be obtained from the British and German data archive in Essex or Cologne 
respectively.
Weighting
The European Social Survey disposes of two weights that can be used to adjust for 
uneven selection probabilities and differences in the population size of countries. The 
clustering techniques bring in design effects of varying sizes that are not equal to one 
and that change the reliability of confidence intervals. When analysing single countries, 
I will use the design weight dweight. When analysing all countries together, I will use a 
combination of the design weight (dweight) and the population weight (pweight), either
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by using a product of both (in chapter 6) or defining the appropriate weight for the 
respective level in the multi-level analysis (chapter 8).
I do not use any weights in the cross-sectional time series analysis. This 
simplification is reasonable, however, since we are only using various measures of age 
(political generation and age group) and gender, so that we just assume that the 
differences in selection probability and non-response are randomly distributed between 
age groups across time.
The problem of confounded cohort, age and period effects
Quantitative survey analysis of age-related effects on political behaviour is confronted 
with three different confounded effects: cohort, life cycle and period effects. Cohort 
effects are shared by those citizens that were bom around the same time and thus form a 
cohort. Statistical life cycle effects affect those who have the same age. Period effects 
subsume all those effects that stem from the point of time of data collection. This last 
effect is strictly speaking not conceptually related to age, but can impinge on age-related 
effects. Period, life cycle and cohort effects are always perfectly multicollinear in a 
cross-sectional survey (see for a review Glenn 1976). If you take, for example, German 
elections in 1998 and 2002 and compare the behaviour of 70 year olds in each election, 
one cannot say whether their behaviours stem from the fact that they are 70 year olds, or 
a combination of cohort effects of those bom in 1928 or 1932 and period effects of 1998 
and 2002 affecting only these cohorts (a two-way interaction effect). One of the three 
effects can always be exchanged by the interaction of two other confounding effects. In 
order to tackle these technical difficulties, the thesis makes use of two different
statistical techniques that I am now going to discuss.
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Studying age effects with international cross-sectional data
A little used technique is the analysis of internationally cross-sectional data to study age- 
related effects (see for example De Graaf 1999; Rubenson et al. 2004). The first 
reasoning in this direction was put forward in an article by Nie, Verba and Kim with 
regard to age and political participation:
‘The nature and timing of major political events vary from country to 
country. If we find uniformity in the relationship between political activities 
and age across these nations [Austria, Britain, India, Nigeria United States], 
it is unlikely that such uniformity was produced by uniform generational 
experiences. It is far more likely that such uniformity reflects the uniform 
impact of aging’ (Nie, Verba, and Kim 1974: 322).
Social scientists usually agree that chronological age as such does not have any 
causal implications for social behaviour. However, chronological age can serve as a 
proxy for social age (i.e. someone’s position in the life cycle and ageing experience) and 
as a proxy for cohort experience. This approach tries to strip chronological age of its 
underlying importance as a proxy and then interpret the coefficient of the residual age 
variable.
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Figure 4-1: Different types of age-related effects, their level of universality and empirical procedure for analysis
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It starts from some theoretical hypotheses about the nature of age-related 
effects -  whether age-related effects are specific to a country or more universal (see 
figure 4-1). The conceptual differentiation between different types of age-related 
effects can then be brought together with the theory that guides model selection. This 
involves a model of voting participation in one chapter and a model of non­
institutionalised participation in the other. In contrast, conventional techniques such 
as national cross-sectional time series or panel studies are often -  because of data 
limitations -  bound to restrict themselves to stating the existence of life cycle or 
cohort effects and post-hoc explanations of these variations. By taking on recent 
advances in sociology and social gerontology, the study of a comprehensive, 
international survey can benefit from a host of conceptually meaningful variables. 
The intention is not to build a full model of the phenomenon in question, but one that 
focuses on the differences between age groups. In statistical terms, it builds a 
multivariate regression model in which the dependent variable (e.g. a yes/no -  
dichotomy of political action) represents the object of study and the independent 
variables stand for various cohort (e.g. religiosity or education), life cycle (e.g.
retirement or free time) and individual ageing effects that we can expect from our *
underlying model. In contrast to other methods, this technique does not allow an 
empirical test about the origin of the nature of age-related variables. It derives the 
assessment from the literature. So the researcher does not test whether education is a 
generational or life cycle effect, but relies on the literature. From then on, the nature 
of the age-related variable is being treated as a well-grounded assumption.
This technique needs a comprehensive data set. The European Social Survey 
allows us to control for many age-related effects in a meaningful way. For example, 
the numbers of children in a household is a good proxy to what extent a young or
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middle aged person has time to pursue political actions at that age. We can thus distil 
effects associated from a certain chronological age via control variables. For that 
procedure, the European Social Survey is superior to the World Values Survey that 
would also have been available.
The idea now is to control for as many age-related effects as possible at the 
individual level, i.e. through individual-level independent variables. Guided by 
hypotheses about potential effects, the researcher is able to include cohort and life 
cycle effects with diverse proxies in the comprehensive data set. Thereby, the 
coefficient of the residual age variable still captures the meaning of individual ageing 
and political generation effects. We now need a procedure to disentangle the 
universal individual ageing effect from national political generation effects.
The 21 or 22 countries in the European Social Survey are very different as to 
their democratic experience. They range from recently democratised post- 
Communist countries to established democracies like Britain. If you pool diverse 
countries together, political generation effects should not distort the residual effect of 
age anymore because they cancel each other out. This means that we can interpret the 
coefficient of residual age as the individual ageing effect with confidence. Imagine 
the group of 50 to 60 year olds in 2002. If we look at the group from West Germany, 
they experienced the 1968 student revolution when they were about 15-25. Their 
Spanish counterpart of the same age in 2002 experienced the last decade of 
totalitarian Franco regime. The Czechs underwent the experience of a regime going 
hard-line after the Prague Spring events. Similarly, 19 other cohort experiences exist 
that we cannot capture separately in other variables. However, all cohorts across the 
diversity of these countries should show the individual ageing effect because it is a 
universal human feature. If the individual ageing effect has an impact on the
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phenomenon in question, it will thus become visible in the pooled analysis. National 
political generation distortions thus add up to a kind of random noise in the pooled 
analysis.
This approach has limits in four aspects. Firstly, we cannot study political 
generation effects. Therefore, this technique is not employed for voting choice where 
political generations are important. In that context, we will use repeated cross- 
sectional time series analysis. However, one can combine the findings from the 
international cross-sectional study of many countries with those of the longitudinal 
analysis of one country, as I will do in chapter 6.
By the same token, we cannot make any predictions about the impact of 
national political generation effects in our model. This would require us to go back to 
individual countries, and we would be confronted with confounded generational and 
ageing effects. However, political generation effects are also least amenable to 
generalisation and can best be studied with regard to a single country -  as we do in 
chapters 6 and 7 where we look at political generations in Britain and West 
Germany.
The third limit of this approach is that interaction effects between period 
effects and cohort or life cycle effects cannot be modelled. Period effects cannot be 
captured at all because all respondents are exposed to the same period effect. Any 
interaction term between age groups and period cannot be traced. Thus, the implicit 
assumption of such an analysis is that period effects do not interact with life cycle or 
cohort effects.
Despite these disadvantages, the major merit of this approach is that different
kinds of age-related effects can be analysed in a conceptually meaningful manner.
Instead of stating the presence of life cycle or generational effects, we can, for
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instance, talk about the relative effects of retirement or raising children (life cycle) 
vis-a-vis education and political ideology (cohort differences), all of which are 
causes of variation across age groups.
Studying age-related effects with time series of cross-sectional data
In the chapter on party choice (chapter 7), I will use time series of accumulated 
cross-sectional data. This is a conventional technique to study generational and 
ageing effects in one country. Because of the easy availability of these data sets, this 
design is probably the most common form to study age-related effects in political 
science (see for example Blais et al. 2004; Clarke et al. 2004; Falter and Gehring 
1998; Gehring 1994; Gluchowski 1983; Klingemann 1998; Rattinger 1998).
A national cross-sectional survey asks respondents in one country at one 
point in time with the sole intention of inferring about the characteristics of the 
population at that moment. If the researcher can establish equivalence between items 
across time, e.g. through the same question wording, one can combine these cross- 
sectional studies into a time series. Each study allows generalisation about the 
national population at each point in time. Over time, we are not able to follow intra­
individual, but are able to follow aggregate change.
This design does not allow us to look at ageing effects at the level of the 
individual, but does allow for good estimates of arguably general effects, like 
growing status-quo conservatism. In addition, we are still trapped with confounding 
life cycle- cohort-period effects. Finally, international comparisons are only possible 
to a limited extent because of problems in the comparability of surveys in different 
countries.
118
4.5 Research methods II: qualitative analysis
Chapter 9 bases its findings on interviews that I led with older participants in the 
Council Tax protests. The objective was to gain a better understanding of the 
experience of older people who protest. These interviews were led by phone in 
November and December 2005 as older people are reported to show strong 
interviewer effects if the interviewer is younger, white and male (Wenger 2002), 
which matches my profile. The high level of mistrust from interviewees that I had to 
overcome when setting up the telephone interviews seemed to confirm that it would 
have been difficult to get agreement to face-to-face interviews. Some of the 
interviewees reported mobility problems and time-consuming commitments within 
their household, like caring for a spouse. These traits would also make face-to-face 
interviews outside of their homes unfeasible. In addition, face-to-face interviews in 
personal households increase variations in situational variables that make interview 
results more dependent on the physical context of the interview (Shuy 2002).
Since there was no population frame from which it might have been possible 
to draw a sample, I used convenience sampling, which does not allow us, from a 
strict point of view, to make inferences about the population of older protesters, or 
even all older protesters at these events. I contacted15 the main Isitfair organisation 
and all local groups that are connected to Isitfair according to the Isitfair website16, 
explaining my research and its non-commercial purpose. I also posted my project on 
the Isitfair internet news forum, asking for volunteers. I included two requirements in 
my request for co-operation: interview partners had to be 60 or older and had to have 
taken part in some of the protest activities that took place in 2004.1 also stated that I
15 See Teske (1997) for a similar research approach towards political activists.
16 About half of the links were broken, however.
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would be more interested in interviewing people (a) other than the high-level 
activists who, for example, run local groups and (b) who are from various places 
across the country.
The sample that I interviewed consisted of people who had been suggested by 
the main organisers as potentially willing to be interviewed and further 
recommendations by this first group. In total, I interviewed 22 older people between 
15 November and 7 December 2005. The sample is very probably biased towards 
more active members of the protest groups, people who are generally politically 
interested and -  as I will demonstrate in chapter 9 -  tend to come from the middle or 
upper classes. However, representativenes is not the goal of these interviews as the 
experience of each interviewee is supposed to help us understand what political 
participation in the form of protest activities at old age is about. Also, one of the 
objectives was to learn about images of old age and politics. These protesters had 
been active in politics themselves and had experienced reactions in their environment 
that had let them to understand that they should be passive in politics. Or they 
expressed internalised self-images about passive old age and politics. Thus, other 
older people who are not as active are probably even more likely to have such self- 
images or experience such stereotypes in their environment.
The findings of that chapter are much more exploratory in nature than the 
other three quantitative large-N studies. The main goals of this exploration were to 
examine the self-perceptions of protesters as ‘older’ protesters, and to examine their 
own past as political activists. The interviews allowed us to see whether some of the 
findings of the large-N survey analysis were applicable for them as well. The 
qualitative evidence is to help to expand a causal narrative to better understand the
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causal chain. But more importantly, the interviews were meant to put forward new, 
richer hypotheses about older people’s protest behaviour.
4.6 Summary
I argue for the study of Europe as a region for comparative analysis because: (a) the 
liberal democracies under investigation guarantee its citizens a certain standard of 
living to satisfy their basic needs; (b) its demographic profile makes the proportion of 
older people in the citizenry roughly similar; (c) its historical diversity makes the 
experience of generations dissimilar across countries; and (d) its culture of life cycle 
that makes the social experience of ageing similar.
The dissertation uses the European Social Survey, national election studies 
and monthly poll surveys of Britain and West Germany, and analyses them with 
quantitative, multivariate regression techniques. These large-N studies will be 
accompanied by a qualitative chapter on older protesters who took part in the English 
Council Tax protests in 2004/5. The empirical analysis stretches over five chapters. 
Four of them (5-8) will directly test the twelve hypotheses that I put forward in 
chapter 3 (see table 4-1). The fifth (chapter 9) will further explore the findings of 
previous chapters to get a richer understanding of the quantitative results.
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Table 4-1: Roadmap of the thesis -  the hypotheses and the chapter location where they will be 
tested
Hypotheses
Chapter 5: 
Exploration
Chapter 6:
Voting
Participation
Chapter 7: 
Party Choice
Chapter 8:
Non­
institutionalised
Participation
HI: Older people are more likely to direct their organisational engagement 
towards political parties and are less likely to direct it towards single-issue 
organisations than younger people.
H5: Older people differ on predictors o f political participation from younger 
people.
H10: Ceteris paribus, older people are more likely to vote than younger people. In 
the cross-sectional analysis with pooled data from all European countries, the 
residual variation between age groups (from young to old) follows a concave 
curve in contrast to the single country analyses.
HI2a: The higher the average turnout in a country, the smaller the gap is between 
the voting probability o f older and younger people, ceteris paribus.
HI2b: The higher the formal education and expressed sense of duty to vote, the 
smaller the gap is between the voting probability o f older and younger people, 
ceteris paribus.
HI2c: Among citizens with high education and low sense o f duty to vote, older 
people do not have a higher voting probability than younger people, ceteris 
paribus.
H4: Older people belong to a cohort that shares party preferences that are stable 
across time.
H6: Older voters have a different endowment o f social characteristics that are 
predictors of party choice. In West Germany, they are less well educated and 
more religious. Thus, they are less likely to vote for the FDP and the Greens than 
younger voters.
H7: Senior parties become successful in countries with growing proportions of 
older people.
H8a: Economic conservatism - Older people are more likely to vote for the most 
economically conservative party. Older people are less likely to vote for the least 
economically conservative party.
H8b: Pro-state-spending - Older people are more likely to vote for the least 
economically conservative party. Older people are less likely to vote for the most 
economically conservative party.
H9: Older people are more likely to vote for the incumbent.
HI 1: Older voters are more likely to vote for larger parties or smaller parties that 
are regularly part o f government.
H2: Older cohorts are less likely to commit non-institutionalised forms of 
participation than more recent cohorts.
H3: The lack of experience of a free, liberal democracy at young adulthood 
decreases the likelihood of non-institutionalised participation.
H5: Older people differ on predictors o f political participation from younger 
people.
122
5 Exploration of Senior Political Participation in Europe
This chapter prepares the main empirical analysis of the dissertation. Firstly, I will 
cast a wide net over the universe of political participation in Europe with regard to 
differences between older and younger people. Secondly, I will isolate two areas of 
political behaviour for further investigation, voting and non-institutionalised 
individual participation. After this chapter, other political actions will not be further 
analysed because -  as I will show - (a) they are inherently linked to younger age (e.g. 
trade union activities) or (b) there is no significant variation between age groups (e.g. 
party activism). In addition, I will test the first hypothesis about older people’s 
organisational involvement. Older people should be more likely to use political 
parties and less likely to use single-issue organisations than younger people. The 
general change in the participatory process away from parties towards single-issue 
organisations should have left generational traces.
Section 1 explains why we need to start the empirical analysis from a wide 
angle. Section 2 describes the range of political actions in the main data set. Section 
3 presents the results of the comparison of age groups on 20 political actions in up to 
22 countries, and argues for the concentration on voting participation and non­
institutionalised forms of participation for the rest of the thesis.
5.1 The logic of a comprehensive empirical approach to political 
participation
I consider all those individual voluntary actions that are carried out to express one’s
political views with the aim of influencing or changing public policy, political
institutions or the selection of political personnel to be political participation.
Political participation -  even according to this definition -  is still a vast universe that
includes voting, being active in or being a member of an organisation, protesting and
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other activities. Any forceful argument about senior participation must approach this 
universe without bias. Any reduction to fewer than all forms of participation in the 
empirical analysis must be argued for and not set up a priori. For example, mistakes 
that are often made include taking the reduced view of political participation as 
simply voting, or summing up all kinds of political participation in one index 
(Leighly 1995).
However, it is also necessary to keep the analysis manageable. This is an 
internationally comparative analysis. There are 20 measured acts of political 
participation in the European Social Survey that we will use. If we multiply this 
number by 22 countries, we can see that a comprehensive analysis of everything is 
next to impossible. It not only takes considerably more resources than a selected sub­
set, it would also tire the reader through its inevitably repetitive nature. In order to 
justify the intensive analysis of some forms of participation, it is helpful to look at all 
of them -  within our definition -  first.
To an individual who wants to participate, all avenues of participation are 
open in a liberal democracy as far as liberties are concerned. Despite this openness, 
an individual can have preferences for one form of participation over another. If I 
only look at protest, for instance, and can show an increase in protesting behaviour 
from older to more recent cohorts, critics could ask whether older people do 
something else instead of protesting. Having started from a wide angle, I can answer 
such questions.
The underlying logic of approaching political participation comprehensively 
is that we need to find those activities where there are perceptible differences 
between younger and older people. In order to achieve this objective, we must start
by looking at all political actions and then locate those with systematic differences.
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This approach does not assume that older people are not active in any of the activities 
that show no differences. Older people are, for instance, active doing voluntary work 
in political parties. When we infer from a mass survey about this political action, 
however, there are only insignificant differences between older and younger people. 
Whenever the levels of participation of older and younger people are the same, an 
implicit assumption is that older people’s levels of intrinsic and extrinsic factors are 
comparable to younger people’s. Thus, we neglect the possibility of both groups 
having the same level of participation on the grounds of different causal models.
5.2 Types of political actions in the European Social Survey
In the European Social Survey, respondents aged 16 and older were asked in spring 
2002 whether they had undertaken any political actions during the last twelve months 
and were then given a list of options. Figure 5-1 shows the average probabilities of 
older and younger people for each political action. Irrespective of age, voting is 
unsurprisingly the most common political activity. The most uncommon forms are 
those that need most resources, namely regular voluntary work for parties or single­
issue organisations. We can already detect in this graph that older people are more 
likely to perform certain political actions than younger people, and less likely to 
commit others. Before the analysis of differences between age groups per country, I 
will explain the typology of the universe of political actions that we see in figure 5-1 
with regard to the function of the various kinds of political participation:
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Figure 5-1: Mean probabilities for two age groups for all political actions in 21 European 
countries in 2002
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Weighted by design and demographic weights. Source: ESS. See text for exact types of single-issue 
organisations.
Voting: this is the fundament of any democracy and the minimal requirement 
for a vital liberal democracy. In the European Social Survey, respondents were asked 
whether they had voted in the last national parliamentary elections. Voting 
participation is the most common form of political participation. It thus warrants to 
be treated separately from other institutionally organised forms of participation. 
Voting conveys public preferences of the voters on parties or candidates and
i
i
h
i
iP
a
□ older people (60+)
■ younger people (59-
■4  f -
126
therefore exercises pressure on governing elites. Voting reveals relatively little about 
the specific issue preferences of the electors.
Participation in political organisations: participation in organisations can 
have four different appearances: membership, donating money, participation in the 
activities of, and voluntary (i.e. regular) work for political organisations. There are 
three kinds of political organisations: political parties, single-issue organisations and 
trade union/ professional organisations. Parties have broad missions that are held 
together by one set of normative values. Issue-based political organisations have a 
much narrower concern. The European Social Survey included two types of single­
issue organisations that have a political focus: environmental/peace or animal rights 
organisations, such as Greenpeace, and humanitarian/humanitarian aid or human 
rights organisations, such as Amnesty International. Trade unions and professional 
organisations make up a separate type of political organisation, as their remit is 
broader than single-issue organisations yet narrower than that of political parties. 
These organisations are, however, intrinsically linked to working life. Not all people 
who are 60 and older are retirees, but the vast majority of them are. The rate of 
economically active people between 60 and 64 tends to be much lower than the rates 
for younger age groups. On average, it stood at 29.4 % in the 21 European countries 
in 2002. The rate of economically active individuals aged 65 and older lay at an 
average of 5.1 % (ILO 2006). Since only a proportion of the economically active 
individuals are members of trade union or professional organisations, it should be 
clear that we can neglect these organisations as a significant channel of political 
participation for older people.
Non-institutionalised participation outside of organisations: some forms 
of political actions do not need long-term commitment and can be carried out quite
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easily. The participant decides on an ad-hoc basis whether to take part or not. These 
forms of participation might be organised by institutions, but participants do not 
subscribe to any long-term commitment, be it for a narrow concern (issue-based 
organisations) or a broad concern (parties). For example, you can take part in a 
protest organised by a party against the invasion of Iraq. Doing this, you are far from 
subscribing to the overall interests and goals of that party. The European Social 
Survey covers the following political actions of this kind: wearing a badge, signing a 
petition, taking part in a legal demonstration, joining an illegal demonstration, 
buying or boycotting a product for ethical or political reasons, and contacting a 
public official or politician.
Some forms of political actions were not put forward in the survey such as 
wild strike, the use of force and other illegal activities (except for illegal 
demonstrations). These actions are missing for a good reason. In the survey, people 
were asked whether the respondents had done any of the political actions within the 
last twelve months. Since illegal actions are socially not desirable, respondents might 
feel obliged not to admit them even if they had carried them out. To make inferences 
about actions that are socially not desirable, it would have been necessary to ask 
respondents about their attitudes towards these kind of illegal actions to measure 
their action potential (see for example Barnes, Kaase, and others 1979; Sanders et al. 
2004).17
An alternative data source to the European Social Survey could have been the World Values Survey 
series. Its primary investigators chose to measure action potential rather than actions and could have 
been useful to look at the illegal forms o f participation. However, the European Social Survey is much 
more comprehensive in its measurements of age-related variables, such as questions about health, for 
instance. I will use the World Values series in chapter 8 to derive at some additional macro variables, 
but decided to exclude it for the primary analysis.
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5.3 Empirical exploration
We start from the null hypothesis that older people are not different from younger 
people in any given mode of participation. Older people are defined as respondents 
who are 60 and older. Their average levels of participation will be compared to those 
of respondents 59 and younger. This approach sets itself apart from a holistic age 
approach that is interested in differences between age groups across the whole 
lifespan. Such an approach would need to distinguish between several age groups, 
such as teenagers, young adults, middle-aged, young-old and old-old groups of 
people. Here, we just want to establish whether there exists a significant difference 
between those aged 60+ and those aged 59-, and if so, what the direction of 
difference between the two groups is. Only if we find a difference between these two 
groups in several countries, will there be further exploration in this chapter and 
finally detailed analysis in the other empirical chapters.
Each form of participation has been coded one if respondents indicate to have 
done this action over the last 12 months and 0 if they say they have not. Missing 
cases or refusals are ignored (listwise deletion). The highest rate of missing cases 
exists by far for voting participation with 6.7 %. All other modes show missing cases 
of less than 1 %. I carried out a weighted comparison of means for older people 
versus non-older people with a significance threshold of 95 % for each country 
separately -  depending on availability -  in 20 or 22 countries. Summed up, 398 tests
1 fthave been carried out.
Table 5-1 summarises the results according to the encountered country 
patterns. I highlighted those cells that have a value higher than 50 %, meaning the
18 The proportion of older people is very similar in each country sample, meaning that a failure in 
significance is unlikely to come from an imbalance in the size of the age groups in the samples.
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specific pattern has been found in more than half the countries. I separated the results 
into three sections. If older people were significantly more active in a majority of 
countries on a particular mode, it was listed in the first section. If they are less active 
in a majority of countries, the mode was put in the second section, and the others in 
the last one. Activities within each section have then been sorted according to the 
strength of the dominant pattern.
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Table 5-1: Patterns of difference between older (60+) and younger people (59-) with regard to
single political actions, 20-22 European countries in 2002
Proportion of countries with respective pattern 
(adds to 100 %)
Older people Older people Older people
more active not different less active
Been a party member 72% 28% 0%
Voted in parliamentary elections 68% 32% 0%
Signed a petition 0% 5% 95%
Bought a product for political, ethical or 0% 9% 91%
environmental reasons
Boycotted a product for political, ethical 0% 18% 82%
or environmental reasons
Taken part in a legal demonstration 0% 28% 72%
Worn a badge 0% 45% 55%
Contacted a public official or politician 0% 45% 55%
Done voluntary work 
environmental/peace/animal rights
0% 100% 0%
Done voluntary work party 10% 90% 0%
Taken part in illegal demonstration 0% 86% 14%
Participated in activities o f political 
party
15% 85% 0%
Been a member of humanitarian or 
human rights group
0% 80% 20%
Participated in activities of 
humanitarian or human rights group
0% 80% 20%
Participated in activities of 
environmental/peace/animal rights 
groups
0% 80% 20%
Done voluntary work for humanitarian 
or human rights groups
0% 80% 20%
Donated to a political party 25% 75% 0%
Been a member of 
environmental/peace/animal rights 
groups
0% 70% 30%
Donated to humanitarian or human 
rights groups
0% 60% 40%
Donated to environmental/peace/animal 
rights groups
0% 55% 45%
Percentages indicate proportion o f countries where there is the dominant pattern o f the respective 
column, Bonferroni test19, significant at 0.05 level, weighted by design weight. Respondents were 
asked: ‘In the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?’, Source: ESS.
19 Other tests like eta or ANOVA lead to the same results.
131
The first striking finding is that each political action only shows one 
significant type of difference. In general, older people tend to be significantly more 
or less active on a given mode, but not both in different countries. In each row of the 
table (for each political action), we only find countries where there is no significant 
difference and countries with a significant difference in just one direction.
In the first section, there are two forms of participation, voting and party 
membership, in which older people are more likely to engage than younger people in 
most countries. In the case of party membership, 72 % of all countries show a 
significant higher occurrence of party membership among older people. In the case 
of voting, 68 % of countries have significantly more active older people.
In the second section, there are six forms of participation for which older 
people are predominantly less active in the majority of countries: signing a petition, 
buying a product, boycotting a product, demonstrating legally and contacting a 
public official or politician. The number of countries with the dominant pattern 
stretches from 94 % in the case of signing a petition to 55 % in the case of contacting 
a public official or politician.
The longest section three is where older people are not different from 
younger people in the majority of countries. At the top of that section, we find 
voluntary work for a political issue organisation in the domains of environment, 
peace and animal rights. Towards the lower end of that section, there are some 
activities that show a consistent pattern of less active older people, albeit in a 
minority of countries: donations to and membership of political issue organisations. 
Older people are less active in donating to environmental/peace or animal rights 
organisations in 45 % of countries, and less likely to being members of these 
organisations in 30 % of countries.
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Most of these findings conform with what we would expect from the 
literature. What is interesting to note is that high intensity participation like voluntary 
work does not show significant differences. Drawing inference from this mass 
population survey, I find no significant difference between younger and older people. 
It could be that in an over-sample of activists there would be systematic differences 
between older and younger people on these forms of participation. For example, in a 
survey of British Labour party members, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley (1992: 99) 
showed that there were mild variations between age groups as to levels of activism 
within the British Labour party. Of those who are 66 and older, 49 % are fairly and 
very active as opposed to 47 % (aged 17-25), 62 % (aged 26-45) and 60 % (aged 46- 
65). In another survey of British Conservative party members (Whiteley, Seyd, and 
Richardson 1994: 106), 21 % of those aged 66 and older were fairly or very active as 
opposed to 39 % (aged 18-25), 26 % (aged 26-45) and 28 % (aged 46-65).
However, from the viewpoint of the population in the European Social 
Survey, differences are too small to be significant. Therefore, we will exclude these 
forms of high intensity participation (voluntary work and participation in parties, 
environmental/peace/animal rights, and humanitarian/human rights groups) from 
further analysis. Similarly, illegal demonstrations do not show any difference 
between the two groups that we could infer from the mass survey and these will be 
excluded as well.
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Figure 5-2: Age ratios (older people's probability by younger people's) of memberships in
political organisations, 20 European countries in 2002
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Poland 
Portugal 
Spain
Probability of older people being a member by probability of younger people
Source: ESS. Data not available for the Czech Republic and Switzerland.
Moving down the last section in table 5-1, we find membership of and 
donations to various single issue organisations and parties. Their patterns together 
with party membership in the first section highlight an overall change in the political 
process that creates generational differences. This is what I put forward as hypothesis 
HI (Dalton 2004; Norris 2002). Political parties across Europe are generally in 
decline in terms of mass membership across Europe, with some exceptions in post­
CD humanitarian and human rights 
organisation
■  environmental, peace and animal 
rights organisations
□  parties
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communist and Southern European countries like Spain (see figure 5-2). The ratio 
that is being used in the following figures is the probability of the older age group 
(60+) doing a certain political action divided by the probability of the younger age 
group (59-) committing that activity. Thus, a one signifies no difference between the 
two, a value above one relatively stronger activism among older people, and a value 
below one a relatively stronger activism among younger people.
The ratio of older people’s probability of being a party member divided by 
the probability of younger people is above one in all countries except Hungary, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. In contrast, the ratio of membership of environmental 
and similar organisations is below one in most countries. These findings confirm that 
there has been a general change in the political process in some countries with parties 
on the decline (Mair and van Biezen 2001). Therefore, political parties are relatively 
more popular among older people today. At the same time, single-issue organisations 
are on the rise and are thus more popular among younger people today (della Porta 
and Diani 1999). This finding confirms by and large our hypothesis HI. Older people 
tend to direct their organisational involvement (membership and donations) more to 
political parties than single-issue organisations in comparison to younger people. 
There remain significant country exceptions. Countries that were recently 
democratised in the 1970s and 1990s do not have parties with a membership 
structure that reflects past fortunes (and thus do not possess more older generation 
members). In line with our argument, past fortunes or lack thereof is reflected in 
generational patterns of party membership.
An interesting question concerns the extent to which the differences between 
older and younger people with regard to party membership, relate to the difference 
between the age groups with respect to membership of other political organisations.
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One way of looking at it is the correlation coefficient between the age ratios of party 
membership on the one hand, and the age ratios of other memberships on the other. 
Recall that older people were mostly more likely to be party members than younger 
people (the age ratios were mostly above 1); thus, a higher age ratio of party 
membership means that older people are even more likely to be party members than 
younger people. For other memberships, the age ratios were below one as older 
people were generally less likely to be members than younger people. Thus, a higher 
age ratio means that the gap between age groups is smaller.
The correlation coefficient is 0.81 for party membership and membership of 
environmental, peace or animal rights organisations, and 0.46 for party membership 
and membership of humanitarian or human rights organisations. We can now say that 
the higher the difference is between older and younger people with regard to party 
membership in one country, the smaller the gap is between older and younger people 
with regard to membership of single-issue organisations. In other words, in countries 
where older people are much more likely to be party members, like France, their gap 
to younger people with regard to membership of single-issue organisations is in fact 
smaller. Some countries have more active senior citizens with regard to all kinds of 
political memberships than others, compared to younger people. That seems to 
suggest that -  on top of the change in political process towards single issues -  
something makes older people more active in some European countries than in others 
in general. This phenomenon will be explored further in chapters 8 and 9 on non­
institutionalised behaviour.20
20 Hypothetically, we should also see a similar ‘substitution’ of political organisations with regard to 
donations. However, donations to political parties have different kinds of limits across Europe and 
cannot easily be discussed cross-nationally.
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Figure 5-3: Age ratios of voting participation, 22 European countries in 2002
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Figures 5-3 and 5-4 re-state the dominant patterns of more active older people 
in voting participation and less active older people in non-institutionalised 
participation. Apart from the generational changes in organisational involvement that 
I just discussed, these two modes show the only consistent patterns. Both forms of 
participation show a consistent pattern of older people’s relative participatory levels,
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and at the same time, variations across countries that we need to explain. In further 
analysis, it is therefore justifiable to concentrate on two kinds of political behaviour.
Figure 5-4: Age ratios of non-institutionalised political participation -  the example of signing a 
petition
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Source: ESS.
5,4 Summary
There are some important empirical findings that allow us to decide on the exclusion 
of political actions in the rest of the thesis. Firstly, trade unionism or involvement in 
professional organisations are intrinsically linked to one’s period of employment.
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Older people tend to be retired, meaning that they are overall much less likely to 
engage in any activities around these political organisations. Secondly, the most 
intense forms of participation, voluntary work and participation in events of political 
organisations, hardly show any variation between age groups. Thus, there is no 
difference that we need to explain. The elderly are as likely to engage in these forms 
of high-intensity participation as other age groups.
Thirdly, there was strong evidence to support the first hypothesis HI. It 
postulated that older people are more likely to direct their organisational involvement 
towards parties rather than single-issue organisations, compared to younger people. 
The cross-sectional evidence - including the deviant patterns for recently 
democratised countries -  supports the argument in the literature that there is a 
general shift of participation away from parties towards issue-based organisations. 
The higher involvement of the elderly in parties in some countries is a cohort effect. 
The elderly are still members of parties because they joined them at a younger age 
and remained loyal to them. In countries where parties did not exist in the 1970s (like 
the post-communist countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece), this pattern simply 
cannot show. Cohorts in these countries, who could hypothetically have been 
attracted to parties when they were younger (and thus, when parties would have 
existed), are not more likely than younger people to be party members. This is in 
contrast to countries with parties who were successful at attracting individuals in 
earlier decades.
Fourthly, I identified two forms of participation that I will now analyse in 
greater detail: voting and non-institutionalised participation. Voting shows a very 
strong pattern of higher turnout among the elderly across countries. Non­
institutionalised forms of participation show something like a mirror image in which
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the elderly are less active than other age groups. These two forms of participation 
have two things in common: they require very few resources and no long-term 
commitment. The participants can take part in the political action or not and decide 
on doing so in an ad-hoc manner. The next chapters will provide a detailed analysis 
of the determinants that can account for the differences between younger and older 
people in these two modes.
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6 Voting Participation in Europe21
’Those who want to further burden 20 million pensioners with pension 
cuts, must be brave enough to say this before the national election. Then, 
pensioners will know what to do when they are going to cast their vote.’
Walter Hirrlinger, president of the German pensioners’ organisation 
VDK, in June 2005 in the run-up to the national election (VdK 2006).
‘This election may very well be the first determined by the votes of the 
over 50s. There are 20 million people in the UK over the age of 50. Also, 
older people are more likely to vote.’
From the 2005 General Election manifesto of Age Concern England 
(Age Concern England 2006b).
In 2005, major old age charities in Germany and in the United Kingdom ran election 
campaigns in which they used the high voting participation and number of their 
constituents to exert political pressure on candidates and parties. Older people are 
generally believed to be more likely to vote. This chapter investigates the causal 
mechanism behind this higher likelihood. Recall from the theory chapter the major 
hypotheses predicting that older people’s voting participation depends on their level 
of resources/motivation and opportunities/mobilisation. These can be different from 
younger people because (a) the elderly are at a different stage in their social life 
cycle, (b) they belong to a different political generation that shares a certain general 
attitude towards voting participation, (c) their generation shares a certain probability 
of having a social characteristic, and (d) the ageing process gives them more time to 
habituate and learn.
More specifically, the model predicts that intrinsic factors 
(motivation/resources) and external factors (mobilisation/opportunities) of political 
participation differ between age groups, either due to life cycle or cohort differences 
(hypothesis H5). Thus, levels of voting participation for older people will be lower or
21 Parts of this chapter have been published in an ealier version (Goerres forthcoming [2006]).
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higher, depending on the nature of a specific factor and its predictable relationship 
with age. If I was wrong, we would not see the predicted correlation with age or we 
would not see the expected effect on turnout. Furthermore, the model assumes higher 
voting probability among older people, even if we control for all these intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors. Through a comparison of the results of the pooled and the 
individual country analyses we can detect a habituative learning pattern for the 
residual variation (hypothesis H10). This learning pattern also interacts with the 
average country turnout and the expressed levels of sense of duty and education, 
which conforms with our expectations about the growing compliance with social 
norms as we age (hypotheses H12a-c).
In this chapter, the empirical analysis consists of two stages. In a descriptive 
section, I will analyse the development of turnout in the example of Britain between 
1964 and 2001. This longitudinal analysis allows us to follow a few selected cohorts 
through time and assess the plausibility of some age-related effects for that one 
context. It is not a rigorous test of any of the hypotheses, but it is indicative of how to 
interpret the results of the rest of the chapter. Then for the major part of the chapter, I 
will use the European Social Survey for a cross-sectional analysis. Firstly, I will test
the hypothesised bivariate relationship between various resources/motivation and
00mobilisation factors and age. This exercise is to assess whether the association 
between cohort or life cycle and that particular predictor of voting participation 
exists and how substantial it is. Strictly speaking, I will only test whether a variable 
is age-related, rather than whether it is a cohort or life cycle effect. I will evaluate the
22 Opportunities to vote can be assumed to be constant for all in liberal democracies, as the option to 
vote should be available to everyone. More complicated registration procedures can impose additional 
hurdles, but in principle voting is open to all major citizens. Institutional variations in voting 
procedures, such as mandatory voting, will be dealt with separately.
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nature of the age-related effects with the help of the literature. In a second step, I will 
build a multivariate regression model of voting participation using all the indicators 
that have been confirmed to be age-related. If my hypotheses are correct, these 
variables must thus show the confirmed relationship twice -  once with age, and once 
with voting participation. Finally, I will look at the remaining effects of the residual 
age variable and compare the impact of those effects seen in the single-country 
models with the effect of that in the pooled analysis. Being stripped of all other 
meaning, these coefficients can only stand for the effects of political generations and 
individual ageing in single-country analyses. The pooled analysis can then be shown 
to stand only for individual ageing. This is because political generation effects from 
historically diverse countries add up to something like white noise in the pooled 
analysis.
The findings of the longitudinal analysis together with those of the 
international, cross-sectional analysis allow us to paint a much more complete 
picture about the determinants of voting participation among older people than we 
could with one method alone.
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6.1 Voting participation across time: the example o f Britain
Figure 6-1: Average turnout of two age groups in British General Elections 1964-2001
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Source: Own calculation according to British election studies 1964-2001.
Figure 6-1 plots the mean probability of two age groups across all British 
elections between 1964 and 2001 (see also Clarke et al. 2004). The intermittent line 
reflects the likelihood of all those citizens aged 60 and older to go to the polls; the 
other line stands for all others, aged 59 and younger. In all eleven elections, older 
people were more likely to vote. However, the difference between the two changed 
significantly over time. In most years (1964, 1966, Feb 1974, 1983, 1987, 1992) the 
difference between the two was smaller than 3 %. It was larger at about 4 to 5 % in 
1970, October 1974 and in 1979. In the last years (1997 and 2001), the difference 
increased dramatically to 10 to 15 %.
The fact that older people are more likely to vote in all British elections is a 
fascinating finding. Older people in the 1960s had been bom under Queen Victoria 
or King Edward and had experienced the era of Liberal-Conservative co-operation 
and limited franchise when they had been young adults. Those older people were 
more likely to vote in the 1960s than the younger generations who had grown up
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with full mass franchise and different political experiences at young adulthood, such 
as the rise of the Conservatives. The younger generation in the 1960s became the 
older generation in 1990s. Again, they differ a lot in terms of their political 
experiences from younger people. Still, older people in the 1990s were more likely to 
vote.
Figure 6-2: Average turnout of four political generations in Britain 1964-2001
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Source: own calculation according to the British election study 1964-2001.
Figure 6-2 shows the voting probabilities of four cohorts across time. These 
cohorts are defined through the historical periods during which they were first 
allowed to vote (see the next chapter for a detailed discussion) and are thus ‘political 
generations’. The four generations are the only ones for which we have data for the 
time at which they first went to the polls. Two aspects are worth mentioning about 
the graphs. The four generations are distinctively different from each other in their 
average voting participation. The more recent the socialisation of each political 
generation, the lower its average voting participation is. In 1997 for example, the 
difference between Blair’s Children, bom in 1975 or more recently, and the 1966-79 
cohort, bom between 1946 and 1956, was about 25 %. At the same time, the
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difference in voting probabilities at the first eligible election between the two 
generations (1970 for the 1966-79 cohort and 1997 for Blair’s Children) was also 
about 15 %. In other words, political generations differ in their initial voting 
participation at the first election and remain distinctive from each other in all 
subsequent elections. In addition, the two ‘long’ political generations about which we 
have data for most elections seem to grow in their likelihood of voting over the 
years. The 1951-66 cohort grows from a low of 75 % in 1966 to a high of 92 % in 
2001. The 1966-79 cohort increases in likelihood from 73 % in 1970 to 88 % in 
2001. This growth is all the more remarkable given that the overall turnout declined 
from 77.1 % in 1964 to 59.4 % in 2001 (Yonwin 2004: 17).
If cohort effects, such as the political generation effect that stipulates a lasting 
influence of early political socialisation, could alone explain the differences in 
turnout between older and younger people, we would not be able to see the growth in 
cohort voting participation of the same cohort across time. This growth cannot be 
due to period effects as the overall tendency was a decline in turnout. If, on the other 
hand, only life cycle or ageing hypotheses were true, we would not be able to see the 
fluctuations in the difference between younger and older voters over time. This is 
because it is reasonable to assume that life cycle or ageing forces are relatively stable 
over four decades. In sum, there seems to be a combination of life cycle and 
generational factors that explains differences between age groups across time.
The rest of the chapter will not concentrate on political generation 
explanations, for which it would be necessary to look at each country separately. 
Instead, I will use an innovative technique to undertake an analysis that does not 
allow an estimation of all generational effects, but does allow for an estimation of the
relative impact of many life cycle effects, as well as the causal mechanism behind 
ageing. This latter mechanism remains underdeveloped in the literature.
6.2 An international cross-sectional approach in a quasi- 
experimental setting
Recall from the methodological chapter the logic of the international cross-sectional 
analysis. The European Social Survey contains 21 European countries. Each country 
has a sample of at least 1,000 respondents that allow estimates for that country. In 
addition, questions have been put to respondents that are checked for equivalence 
across countries, for example through reliable translation. Each country sample 
contains members of different age groups. The set-up of 21 countries can now serve 
as a quasi-experimental setting because members of the same age groups in different 
countries share some predispositions and are different in others. I introduced two 
randomly drawn individuals, the older Adam and the younger Henrietta. The Finnish 
Adam and the British Adam experienced radically different political lives that varied 
in their experience of the party system, elections, salient campaigning issues and 
electoral systems. Their socialisation at a young age was as different as the period 
effects at the time of the survey. The same would be true for the younger Finnish 
Henrietta versus a British Henrietta. As we have 21 countries, the socialisation and 
period experiences vary widely across age groups.
At the same time, citizens of the 21 countries are assumed to be similar in the 
way they reach a decision about political participation. They make a calculation 
about costs and benefits (instrumental and expressive) and consider the 
resources/motivation on the one hand in the face of mobilisation factors on the other. 
The cost and benefit calculation is influenced by a mixture of political generation, 
shared social characteristic cohort, life cycle and individual ageing effects. When we
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only look at differences in turnout between age groups at one point in time, the 
difference in average voting participation must be due to a combination of those four 
effects on the cost-benefit calculation. Adam might have a likely voting participation 
of 85 % in contrast to Henrietta who might just have 75 %. Both of them, however, 
follow the same decision-making procedure about whether to vote or not according 
to our assumptions.
I will illustrate the accumulative age effects on the cost-benefit calculation for 
the two. Adam might belong to a political generation that was socialised into having 
high esteem for voting as a duty, but has a bad knee due to his lifelong work as a 
manual labourer making it difficult to go to the booth. At the same time, he only has 
basic education that makes it harder for him to order a postal ballot. However, he has 
voted ten times already, knows the parties well and has some experience of similar 
political situations. Henrietta, in contrast, grew up during an era of disenchantment 
with electoral politics, has no health problems, but does have concern for public 
schools as she has three children. She also has a professional degree in the services 
sector that she completed after her A Levels. She has only voted three times in her 
life. This illustration shows that we need to measure all of these differences 
separately in order to explain the difference of 10 % between Adam’s and Henrietta’s 
likely voting participation. In the multivariate regression analysis, we can do so with 
the help of independent control variables.
The problem is, however, that not all of the hypothesised effects are directly 
measurable through survey questions. Differences in early socialisation (political 
generation effect) can only be partly measured via variables concerning political 
attitudes. Individual ageing, however, poses the biggest problem. Its hypothesised 
nature as norm-compliance and habituation is not amenable to asking respondents
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questions. However, the quasi-experimental setting allows the interpretation of the 
coefficients of the residual age variable once all measurable age effects are 
controlled for. If all life cycle effects and shared social characteristic cohort effects 
are controlled directly, the coefficient of the residual age variable contains as yet 
unmeasured political generation effects and the individual ageing effects. In a single 
country cross-sectional study, the two types of effects remain confounded. In the 
pooled analysis however, the national political generation effects should cancel each 
other out. Furthermore, if the differences between age groups are captured via age 
dummies, the pooled analysis should show a smooth concave learning curve that 
represents the character of habituation (hypothesis H10). In addition, the nature of 
norm-compliance should vary according to the degree to which the social norm of 
voting is spread. Thus, I will compare the results across various groups of countries 
with different turnout levels and across respondents with varying levels of education 
and expressed sense of duty to vote (hypotheses H12a-c).
6.3 Independent variables: their bivariate relationship with age and 
predicted link to voting participation
As a first step, we must now decide which independent variables we should include. 
We must ask (a) where cohorts differ in their cost-benefit calculation of voting, and 
(b) how transitions over the life cycle affect the calculation. Although technically not 
necessary, we furthermore typify the variables according to the cohort/life cycle 
differentiation for ease of interpretation.23 This classification exercise does not
23 Technically, we do not need to make the life cycle and cohort categorisation because these 
independent variables mainly serve as control variables to isolate the individual ageing effect. 
However, these effects are well-researched, and the conceptual categorisation is a helpful tool to 
discuss the political implications, such as the fact that life cycle effects are more stable than cohort 
effects.
149
represent an empirical test, and from then on, I treat the classified nature of age- 
related effects as assumptions.
Our theoretical framework predicts that cohorts might be different in terms of 
their preferences. This is because members of one cohort share the exposure to a 
common early political experience. This is what I call the political generation effect. 
It can be partially measured via attitude questions. For example, the sense of duty 
that is associated with voting can be a function of the early experience. Also, a cohort 
can be different because its members have a different level of endowment with 
regard to resources. For example, the lower level of educational attainment among 
older cohorts takes that resource away from those generations. Cohorts can also 
differ in mobilisation as older people are more likely to be party members in most 
countries, as I showed in chapter 5. These are shared social characteristic cohort 
effects and can be measured well via survey items. Life cycle variations can also be 
captured via survey variables. For example, older people have a richer endowment of 
resources because they have lived longer in a particular residence and are thus 
familiar with the problems of that area and are also more likely to be registered.
Table 6-1 lists the range of independent variables that I will now discuss in 
detail. Details about operationalisation, descriptives and correlations among them can 
be found in the appendices 11.1 and 11.2. According to the literature, two are pure 
cohort (namely social characteristic cohort) and seven are pure life cycle effects. For 
six variables, there is a mixed expectation (see next section). As a first empirical test, 
each variable has been tested as to whether it has the expected bivariate correlation 
with age. Each one of these variables correlates with age at least 0.10 in two or more 
countries. The break-up point of 0.10 is rather low. This is due to the fact that within 
age groups there are considerable variations as to these variables as well, meaning
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that the relationship between age groups cannot be straightforward. In addition, some 
of these variables measure attitudinal predispositions as proxies, so that a lower 
threshold seems advisable.24 One variable has been excluded after this test: political 
trust, which I expected to vary between cohorts according to the literature on the 
change of political process (Dalton 2004). It does not correlate significantly with age. 
Overall, however, the expected associations were confirmed, which represents the 
first test for hypothesis H5, that older people differ on predictors of political 
participation from younger people.
I will now discuss groups of independent variables in detail, starting with 
those that have a suppressing effect on the turnout for older people. A variable has a 
suppressing effect either because it is negatively related with age and positively with 
turnout (like education) or the other way round (like health).
24 If I include all independent variables in the multivariate model no matter what their relationship 
with age, the findings of this chapter do not change significantly.
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Table 6-1: Age-related independent variables: correlation with age and the expected association 
with voting participation
Independent variables Overall correlation with Expected correlation
age (Pearson’s r) with voting
participation
Cohort effects
Religiosity 0.20 ** +
Education -0.18** +
Cohort/life cycle effects
Party identification 0.16** +
Sense o f duty to vote 0.15 * * +
Income -0.13** +
Political interest 0.08** +
Trade union and party membership 0.03** +
Gender (female) N/ab
Life cycle effects
Pension main source of income 0.67** +
Duration of residence 0.54** +
Number o f minor children in household8 -0.47** +
Subjective evaluation of health -0.36** +
Living with partner8 -0.26** +
Friends in non-political networks -0.09* +
Internal political efficacy -0.08** +
External political efficacy -0.07** +
* Significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01 one-tailed, weighted by design and demographic weights, 
coding in the appendix, source: ESS.
a: these variables have a curvilinear relationship with age, correlations are for respondents 40 years 
and older.
b: demographers use the masculinity ratio to describe how many men there are per one hundred 
women in a particular age group. In 2000, the ratio was around 90 in European countries in the 60-64 
age group and around 50 in the 80+ age group (Avramov and Maskova 2003: 51).
Suppressing Turnout
Education, income: the so-called ‘standard model’ of political participation
postulates that higher socio-economic status has a positive impact on participation.
Higher education enables citizens to have a better understanding of politics (for an
overview see Leighly 1995). At the same time, they are more likely -  because of
occupation and income - to be in a social context where norms of participation
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prevail. Higher income citizens also have a higher material stake in the system. The 
spread of mass education, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Thus, there is 
a clear generational decline in aggregate levels of education. Income declines with 
age, mirroring cohort and life cycle differences. Older generations do earn less, but 
all the elderly have less income as they retire, because pension levels are below 
working life wages.
Gender: entrenched understandings of traditional gender roles could interact 
with age since newer cohorts are less likely to hold them. Women in older 
generations might still have been socialised into social roles that prescribe political 
activity only in the shadow of their husbands (Welch 1977). Also, it is necessary to 
include gender because older age groups are comprised of more women because of 
their longer life expectancy.
Living with a partner, number o f minor children in household, subjective 
evaluation o f health: these are clear life cycle effects. To live together with a partner 
increases the chance of voting because the partner is another potential mobilising 
source (Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2003). On the grounds of widowhood and 
divorce, this variable is negatively correlated with age for people who are 40 and 
older. Children enhance one’s personal interest in public provision. A certain amount 
of physical fitness is needed to undertake even the minimal requirements of voting. 
Frailty increases with age (Gehring and Wagner 1999: 696-97) due to the 
accumulative effects of unhealthy lifestyles and the physical effects of ageing.
25 One might question the validity of subjective self-evaluation o f one’s own health, but this 
evaluation is, first of all, highly correlated with objective health measures and secondly, this self- 
image is a powerful force by itself (see Bazargan, Kang, and Bazargan 1991: 183-4).
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Friends in non-political networks: according to the disengagement thesis that 
I presented in chapter 2, the elderly are thought to show a decline in inter-personal 
activity as they disengage themselves from their social environment. This 
disengagement includes disengagement from the political sphere, meaning that levels 
of participation should drop. The retreat should be reflected in a decline in the 
number of social networks that are reported to include close friends. The social 
retreat would then not only affect the political sphere directly, but also decrease the 
possibility of individuals being mobilised in a non-political context, such as by 
friends. Social networks are considered to be important in making people participate 
in politics in general (Knoke 1990; Putnam 2000). Individuals gain expressive 
benefit from voting as they can talk, for example, with their friends about the 
experience.
Internal and external political efficacy: one strand of the social 
gerontological literature deals with problems of ageism in Western societies (see for 
example Wilson 2000: 161-62). Negative stereotypes of inactivity in the elderly 
reflect back on senior citizens and influence their self-image in a way that may make 
them feel less politically efficacious. The social situation of older people in general is 
shaped by the images that the environment has of them. As a result, internal and 
external political efficacies decrease, resulting in the political participation of older 
people being hampered. I will further explore these images in chapter 9.
Trade union and party membership: membership of a political organisation is 
a strong mobilising factor in voting because members are exposed to the activists’ 
efforts to make them cast their vote in favour of the organisation. Some countries 
have experienced a decline in party and trade union membership, which would be
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reflected in ageing membership profiles. Retirement leads to exit from trade unions 
in most countries (see chapter 5 and Mair and van Biezen 2001; Widfeldt 1995).
Boosting Turnout
Sense o f duty to vote: in the survey, respondents have been asked to give an answer 
to the following question on an 11 point scale: ‘To be a good citizen, how important 
would you say it is for a person to vote in elections?’ This variable is helpful to catch 
some of the variation in the individually felt subjective norm to vote. According to 
our theoretical expectations of norm-compliance over a lifetime (hypotheses 12a-c), 
we can expect this item to show the features of a life cycle effect. Unfortunately, we 
must expect over-reporting of such a socially desirable trait, so the proxy loses its 
power. In addition, the decline of the sense of duty to vote as a cohort effect has been 
established in several country studies (Blais et al. 2004; Clarke et al. 2004).
Religiosity: secularisation makes newer cohorts less religious (see Wilson 
1966). Religiosity seems to increase our felt obligation to comply with social norms 
and thus makes more religious citizens more likely to vote.
Duration o f residence: this is considered to be one aspect of social 
connectedness. The longer one has been living in a certain area, the more likely one 
is to be socially settled. This means that one can pay attention to the increasingly 
familiar problems of that area that might need political solutions (Miller and Shanks 
1996: 100-6). One’s level of resources/motivation to vote is thereby increased.
Party identification: research into the decline of institutional forms of 
political participation holds that younger generations identify less with parties than
26 There is also evidence at the ecological level that districts with high levels o f residential mobility 
have lower turnout (Gimpel, Morris, and Armstrong 2004).
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with other political groupings with a smaller scope of activity. On the other hand, the 
older a person is, the higher that individual’s potential attachment to his or her party, 
as they have more time to grow attached. This could explain the higher level of party 
identification amongst older people (Butler and Stokes 1983 [1974]: 59-61; Converse 
1976; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995a; Tilley 2003). Voters with lower levels of party 
identification feel less motivation to engage in a form of electoral politics where they 
lack the identification with an actor they might deem worth voting for.
Pension as a main source o f income’, to be dependent on public pensions 
could be a mobilising factor because politics can be important in determining the 
amount of income (see Campbell 2003a).
Political interest', the disengagement thesis hypothesises a decrease in 
political interest. But a competing hypothesis of ‘selective withdrawal’ demands that 
politics might be one of the few areas where the elderly decide to remain active. This 
view predicts a general social retreat among the elderly accompanied by the 
concentration on fewer subjects, including politics (Glenn and Grimes 1968). 
Political interest is thereby a strong predictor of political participation because it 
decreases information costs. Citizens who are politically interested do not view 
getting information about politics as a costly necessity, but draw some enjoyment 
from it. Younger cohorts, e.g. in Britain, show less interest in formal politics than 
older cohorts (Henn, Weinstein, and Wring 2002).
The following empirical investigation will show that not all of these variables 
are equally important when considered in a multivariate regression analysis. I will 
show that the pure life cycle effects of having lived in an area for longer (positive 
impact), living without a partner, and deteriorating health (negative impact) are the
factors that have the strongest impact on an older person’s likelihood of voting.
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6.4 Results o f the cross-sectional regression analysis
This cross-sectional analysis can be divided into three different steps. Firstly, I want 
to establish the relative impact of the independent variables in multivariate models 
(table 6-2, models 1-3). Secondly, I will demonstrate the universal presence of 
individual ageing by comparing the results of the pooled analysis with results from 
separate country regressions (figure 6-4). Thirdly, I will run several tests with sub­
samples (table 6-3) showing that: (a) the impact of the individual-level variables does 
not vary a lot depending on the macro country context (models 4a-c); (b) differences 
between age groups are bigger in low turnout countries; and (c) the causal 
mechanism behind the effect of individual ageing on voting participation is the 
habituation of socially conformist behaviour (models 5a-b).
I am using logistic regression models with country dummies for the analysis 
of several countries at the same time. We know from the analysis of electoral 
institutions that they affect the average probability of the eligible voter to go to the 
polls. By modelling country dummies as part of these models, I allow this average 
probability -  in effect: the intercepts -  to vary between countries. The dependent 
variable is a dichotomy of whether or not the respondent voted in the last national 
parliamentary election before spring 2002.
Table 6-2 shows a series of three regressions. Model 1 as a reference model 
only has age dummies as explanatory variables. Model 2 includes the full list of 
independent variables. There are some age-related effects that lose significance in the 
multivariate regression model: religiosity, gender, income, social networks, internal 
and external political efficacy, and pension as the main source of income. Model 3 
introduces an interaction term between education and age. The last column in table 
6-2 shows the difference in fitted probabilities between the minimum and at the
157
maximum of the independent variable when other effects are being held constant at 
their means in model 3. However, these calculations do not tell us enough about the 
differences between age groups because the model looks at all variance within as 
well as between age groups.
Table 6-2: Logistic regressions on vote participation in Europe, whole sample
Dependent variable: vote participation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. A in fitted
probabilities
between
minimum
and
maximum
Constant 0.08 0.07 -4.51*** 0.20 -4.30*** 0.20
Individual Ageing
Age dummies (29 and
younger baseline)
30-39 0.62*** 0.06 0.44*** 0.08 0.49*** 0.09 0.05
40-49 1.15*** 0.07 0.77*** 0.09 0.82*** 0.09 0.07
50-59 1.30*** 0.07 0.88*** 0.09 0.90*** 0.09 0.08
60-69 1.41*** 0.08 0.87*** 0.12 0.87*** 0.12 0.07
70-79 1.31*** 0.09 0.93*** 0.13 1.07*** 0.15 0.08
80+ 0.60*** 0.12 0.34* 0.17 0.76*** 0.20 0.06
Cohort
Education 0.11*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.05 0.18
Religiosity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Cohort/life cycle
Sense o f duty to vote 0.29*** 0.01 0.29*** 0.01 0.51
Party identification 0.23*** 0.02 0.23*** 0.02 0.09
Political interest 0.27*** 0.27 0.27*** 0.04 0.09
Trade union and party
membership 0.19* 0.19 0.19* 0.08 0.04
Female -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.05
Income 0.03 0.01 0.03* 0.01
Life cycle
Duration o f residence,
logged 0.31*** 0.03 0.31*** 0.03 0.18
Subjective evaluation of
health 0.13*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.03 0.07
Living with partner 0.42*** 0.06 0.41*** 0.06 0.05
Number o f minor children
in household 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Friends in non-political
networks, logged 0.19*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.06 0.05
Internal political efficacy,
logged 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
External political efficacy,
logged 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Pension main source of
income 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.10
30-39 X education -0.19** 0.06 -0.13
40-49 X education -0.23*** 0.07 -0.16
50-59 X education -0.26*** 0.07 -0.18
60-69 X education -0.26*** 0.07 -0.18
70-79 X education -0.11 0.08 -0.07
80+ X education 0.09 0.12 -0.06
Valid N 34,303 33,976 33,976
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.250 0.252
*** Significant at 0.001 level, ** at 0.01 level, Data: ESS.
Tested insignificant interaction terms: age X gender, pension X income. GB baseline with country dummies (unreported). Last model with centred 
education variable.
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Figure 6-3: The impact of age-related independent variables on vote participation and their 
correlation with age
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Living with partner and number of minor children for respondents aged 40 and older.
Figure 6-3 illustrates which variables are most important to explain the 
differences between age groups (apart from education which I will discuss 
separately). The horizontal axis shows the absolute value of the bivariate correlation 
of the independent variables with age. The vertical axis shows the impact as 
calculated by the difference in fitted probabilities. From this age-centred perspective, 
the variables that stand out as having a relatively high impact, as well as a stronger 
correlation with age, are the following: duration of residence, if someone is living 
with a partner, and subjective evaluation of health. Their distance to the other 
variables, more to the left, is relatively large. The closest variable from this group of 
four is party identification, to which I will come back in the discussion of the sub­
samples. None of these four variables is as strong as the residual age variable, which 
-  if it were on the graph -  would be higher on the vertical and more to the right on 
the horizontal axis than any of the control variables.
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There are some remarkable aspects concerning these three factors. For one, 
all of them are purely sociological and stand outside of the political process. It is the 
social context of the life cycle that matters rather than the political context to explain 
variation between age groups. All of these variables describe life cycle effects. The 
probability of living with a partner increases from youth to middle age and decreases 
thereafter. Duration of residence increases with age. Health worsens with age. 
Secondly, the impact of these factors on voting participation is arguably quite stable 
since they are embedded in a cultural conception of a social life course that is only 
subject to slow societal change. Finally, two of the three most important age-related 
effects make elderly people less likely to vote. This hints at the magnitude of the 
other effects that make older people more likely to vote, namely individual ageing 
and the duration of residence. In sum, hypothesis H5 that holds that older people 
differ on predictors of political participation from younger people has only partially 
been found evidence for with regard to voting participation; some variables (for 
example pension as a main source of income) that correlate systematically with age 
(see bivariate assessment above) show no impact in the multivariate regression 
analysis. Thus, the model could be made more parsimonious by dropping these 
variables for future testing.
Model 3 in table 6-2 further introduces an interaction effect between 
education and age. This interaction was first shown by Raymond Wolfinger and 
Stephen Rosenstone (1980) with US census data and confirmed by Rosenstone and 
John Hansen (1993) with US election surveys. The older the voters are, the smaller
27 Jonathan Nagler (1991) raised the problems of artificial interaction effects in logistic regression that 
are due to the S-shaped probability curve. As a simple remedy to test whether the observed interaction 
effect between age and education is an artefact or real, I ran the same regression for all seven 
educational groups separately. The changes in the coefficient of the age dummies correspond to what
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the gap is between different educational groups. Highly educated citizens generally 
show a higher likelihood of voting because they are more likely to understand the 
political process and live in a social context where norms of participation prevail. 
Over a lifetime, however, less educated people catch up with their more educated 
fellow citizens of the same age. This can be explained by the substituting effect of 
life experience for education. The learning effect through own past experience is 
stronger for people of lower educational backgrounds over a lifetime. Individuals 
with lower levels of education who are young cannot circumvent the constraint of 
limited rationality using the heuristic short-cuts of their own experience.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the general curvilinear increase of 
voting participation in all educational groups when plotted against age.
Figure 6-4: Variation between age groups as to fitted voting probability after analysis for each 
country separately and for pooled sample
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we would expect from the interaction effect. Therefore, this interaction term is not an artefact of the 
regression technique.
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Figure 6-4 shows the results of 21 regressions, one per country (based on 
model 2). The horizontal axis shows the fitted probability for all other variables held 
constant except for age. As we can see, there is a lot of variation between countries. 
Most countries do show an increasing tendency to vote with age, but not all. The 
reason for the difference between countries lies in the cross-sectional nature of the 
data. If we look at, for example, the British 50-59 year olds and their likelihood of 
voting, this average probability is not only determined by individual ageing but also 
the cohort experience of those that have been bom between 1942 and 1952. We can 
control for part of this cohort experience, namely the shared probability of attaining a 
social characteristic like education or religiosity, at the individual level. What we 
cannot control is the shared experience as a political generation that might make this 
age group different from others in Britain (and a group of unknown factors the 
influence of which we assume to be random). However, these political generation 
effects are determined by national political history. Therefore, the graphs of each 
country look very different. If we pool all respondents into one analysis, these 
political generation experiences cancel each other out. In the pooled analysis, they 
become a kind of white noise that does not affect the universal experience that all 
countries share: individual ageing. Other factors that are unknown and are captured 
in the residual age variation are assumed to be random and do not therefore influence 
the result when we pool the analysis.
The thick concave line represents the result from the pooled analysis. As 
hypothesised (hypothesis H10), we see a clearly increasing trend, which is increasing 
at decreasing rates. This is the typical form of a learning curve. I hypothesise that the 
causal mechanism behind this individual ageing effect is the habituation of socially
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conformist behaviour. To lend evidence to this, we can split the sample in two 
different ways for two series of regressions as a second test.
The first division separates the countries according to their average 
parliamentary turnout 1945-2001 (according to IDEA 2002: 83-4).28 The first group 
of low turnout countries consists of France, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom (51.4 % - 74.9 %). The medium-tumout 
countries are Finland, Germany, Greece, Norway, Spain, Slovenia (76.4 % - 80.8 %). 
The final groups of high turnout countries consist of Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (83.8 % -  92.0 %). Belgium has 
been excluded from the last group because of its system of compulsory voting with 
strong enforcement that leads to high turnout. The size of each sub-sample is 
between 10,700 and 11,000.
Higher average turnout is relevant in two ways. First of all, the norm of 
voting is more established in higher turnout countries since more people practice it. 
Secondly, comparative research suggests that turnout is higher when elections are 
held in a way in which the voter perceives a stronger instrumental incentive to vote 
(Franklin, van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis 1996).
28 Vote to voting age population ratio.
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Table 6-3: Logistic regressions on vote participation, sample split by average country turnout (model 4) and by sense of duty (model 5)
Dependent variable: vote participation
Model 4a 
low average turnout 
France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Poland, 
Switzerland, the United 
________Kingdom________
Model 4b 
medium average turnout 
Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Norway, Spain, Slovenia
Model 4c 
high average turnout 
Austria, Czech Rep., 
Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden
Model 5a 
low sense of duty
Model 5b 
high sense of duty
Country dummies Great Britain baseline 
Coef. Rob. Std. Err.
Germany baseline 
Coef. Rob. Std. Err.
Austria baseline 
Coef. Rob. Std. Err.
Great Britain baseline 
Coef. Rob. Std. Err.
Great Britain baseline 
Coef. Rob. Std. Err.
constant j2*** 0.28 -4.06*** 0.32 -2.64*** 0.47 -3.70*** 0.45 -3.31*** 0.26
Individual ageing
Age dummies (29 and younger
baseline)
30-39 0.47*** 0.13 0.70*** 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.71 0.45 1.09*** 0.23
40-49 0.84*** 0.14 1 01*** 0.16 0.36 0.19 1.38** 0.47 1.63*** 0.23
50-59 1.02*** 0.14 0.87*** 0.18 0.41* 0.18 1.05* 0.47 1.89*** 0.22
60-69 1.20*** 0.19 0.60** 0.21 0.51 0.28 1.52** 0.49 1.83*** 0.23
70-79 1.18*** 0.22 1.02*** 0.28 0.85** 0.29 0.64 0.50 1.75*** 0.24
80+ 0.99*** 0.32 0.51 0.34 0.70 0.51 0.77 0.63 0.77* 0.31
f^onort
Education 0.20*** 0.06 0.41*** 0.12
Religiosity 0.03* 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Life cycle/cohort
Female -0.03 0.08 -0.20* 0.10
Political interest 0.27*** 0.06 0.29*** 0.07
Sense of duty to vote 0.30*** 0.02 0.31*** 0.02
Income 0.01 0.02 0.08** 0.03
Party identification 0.17*** 0.03 0.27*** 0.04
Trade union and party
membership 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.13
0.74*** 0.14 0.32** 0.10 0.28*** 0.05
0.01 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.10 0.11 0.06 0.12 -0.14* 0.06
0.23** 0.08 0.38*** 0.08 0.35*** 0.04
0.29*** 0.02 - - - -
0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
0.33*** 0.04 0.28*** 0.05 0.27*** 0.02
0.13 0.16 -0.12 0.20 0.30*** 0.08
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Model 4a 
low average turnout 
France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Poland, 
Switzerland, the United 
________Kingdom________
Model 4b 
medium average turnout 
Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Norway, Spain, Slovenia
Model 4c 
high average turnout 
Austria, Czech Rep., 
Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden
Model 5a 
low sense of duty
Life cycle
Valid N 
Pseudo R2
10,729
0.222
11,101
0.270
10,710
0.268
3,580
0.156
Model 5b 
high sense of duty
Duration of residence, logged 0.29*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.05 0.46*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.07 0.31*** 0.03
Ext. pol. efficacy, logged -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
Int. pol. efficacy, logged 0.05 0.04 0.09* 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03
Pension main source o f income 0.13 0.13 0.34 0.18 -0.48* 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.01 0.10
Living with partner 0.33*** 0.09 0.54*** 0.10 0.44*** 0.13 0.51*** 0.14 0.41*** 0.06
Subj. evaluation o f health 0.12* 0.05 0.25*** 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.16*** 0.03
Friends in non-political 
networks, logged 0.22* 0.09 0.24* 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.25*** 0.06
Number of minor children in 
househ. 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.03
30-39 X education -0.20* 0.08 -0.21 0.14 -0.50** 0.18 -0.24 0.14 -0.19** 0.07
40-49 X education -0.19* 0.08 -0.40** 0.14 -0.48*** 0.18 -0.39** 0.14 -0.24*** 0.07
50-59 X education -0.16 0.08 -0.41** 0.15 -0.71*** 0.16 -0.36* 0.15 -0.26*** 0.07
60-69 X education -0.07 0.10 -0.59*** 0.13 -0.59** 0.19 -0.63*** 0.17 -0.21** 0.07
70-79 X education -0.00 0.11 -0.45** 0.14 -0.32 0.20 -0.27 0.17 -0.07 0.09
80+ X education 0.16 0.15 -0.30** 0.18 -0.04 0.31 -0.35 0.27 0.15 0.13
30,396
0.171
*** Significant at 0.001 level, ** at 0.01 level, Data: ESS. All models include country dummies with differing baselines.
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Table 6-3 shows the regressions (models 4a-c). Some of the small-impact coefficients 
change in significance somewhat. That should not concern us too much because their 
minor impact makes them more interesting as control, rather than substantive variables. 
It is important to note that no coefficient changes its sign apart from pension as a main 
source of income.29 In models 4a-b, this variable is insignificant and carries positive 
coefficients. In model 4c, it is negative and significant at 0.05 level.
Two out of the three social characteristics that are so important in explaining 
variation between age groups (duration of residence, living with partner) show stable, 
significant coefficients. Subjective evaluation of health is not significant in the last 
model and only significant at 0.05 level in model 4a, but the coefficient remains positive 
throughout. All other coefficients with strong impacts remain quite similar. Party 
identification changes its coefficient depending on the country group. It becomes twice 
as high in the high turnout states in comparison to those with low turnout. This is not 
due to sampling error, which is relatively small for this independent variable. It could be 
that party identification is a stronger mobilising factor in countries in which perceived 
costs of voting are lower (higher turnout countries).
If we now turn to the coefficients of the age dummies, we can see that the overall 
curvilinear relationship is the same. However, compared to younger age groups, older 
age groups are the more likely to go to the polls, the lower the average turnout in that 
country. If one compares the coefficients line by line, one can see that they decrease 
from left to right in all instances except for the medium group in the 30-39 and 40-49
29 Sampling error alone can explain quite a lot of variation just between different samples of the same 
population and does not need to hint at systematic differences between the country groups.
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categories. Thus, all other things being equal, an older citizen differs more from a 
younger in a country like Britain or Poland (low turnout) than in Denmark or Austria 
(high turnout). This lends support to our hypothesis 12a.
This can be explained by the fact that in a country with low turnout, there is less 
social pressure to conform for all age groups. Thus, a young person in those countries 
feels less incentive to conform to the voting norm. Over a lifetime however, a person 
learns to conform more and more as s/he becomes part of a social context that values 
that norm. Starting from a lower level at a younger age, there is more room for the 
habituating process towards the top.
The interaction effect between education and the age dummies also seems to 
depend to some extent on the average level of turnout in a country. The higher the 
average level, the stronger is the increase in the coefficients. Substantially, this means 
that the hypothesised replacement of the function of formal education by life experience 
is stronger, the more widespread the social norm of voting is. It makes sense that the 
learning process associated with experience has a stronger effect in countries where the 
social phenomenon that is the content of learning is more prevalent.
Another test for the nature of the habituation process is to split the sample into 
two groups according to their reported sense of duty to vote. The group with a low sense 
of duty are those respondents with a score 0-4, and the group with a high sense of duty 
are those with a score 5-10.30 The sample with the lower sense of duty consists of about
30 In general, we can expect bias in terms of respondents over-reporting their sense of duty because it is a 
socially desirable trait. It is reasonable to assume, however, that this bias does not differ between age 
groups (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: appendix B).
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3,600 respondents, die other of about 30,400. Naturally, standard errors are about half 
the size in the larger sample compared to the smaller. In general, for those with the low 
sense of duty the coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal or a bit higher than 
in the group with the higher sense. This can be explained by the fact that mobilising 
factors have a stronger impact on those who feel a lower civic duty to vote.
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Figure 6-6: Variation between age groups as to fitted voting probability, low sense of duty to vote
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Figures 6-5 and 6-6 show the relationship between age, education and the fitted
probability of voting, all other things being equal, for the two sub-groups. Not
surprisingly, those who feel a high sense of duty have a higher probability of voting in
general, in comparison to their counterparts of the same age and educational
background. If we now look at figure 6-5 for those with a high sense of duty and high
formal education, there is almost no variation between age groups. This is the graphic
embodiment of the ceiling of habituation. Those who feel a high sense of duty at a
young age have a high incentive to vote when they are also more highly educated. This
is because they have an understanding of the political process and are cognitively
engaged (Dalton 1984). Thus, life experience cannot lead to more habituation in this
group of voters, because these individuals are likely to vote in every election. For those
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with low educational backgrounds and a high sense of duty, life experience substitutes 
for understanding the political process by education. These findings confirm our 
hypothesis HI2b. Figure 6-6, in contrast, paints a different picture for those with a low 
sense of duty. Here, high educational background does not equate with high 
participation. The relationship across age groups is not positive and does not look 
similar to the individual ageing effect. This stems from the fact that those people who 
are highly educated, and are thus prone to have a greater understanding of the political 
process, do not habituate voting across their life time because they do not perceive it as a 
civic duty. Thus, it would be inconsistent for them to conform to a kind of behaviour 
that they do not deem desirable. This finding confirms hypothesis HI2c. For those with 
low educational backgrounds, there is still some residual effect -  although not a clean 
learning curve - of life experience teaching them the norm. It might be that the less 
educated are more open to social pressure because they are not cognitively mobilised to 
resist the habituation of a norm they do not agree with. All in all, however, this 
habituation pattern is much less pronounced in comparison to the other patterns we have 
seen.
6.5 Discussion and summary
If we now combine the findings from the British case and the analysis of the European 
Social Survey, we can see that there is strong evidence for all four types of age-related 
effects being present to explain the difference in voting participation between older and 
younger people.
Firstly, there is a case to be made for the presence of habituation as a
consequence of individual ageing (confirmed hypothesis H10). The learning curve that
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arose in the pooled analysis in comparison to single-country regressions gives evidence 
to this causal process. My causal narrative is that the cognitive short-cuts of past 
experience are important for ageing voters as it decreases their costs of voting. Then- 
past experience allows easier decision in the light of limited rationality. This past 
experience is so important that it can replace the function of formal education over the 
lifetime. Familiarity with the voting situation and similar political constellations in 
previous elections make it easier for older voters to take the decision to vote. The 
finding of habituation of voting also finds evidence in recently conducted experimental 
studies (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003; Green and Shachar 2000).
In addition, the increasing tendency to vote is higher, the more widespread the 
social norm of voting is, i.e. the higher the average voting turnout is in a country 
(confirmed hypothesis HI2a). This increase with age only manifests itself if voters are 
still open to an increase in their personally felt obligation to vote; among those with a 
high sense of duty, habituation with age hardly takes place anymore (confirmed 
hypothesis 12b), because the subjective norm to vote is already very high at a young age. 
In the group of voters with a low sense of duty and high cognitive mobilisation (high 
education), no increase in voting participation across age groups is visible (confirmed 
hypothesis HI2c) as voters understand the process and do not accept the social norm.
Are there any alternative explanations for the increasing voting probability of 
ageing voters? Since we needed to make assumptions about the unknown factors that are 
captured in the residual variation besides political generation effects from each country, 
it could be that this assumption is violated and that we omitted a systematic factor. 
Possibly, the older we are, the more we have at stake in a political system. In that case, it
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would not be social norms that drive us, but personal material interest. The older we are, 
the more we possess and more dependent on (or used to) public provisions we become. 
This would be a different version of the hypothesis that older people should vote for big- 
spending parties. Thus, we would lose more, if we did not exert our right to vote. This 
explanation is implausible because our vote contributes infmitesimally little to the 
outcome. If this explanation was true, the differences between countries should also not 
be the way they are. Economic interests that grow alongside ageing should not depend 
on the average turnout of the country. Thus, the systematic pattern that age differences 
are biggest in low turnout countries would remain unexplained. Also, direct measures of 
material interest like income and pension income would not be insignificant.
Another hypothesis could attribute the rise in turnout with age to an all- 
encompassing generational difference in the acknowledgement of voting as an important 
function of democracy. This notion is shared more by older people and less shared by 
younger persons (because they might see other forms of participation as more effective). 
This explanation is highly unlikely. Why should the elderly in Ireland share the same 
sense of the usefulness in voting as older Poles? Both groups have had very different 
experiences of democracy. Therefore, finding an all-overriding generational effect in so 
many countries is improbable.
Secondly, sociological life cycle factors are stronger than shared social 
characteristic cohort variables to explain differences between age groups. We have seen 
evidence for predictors of voting participation to be systematically correlated with age, 
and have seen these predictors having an impact on voting participation. The social and 
cultural construction of our life course sets the scene for a higher likelihood among older
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people to vote. Most importantly, the tendency to move houses less in later life makes 
older people more likely to have lived in a certain area for longer and therefore gives 
them an edge in knowing the problems of the area. The suppressing factors of being 
likely to live alone or being less able-bodied reduces the voting probability of older 
people.
Thirdly, shared social characteristic cohort effects play a subordinate role. 
Education loses its importance, the older the voter is. The highest ranking predictor in 
terms of influence on the dependent variable is party identification, which also has a life 
cycle root to it. Other ‘mixed’ age-related effects play an even less important role. 
Overall, not all predictors of political participation that are age-related maintain an 
impact in the multivariate regression analysis, meaning that hypothesis H5 is only 
partially confirmed with regard to voting participation.
Fourthly, cohort effects are definitely present to explain the difference between 
older and younger voters, as the British data analysis has shown (although we have not 
subjected this finding to a substantial test). Today’s younger people, Blair’s Children, 
show a smaller likelihood of voting in their early life cycle elections than the other three 
generations at the same age. The ‘zigzag’ lines in figure 6-4 of the European analysis 
demonstrate that the political generation differences can be quite substantial and erase 
parts of the individual ageing effect.
However, there has to be a caveat in the interpretations. I did not test the nature 
of the age-related effects empirically, i.e. I did not test whether duration of residence, for 
example, is a life cycle effect or a shared social characteristic cohort effect, but only
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assessed this origin through the literature. So, although well-grounded in the literature, 
one has to be aware of these limitations.
It is impossible to assess statistically the relative weight of each type of age- 
related effect for a concrete country. It is all the more difficult since the effects depend 
on the country context of past political history or the intensity of the social norm of 
voting. The proof of the habituation mechanism required us to create a ‘meta’- electorate 
of European voters with random noise political generation and period effects. However, 
if we remember the omnipresence of older people being more likely to vote -  across 
time for Britain and across space for the 21 European countries (see figure 5-3 in chapter 
5) -  it seems that the effects that are stable across time between generations (life cycle 
and individual ageing) are stronger.
If we accept this notion for the moment, it seems as if the campaigns of old age 
interests groups, as I reported them at the beginning of the chapter, are well-grounded in 
the underlying causal mechanisms of older people’s higher likelihood of voting. The 
nature of human decision-making as much as the sociological foundations of the life 
cycle stands outside of the political process. They cannot be changed, or at least not very 
easily. Older people are thus likely to maintain their relative higher voting probability 
compared to younger citizens, in the near future.
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7 Party Choice in Britain and West Germany
‘...Campaigners [in the 2005 British General Election] recognise that the 
search for the grey vote is more complex than simply handing out money.
Both the age and experience of older voters do not make them mere "what's 
in it for me?" consumer voters.’
Michael White (2005), political editor of the Guardian, in March 2005
In the run-up to the 2005 British General Election, there was a bidding war between the 
major political parties. Each one promised to allocate material hand-outs to pensioners: 
through either a discount or change in the Council Tax system (see chapter 9), more 
heating fuel money or higher pensions. Ignited by the campaigns of old age interest 
groups, all parties wooed the grey vote. Party campaigners were told that older people 
are more likely to switch their vote and must thus be won over. As the political editor of 
the Guardian above observed, this competition for the grey vote turned out to be very 
difficult because pure self-interest seemed not to be the only concern for older voters, 
with other factors remaining in the dark. The level of attention directed towards older 
voters increased significantly in the last few years. Still in the 1997 campaign, Peter 
Mandelson told an old age interest group lobbyist that Labour would not present New 
Labour in any way to appeal to older people because they would not change their vote 
(Vincent, Patterson, and Wale 2001: 74).
This chapter sheds some light on the matter from a more general angle: to what
extent do older voters cast their vote differently? Answering this question also represents
an attempt to analyse the content of a political participation decision rather than just the
determinants of the action itself. To that end, I will look at two countries, Britain and
West Germany, across several decades of time. This is a limited analysis as it only looks
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at two countries; however, the technical necessity of accumulating cross-sectional 
surveys to disentangle the statistical differences between age and cohort effects makes 
the analysis even of these two countries complex.
Each one of the four groups of hypotheses that guide the analysis of this PhD 
dissertation are testable with regard to party choice. The political generation hypothesis 
H4 predicts that older people’s behaviour is shaped by circumstances during their young 
adulthood. They share preferences across individuals because of common historical 
experiences with regard to parties. A party’s fortunes among young voters vary across 
time. The hypothesis stipulates that voters in early adulthood are more susceptible to the 
impressions that parties leave on them. They are likely to retain their preferences for the 
party that impresses them most. Thus, if the hypothesis was correct, we should be able to 
predict a party’s fortune among a certain cohort through our knowledge of the historical 
electoral circumstances of the period during which the cohort was in young adulthood. If 
I am right, we should be able to detect stable preferences in party choice with 
identifiable cohorts -  political generations -  across time. We should be able to predict 
the popularity of a certain party within a political generation relative to the preceding 
political generation. We can thus infer how older people who are members of a 
particular cohort differ from younger generations (hypothesis H4).
The shared social characteristic cohort hypothesis H6 entails that a cohort shares 
a certain probability to be exposed to a social characteristic. This can then influence the 
decision to participate politically in later life because, for example, motivations are 
different from other cohorts. The generational changes in social background, such as 
education or religiosity, can shape party fortunes among various cohorts. Thus, on top of
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the fixed political generation effect based on early socialisation, we should find effects 
of religiosity and education in the vote for the FDP and Greens that makes younger 
cohorts more likely to vote for them (hypothesis H6). We would expect similar social 
compositional effects for British cohorts, but because we face a more limited data set, 
we cannot test the analogous hypothesis for Britain.
There are four testable life cycle hypotheses in this chapter. Two of them are 
competing notions of growing conservatism with age. The accumulation of material 
resources over the life cycle could make older voters more likely to vote economically 
conservative as they have more material resources they want to preserve. The most 
extreme parties in economic policy terms should therefore show life cycle variations in 
the expected direction. In other words, older people should be more likely to vote for the 
most economically conservative party (FDP, Tories) and less likely to vote for the most 
economically progressive party (SPD, Labour) (hypothesis H8a). A competing 
hypothesis (H8b) predicts exactly the opposite. As older people are more dependent on 
public provisions, they should vote for the more economically progressive parties that 
favour a big state in terms of spending.
As another notion of conservatism, older people could become more 
conservative in the sense that they are reluctant to change and want to preserve the status 
quo and should thus be more likely to vote for the incumbent party. Opposition parties 
would thus be seen among older voters as less predictable in what they want to change 
(hypothesis H9). A final testable life cycle notion in this chapter is that older citizens
31 A third notion is growing authoritarianism with age that has recently been successfully rejected and will 
not be further considered here (see chapter 2).
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vote according to ‘grey interests’, i.e. for parties that set out to protect the material 
interests of older people. The social situation of retirement can shape the preferences of 
voters at that age, especially with regard to material provisions, such as pensions, social 
care and certain taxes. This notion can be tested at the aggregate level through a review 
of the success of senior parties (hypothesis H7). This is because ageing democracies 
should witness an increasing success of senior parties.
Lastly, the individual ageing hypotheses postulate that older voters learn from 
their experience and use this experience as a cognitive short-cut to make a decision. This 
leads to the testable proposition H ll that larger parties, or smaller parties that are 
regularly part of the government, have more of an edge among voters the older voters 
are. This is because these parties are more likely to leave impressions on them over their 
lifetimes- through the media and through their policies.
I proceed in this chapter in the following steps. Firstly, I will look at the electoral 
fortunes of grey parties that are specifically set up to address older voters’ interests. 
Secondly, I will describe the over time variations of differences between older and 
younger voters and political generations in Britain and West Germany. This is to show 
that neither pure life cycle, nor cohort explanations alone fit the data well. Thirdly, I will 
run various regressions to test the hypotheses together.
The results suggest the following: all of the four groups of hypotheses find some
evidence, but not without further refinement. Thus, some hypotheses are only partially
confirmed, and I suggest new refined hypotheses for further research. Growing
economic conservatism as much as growing interest in state-spending with higher age
can be refuted. The poor showing of grey parties also suggests that only a small minority
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of older people can vote for them. Moreover, some parties can leave a more prominent 
impression on electors through repeated government participation or their relatively 
constant electoral size. They seem to be more successful with older voters in electoral 
systems with proportional representation as they can repeatedly impress ageing voters. 
Furthermore, political generations matter if the party system is characterised by stronger 
alignment. Political impressions at political youth leave an impression that is carried 
through our lifetimes, but even more so if the overall volatility is low. This is because 
the strength of generational socialisation is one observable implication of the state of 
alignment. Finally, older people tend to be more status-quo conservative, voting for the 
incumbent party as a means to minimise the impact of unforeseen changes.
7.1 Voting for old age interests: the failure of grey parties
A grey party signals that its main target group are older people through its name, such as 
Grey Panthers, the Greys, or 55+. Hypothesis H7 holds that senior parties become 
successful in countries with sizeable and growing proportions of older voters. Older 
people might cast their vote for a party who represents special material interests 
associated with their higher age, most importantly health, care and pensions. These are 
expensive policies that need a high amount of re-distribution. It is remarkable that many 
European parties show the candidacy of grey parties. Indeed, there are few countries in 
which there is not one.
Older people’s parties appear in two disguises: with the label ‘pensioners’ or that
of ‘older people’. Most of these parties are electorally unsuccessful. Even in the
Netherlands, the country with the lowest electoral threshold in the world, pensioners’
parties could not gain more than six seats in one election (see table 7-1). The two
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successful exceptions are the Slovenian party that has been a member of the ruling 
coalition with one ministry (defence) since 1996, and the Luxemburgish party. The party 
in Luxembourg started out as a single-issue party that campaigned for equal pension 
treatment of public and private workers, but has seriously broadened its appeal and is 
now a right-wing party where senior interests are no longer the main campaigning issue 
(Wort.lu 2005). Thus, the hypothesis is false that senior parties become more successful 
in ageing democracies, because there is no visible trend of growing popularity.
Table 7-1: The electoral fortunes of grey parties in selected countries across Europe since 1980
Party Name Country Best Electoral Result
Action Committee for 
Democracy and 
Pensions Justice
Luxembourg 9.9 % (national election 2004)
Pensioners Party Finland 4.2 % (national election 1987)
Democratic Party of 
Pensioners of Slovenia
Slovenia 4.1 % (national election in 2004), member of 
the ruling coalition since 1996
Older people’s party, 
Union 55+, General 
Older People’s Union
Netherlands 3.6 % (AOV in 1994 national election), 0.9 % 
(U55+ in 1994 national election)
Pensioners’ Party of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.4% (2002 national elections)
Pensioners Party Italy 1.1 % (2004 European elections)
Pensioners Party Norway 0.5 % (2005 parliamentary elections), 1.5 % 
(2005 municipal elections)
Grey Panthers/the 
Greys, 50+
Germany 0.5 % (1994 national elections)
Swedish Senior Citizen 
Interest Party
Sweden Some regional and local representation
The Pensioners Party England/Wales,
Scotland
No representation
Sources: www.electionworld.org. Mackie and Rose (1990), various party websites.
It is interesting to note that grey parties started to emerge in the 1980s. Two 
explanations might account for this temporal incidence. In the aftermath of oil crises and
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recessions, welfare state programmes were being reconsidered across Europe. Older 
people, as the beneficiaries of some of these programmes, became the target of cutbacks 
as the whole political discourse around old age changed (Walker 1999). Also, the onset 
of de-alignment in some European countries had opened opportunities for new parties 
(Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992).
The generally bad fortune of grey parties might be a problem of supply rather 
than demand. In a Eurobarometer Survey in 1992, 10 to 20 % of older respondents in 
EU member states indicated that they thought that a party for older people would be 
good idea (Walker and Maltby 1997). In the accompanying senior boost survey in which 
older people (60+) had been asked, 22 % said that they would join a political party for 
older people (EB2242, own calculations).
We cannot refute the notion that older people vote according to their senior 
material interests if senior interests are best captured by mainstream parties. In many 
countries, there is no senior party of significant size that can even enter parliament. 
Senior parties might not only face the challenges that all small parties in general have to 
tackle, such as electoral thresholds. They might also be unsuccessful because major 
parties take up policies for senior citizens in order to gamer support from this large pool 
of voters. Thereby, older voters could want to vote according to senior interests, but 
there would not be one ‘best senior party’. Established parties might converge on these 
‘best senior’ positions. One could compare this notion with the middle class vote. In 
post-industrial societies, the middle class tends to comprise the majority of voters. Thus, 
no party can afford not to propose policies that benefit the middle class. In democracies 
with many older people, no party can afford not to be senior-friendly. We would expect
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an even stronger party interest in older people’s policies as all voters aspire to become 
old. Unlike a social class, the frontiers of old age as a policy group are open to everyone.
In the next sections, I will now look in detail at all the other hypotheses for 
Britain and West Germany. Similar to chapter 6, I will first look at the differences 
between age groups and political generations across time. Then, I will conduct a joint 
hypotheses test in multivariate regressions in section 7.3.
7.2 Descriptive analysis for age groups and political generations 
Variations between age groups
Figures 7-1 to 7-4 show the ratio of the proportion of voters aged 60 and older divided 
by the proportion of voters aged 59 and younger that vote for a certain party from a 
longitudinal perspective. If the ratio is 1, it signifies that senior voters do not show a 
different voting pattern. If the ratio is higher than 1, older people were more likely to 
vote for that party than younger people, and vice versa for ratios below 1. We can only 
use observations where respondents have indicated whom they voted for. Non-responses 
or characteristics of non-voters are not included. I decided to look at the expressed 
voting choice rather than party identification. Voting choice is more comparable across 
time than party identification is, which according to the literature on de-alignment is 
weakening. Also, I am interested in the potential repercussions of voting behaviour 
rather than just the attitude towards a party, as I am mainly concerned with political 
outcomes.
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Figure 7-1: British party ratios (vote share of voters aged 60 and older by vote share of those
younger than 60) -  Conservatives and Labour 1955 - 2001
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Source: own calculation according to British election studies 1964 to 2001 and Gallup polls 1958 and 
1960.
Figure 7-2: West German party ratios (vote share of voters aged 60 and older by vote share of those 
younger than 60) -  CDU/CSU and SPD 1949 - 2002
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Source: own calculation according to German election studies 1961 to 1998 and Politbarometer 2002.
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Figure 7-3: British party ratios (vote share of voters aged 60 and older by vote share of those
younger than 60) -  Liberals and other parties 1955 - 2001
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Source: own calculation according to British election studies 1964 to 2001 and Gallup polls 1958 and 
1960.
Figure 7-4: West German party ratios (vote share of voters aged 60 and older by vote share of those 
younger than 60) -  FDP, Greens and other parties 1949 - 2002
1.6
1.4
0.8
£  0.6
0.2
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002
- • F D P
* —  Other
Source: own calculation according to German election studies 1961 to 1998 and Politbarometer 2002.
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In figure 7-1, the party ratio of the Conservatives is significantly above one in 
eleven out of 13 election years and below in the other two instances. That means that the 
Conservatives had an advantage in the group of 60+ voters in most elections. But the 
party ratio varies considerably between less than 0.9 and up to 1.4. The party ratio for 
Labour seems to mirror the Conservative age ratio in the opposite direction. It is below 
one in almost all instances where the Conservatives had the edge among older voters. 
Nonetheless, in three out of 13 years (1959, 1983, 1992) an older voter was more likely 
to vote for Labour than a younger voter.
In West Germany (figure 7-2), the Christian-Democrats were more likely to be 
voted for by older voters in all election years. However, the difference between older 
and younger voters varied between 10 % in 1949 and more than 60 % in 1998. The 
Social-Democratic party ratio lay below one in most, but not all elections. However, for 
them the differences between age groups are much smaller, compared to the CDU/CSU. 
The highest advantage for younger voters was in 1949 with 40 % and the smallest 0 in 
1987.
At first sight, these two figures seem to support the growing economic 
conservatism hypothesis (H8a) and reject the competing hypothesis that suggests that 
older people become more likely to vote for a more progressive party that favours state 
spending (H8b). The more conservative party (Tories, CDU/CSU) is generally more 
favoured among older voters than the more progressive party (Labour, SPD). However, 
the strong variation seems to indicate that there are other forces at work as well. 
Election-specific factors could only explain this variation if they affected the two age
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groups differently. For instance, a universal swing away from one party would affect 
both age groups equally and the age ratio would stay the same.
Figure 7-3 shows the party ratios for Liberals and other parties in Britain. Except 
for two years (1955, 1987) younger voters were more likely to vote for the Liberals or 
other parties than older people. In figure 7-4, the West German Liberals show a similar 
pattern: with the exceptions of 1949, 1990 and 1998, the FDP fared better among 
younger voters. The party ratios of other parties are constantly below one after 1976, but 
show a zigzag pattern before. From 1980, the Greens enter into the picture. They are 
heavily over-represented among younger voters, but with a decreasing trend. The finding 
that younger voters are more likely to vote for the small, (mostly) non-governmental 
parties, the Liberals, the Greens and others seems to lend support to the hypothesis that 
larger parties have an advantage among older voters (hypothesis HI 1).
Variations between political generations
The social science literature on political generations is confronted with a lack of findings 
about the factors that determine the emergence of political generations. We somehow 
know that generational differences exist. We are unclear, however, how to recognise 
when a new political generation evolves, why it evolves, and where the next generations 
starts (Braungart and Braungart, 1986). In addition, generations can be different on 
various dimensions; thus, there can be political, economic or social generations that do 
not necessarily coincide (see for a critical review Spitzer, 1973). Also, the lack of 
multiple sources of surveys across time brings up the question as to whether new 
generational explanations can still be fitted to data sources that have been used many 
times for similar explanations.
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Nevertheless, there is some evidence with which we can discern distinct political 
generations in terms of political behaviour in West Germany and in Britain. We need to 
look at historical, electoral developments to hypothesise about the existence of political 
generations. The critical stage is the electoral context of the time at which voters first 
went to the polls. This has already been suggested by James Tilley (2002) with regard to 
party identification.
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Table 7-2: Political generations in post-war Britain
Name of
political
generation
Years of 
birth
Dates of 
first 
election
Distinct historical context 
At youth
Electoral predictions
Lab Cons Lib Others
Victorian
generation 1896 and earlier 
(men), 
1887 and 
earlier 
(women)
Limited franchise, two party 
Before system Liberals and
1918 Conservatives, First World
War
weak
Few
votes
since
two-
party
system
Inter-War
Cohort
1897- 
1914 
(men) 
1888 -  
1914 
(women)
1918-
1935
Conservative dominance, 
Labour party on the rise, 
Liberals on the decline
1945 Cohort
1915 -  
1929
1945-
1950
Great Depression, 2nd World 
War, first majority Labour 
government after landslide, 
installation of modem 
welfare state
+
1951 -  1966 
cohort
1930-
1945
1955 -  
1966
Conservative dominance, 
2nd Labour government 
under Wilson with 
landslide, Liberals close to 
oblivion
1966 -  1979 
cohort Alternating governments, 
strikes, revival of 
1946 -  1970 -  conservative values in
1956 1974 society (Norris 1997),
growing Liberals, more 
parties
Thatcher’s
Children 1957 -  1979 -  Conservative era, Thatcher,
1974 1992 reforms of the welfare state
Blair’s
Children New Labour shifted towards 
1975 and 1997 -  the centre, Conservatives in 
younger 2001 disarray, Lib Dems gaining,
devolution
Signs show expected change relative to the preceding generation.
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Table 7-2 shows the expected political generations for Britain. Butler and Stokes 
(1983 [1974]) established the existence of the first four generations, and Russell et al. 
(1992) demonstrated the distinct political preferences of the young generation under 
Thatcher, which they called ‘Thatcher’s Children’. The other generations fill the gaps in 
between, and I have given historical explanations why each generation should be 
different. For instance, the generation that first went to the polls in 1945 and 1950 
experienced the Labour landslide of 1945, the first Labour-led government and the 
establishment of the post-war welfare state. This historical experience should make this 
cohort as a whole more pro-Labour than the previous cohort that first voted in an era of 
Conservative dominance. I have made predictions for each generation and party, relative 
to the preceding generation.
32 With respect to party identification, Tilley (2002) has shown the existence of political generations 
according to party dominance at the time of socialisation. Clarke et al. (2004) showed the difference of the 
‘Thatcher generation’ and ‘Blair generation’ from previous cohorts as to the civic duty to vote. They also 
identify the 1945 Cohort as the ‘Post-war’ generation, the 1951-66 Cohort as ‘Macmillan’ and the 1966- 
79 Cohort as ‘Wilson/Callaghan’ generation. Note, however, that my empirical analysis is not an 
empirical test of their differentiation because (a) I am using the same data, and (b) they look at turnout.
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Table 7-3: Political generations in post-war West Germany
Name of 
political 
generation
Years
of
birth
Dates of 
first 
election
Distinct historical context 
At youth
Electoral predictions
SPD CDU/ FDP 
CSU
Greens
Empire 1891
and
earlier
(men
only)
Semi-authoritarian regime, only 
Before men allowed to vote, census 
1918 franchise in state parliamentary 
elections
SPD is the only party that existed 
during time of early socialisation
Weimar 1892
1914
(men)
1914
and
young
er
(worn
en)
1919-
1933
Increasing polarisation of the 
party system, hyper inflation, 
world recession, SPD strongest 
party before the NSDAP came 
to power
Parties do not 
exist yet, but 
some 
predecessors do:
Zentrum
DVP/
DDP
Not
known
to
them
during
time
of
early
sociali
sation
Adenauer
1915
1945
Economic Wirtschaftswunder, 
1949 -  consolidation of Christian
1966 Democrats as dominant party, 
FDP in government
Brandt
1946
1962
Grand coalition, Social 
democrats in power for the first 
1969- time since Weimar, new foreign 
1980 policy towards East, student
revolts, emergence of Green 
party
0 +
Kohl
1963
1976
2nd era of CDU/CSU dominance 
1982 -  anti-nuclear protests,
1994 unification, growing mass
unemployment
+
Schroder 1977
and
later
1998 -  
2002 Green party in power 0 +
Signs show expected change relative to the preceding generation.
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Table 7-3 summarises the expected political generations for West Germany. 
For instance, the largest political generation is the Adenauer Generation. Its members 
first went to free polls in early post-war Germany. It was the era of Wirtschaftswunder 
and a strong Christian-Democratic party that brought stability after the politically 
unsteady course of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Thus, this generation 
should be more pro-CDU/CSU than its predecessor, the Weimar Generation. The latter 
only knew the smaller Zentrum, some of the personnel of which made up the post-war 
CDU. By contrast, the following Brandt Generation who first voted between 1969 and 
1980 experienced the first post-war SPD-led governments, a radical change in foreign 
and inner-German policies. This generation should be more pro-SPD, compared to the 
Adenauer Generation.34
I will now give a descriptive overview of the patterns of party support for 
political generations for the Social-Democratic and the conservative parties. Graphs for 
the liberal, green and other parties are available in the appendix 11.4.
33 See Ulrich Herbert (2003) for the generations Kriegsjugendgeneration (bom 1900 until 1910), which 
corresponds with my Weimar Generation, the skeptische Generation (bom 1925 and 1935), which 
represents the second half of my Adenauer Generation and die 68er Generation (born 1940-1949), which 
corresponds roughly with my Brandt Generation. Peter Merkl (1989) also suggests a typology of political 
generation of German leaders, depending on the historical-political experience at youth.
34 The Nazi period (1933-45) is unlikely to play a role for party preference formation because there were 
no free elections. Also, any NSDAP preference could not be translated into a vote in the post-war period 
because all extreme right parties were forbidden.
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Figure 7-5: Proportion of political generations who voted Labour in British elections 1964-2001
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Source: own calculation according to British election studies 1964 to 2001.
The picture of political generations and the Labour Party is mixed (figure 7-5). 
Until the mid-1970s, there appears to be a distinct relative position for each generation: 
while members of the Victorian Generation were least likely to vote Labour, the 1966- 
79 Cohort was most likely to vote Labour. The 1945 Cohort and the 1951-66 Cohort 
were in between, but did not differ a lot from each other. From 1979 onwards, however, 
generational differences seem to disappear. Thatcher’s Children were most likely to vote 
Labour after 1979. The separation in those two periods might reflect the consequences 
of de-alignment through which long-term allegiances (and the two-party system of 
Labour and Conservatives) ceased to exist. I am going to return to this notion later on.
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Figure 7-6: Proportion of political generations who voted Conservative in British elections 1964- 
2001
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Source: own calculation according to British election studies 1964 to 2001.
For the Conservatives (figure 7-6), the pre-1979 period shows clear generational 
patterns. The Victorian Generation and Inter-War Cohort were most likely to vote 
Conservative, followed by the 1945 Cohort and 1951-66 Cohort, which were again too 
close to each other to represent distinct variations. The 1966-79 Cohort was least likely 
to vote Conservative. From 1979 onwards, the generational differences became 
relatively small, with the exception of the (then oldest) Inter-War Cohort which persisted 
to be the strongest pro-Conservative generation.
These generational variations together have implications for older voters: in the 
1950s, older voters were largely pro-Conservative (and unlikely to vote Labour) because
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they were members of the Victorian Generation who first went to the polls during the 
Liberal-Conservative two-party system. In the 1970s, the majority of older voters were 
more pro-Conservative (and less likely to vote Labour) than younger voters, because 
they were members of the Inter-War Cohort who first had gone to the polls of 
Conservative dominance. In the last elections of the series, however, older voters did not 
show a distinct generational difference any longer.
Figure 7-7: Proportion of political generations who voted SPD in German elections 1949 - 2002
70.0
65.0
60.0
2  55.0
£  50.0
.2 45.0
£  40.0
8  35.0
“ ■ 30.0
25.0
20.0
‘Empire
generation
'Weimar
generation
■Adenauer
generation
Brandt
generation
■Kohl
generation
■Schroeder
generation
Elections
Source: own calculation according to German election studies 1961 to 1998 and Politbarometer 2002.
The German graphs for the Social-Democrats (figure 7-7) and Christian- 
Democrats (figure 7-8) do not show a potential de-alignment pattern as the British ones 
did for the Tories and Labour. With the exception of 1983, 1987 and 2002, we can detect 
some generational differences for the SPD. The earliest Empire Generation was more 
likely to vote SPD than its follower, the Weimar Generation, which had the lowest
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likelihood of all. The Adenauer Generation was again more pro-SPD than the Weimar 
Generation that it followed. Overall, the Brandt Generation was most pro-SPD, whereas 
the Kohl Generation was somewhat in between.
Figure 7-8: Proportion of political generations who voted CDU/CSU in German elections 1949 
2002
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Like in Britain, the conservative party CDU/CSU shows clearer generational
patterns. The Weimar Generation, most adversarial to the SPD, was most pro-CDU,
followed by the Adenauer Generation. The preceding Empire Generation, with the
exception of 1961, is up to 30 % less likely to vote CDU/CSU than the Weimar
Generation. The difference between the Weimar Generation and the Brandt Generation
was up to 20 %. Differences between Brandt, Kohl or Schroder generations were not
apparent. For older people we can deduct an interesting picture. Right after World War
II, older voters were -  as members of the Empire Generation - less likely to vote
CDU/CSU and more likely to vote SPD than middle-aged or younger voters. The reason
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for this higher, relative popularity of the Social-Democrats among male voters who first 
voted in the Wilhelmine era might lie in the good fortunes of the party before 1918, and 
the lack of continuance of all other parties between the German Empire and the Federal 
Republic. The Social-Democrats were the only party that continued to exist for almost 
one hundred years (apart from the totalitarian time 1933-45 when it was forbidden and 
had to be organised underground). All other parties after 1949 represented new parties 
that had some predecessors, but did not have the organisational continuance of the SPD. 
In the 1970s, older voters from the Weimar Generation, who experienced the 
deterioration of the SPD as a ruling party in the Weimar Republic as young voters, were 
much more likely to vote CDU/CSU than the young Brandt Generation. In 2002, older 
people as members of the Adenauer Generation, who first voted in an era of Christian- 
Democratic dominance, were still more likely to vote for the Christian-Democrats and 
less likely to vote for the SPD.
This first descriptive tour has shown that life cycle and generational effects seem 
to tell part of the story. We have found evidence for the existence of some of the 
hypothesised political generations and have also seen that some hypothesised 
generations seem not to be different from adjacent ones. Thus, the differences between 
younger and older voters seem not to be stable, but the result of the relative contrast of 
different political generations. I will now test generational and age effects together in 
multivariate regression analysis.
7.3 Combined hypotheses-testing in multivariate regressions
I will first check the existence of the hypothesised generational effects by separating
them from any kind of age effect. To that end, I will run a series of logistic regression
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models where the dependent variable is voting for one specific party versus voting for 
all others. I will also establish the independence of variations from socio-economic 
factors by running single-election analyses with more socio-economic control variables. 
Finally, I will test the status-quo conservatism and larger parties’ advantage hypotheses 
with a different set of dependent variables, i.e. incumbent versus opposition, and larger 
or governmental parties versus smaller parties.
Separating political generation effects from other age-related effects in party-by- 
party analysis
In order to estimate age as well as generational effects while controlling for period 
effects, we easily run into the problem of multicollinearity, i.e. independent variables 
can be predicted to a large degree by other independent variables. If I used year of birth, 
age and survey year as predictors, we would have perfect multicollinearity. This is 
because I can deduct the survey year if I know the respondent’s age and year of birth and 
vice versa. Our first step is to acknowledge that we are interested in theoretically 
expected political generations that comprise a decade or more and are of unequal size. 
Moreover, I use three age dummies (young 18-29, middle-aged 30-59 and old 60+) to 
estimate the age effect. Conceptually, I tried to select a division that makes sense in 
terms of the general social position of the voter. I have chosen the 60+ group as an 
approximation for older people who are likely to be retired. The young category between 
18-29 roughly approximates the period before voters have settled down. The middle-
35 The vif diagnostics are below 5 for all estimators. Also, the sample size is large, so that the decline in 
precision due to collinearity is tolerable.
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aged category is the residual category between the two. Alternative categorisations (e.g. 
<35, 35-64, 65+) lead to similar results.
I split the British data in two time series 1964-1979 and 1979-2001. In terms of 
the predictive power of social class, 1974 can be seen as the first election of a de-aligned 
era (Clarke et al. 2004: 47-8), but the number of observations for 1964-1970 would 
make it difficult to estimate the generational effects. The year 1979 and the 1966-79 
Cohort are overlapping baselines, meaning that we can indirectly compare differences 
across the split.
199
Table 7-4: Logistic regression models of party choice in Britain, 1964 -1979 and 1979 -  2001
Dependent Variable: Voted in last parliamentaiy for one party versus 
voted for another
Period 1:1964-1979
Labour Cons Liberal Other
Valid N 9,420
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.017 0.028 0.070
Constant -0.40*** -0.44*** -1.58*** -3 4 9 ***
(0 .10) (0 .10) (0.15) (0.34)
Victorian -0.71*** 0 09 *** -0.38 -1.46
(0 .20) (0 .20) (0.34) (0.91)
Inter-War Cohort -0.42** 0.69*** -0.39 -1.23
(0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0 .66)
1945 Cohort -0.04 0.25* -0.25 -0.82*
(0 .11) (0 .11) (0.17) (0.38)
1951-66 Cohort -0.06 0.24* -0.30* -0.18
(0.09) (0 .10) (0.15) (0.31)
1966-79 Cohort 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Young (18-29) 0.09 -0.09 -0.03 0.12
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.31)
Middle-aged (30-59) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Old (60+) 0.18 -0.11 -0.26 0.44
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.55)
Period 2:1979-2001
Valid N 15,970
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.025 0.020 0.071
Constant -0.56*** -0.16** -1.76*** -3.89***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0 .21)
1945 Cohort 0.09 -0.04 0.03 -0.39*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.16)
1951-66 Cohort 0.05 0.08 -0.17** -0.09
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0 .11)
1966-79 Cohort 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thatcher’s Children 0.14* 0.06 -0.29*** -0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0 .11)
Blair’s Children -0.08 0.37* -0.19 -0.72*
(0.17) (0.17) (0 .21) (0.34)
Young (18-29) 0.12 -0.24*** 0.17* 0.22
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14)
Middle-aged (30-59) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Old (60+) 0.01 Qi9*** -0.28*** -0.15
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0 .12)
All models control for gender (male baseline) and election year (1977 baseline), standard errors in 
brackets; ***, **, * significant at 0.001,0.01,0.05, Data: BES.
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In the first period, age did not matter for any of the parties (table 7-4). Once we 
control for the political generations, none of the age dummies is significant. This is an 
important finding. It refutes our economic conservatism hypothesis (H8a) and its 
competing explanation (H8b) for the period 1964-79. If the economic conservatism 
hypothesis, for example, held true, we should see significant variations between age 
groups whilst controlling for differences between political generations. By contrast, 
there are significant generational variations. Most generational differences can be seen 
for the two large parties, Labour and the Conservatives. Nine out of the 16 relative 
predictions that we made hold true (see black boxes in table 7-5). For this period, the 
political generation hypothesis (H4) that older people belong to a cohort with stable 
party preferences holds generally true, but this test also seemed to suffer from the 
difficulties of separating adequate political generations and making predictions. The 
generational differences tell a story of a steady decline of the Conservative party vote. 
For the Victorian Generation, the odds of voting Tory is higher by the factor 2.7 
compared to the 1966-79 Cohort. Labour partly profited from this with increasing the 
odds from the Victorian Generation to the 1945 Cohort, where it stabilises at factor 2.0 
compared to the Victorians. That means that in the early 1960s, the odds of voting Tory 
for an older voter (Victorian Generation) was 2.1 times higher than that of a young 
person (1951-66 Cohort). The odds of voting Tory for an older voter (Inter-War Cohort) 
in 1979 were 2.0 times higher than a young voter’s (1966-1979 cohort) odds.
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Table 7-5: Fit of political generational hypotheses in Britain
Period 1: 1964-79
Period 2: 1979- 
2001
Inter-War 
Cohort
1945 Cohort
1951 -  1966
cohort_______
1966 -  1979
cohort_______
Thatcher’s 
Children 
Blair’s 
Children
Black boxes signify confirmed expectation as to a predicted movement relative to the previous 
generations.
Lab Con Lib Oth
- + 10- - +
1 - +0 ■ +
In the second period, there is less variation with regard to adjacent generations. 
Also, only in six out of 16 instances are our predictions right (see table 7-5). Even more 
revealing are the coefficients of the three generations that overlap in both periods (1945 
Cohort, 1951-66 Cohort and 1966-79 Cohort). Relative to the baseline 1966-79, the two 
remaining overlapping generations look different for the two time periods with respect 
to the Tory vote. In the later period, they are not any different from the baseline 
generation. In addition, the generational differences are much smaller. The biggest 
generational difference is between Blair’s Children and the 1945 generation. The odds of 
the former to vote Tory is only 1.4 times than the odds of the latter. Overall, the 
strongest generational difference is between Blair’s Children and the 1966-79 Cohort, as 
the odds of voting Tory are 1.4 times higher for the latter. This is much smaller than the 
maximum difference for the first period, which was an odds factor of 2.7.
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In contrast to the first period, we also have significant age effects. No matter 
what generation, older voters are more likely to vote Conservative. Older voters’ odds of 
voting Tory are 1.5 times as high as for a young voter. In juxtaposition to that, young 
voters’ odds are 1.6 times higher to vote Liberal than older voters’.
Table 7-6: Diagnostic single-election logistic regressions with socio-economic controls for Tory vote, 
Britain, 1964,1983,1997
Dependent Variable: Voted in last parliamentary elections for Tories versus voted for 
another
1964 1983 1997
Valid N 1,107 3,120 2,402
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.040 0.020 0.026 0.024 0.056
constant -1.76*** -2.62 -1.8 8*** -2.32*** -1 7 9 *** -2.75***
(0.25) (0.30) (0 .20) (0 .22 ) (0.13) (0.18)
Education 0.40*** 0.50*** 0 .12*** 0.19*** -0.06 0.01
quintiles (0 .10) (0 .10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Income 0 .11* 0 .2 2 *** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.29*** 0.42***
quintiles (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
female 0.05 0.12 -0.01 -0.04 0.15 0 .2 0 *
(0 .12) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0 .10) (0 .10)
60 or older 0.85*** 0.50*** 1 .10***
(0.16) (0.09) (0 .12)
Education and income have been re-calculated to quintiles. Data: BES.
Table 7-6 reports the result of another empirical test. The impact of the age and 
generational variables could be largely irrelevant next to other variables that capture the 
main dimension of party competition. The tendency among older voters to vote 
Conservative could also be due to the fact that Labour voters die earlier because they 
belong to social classes or the male gender that have a shorter average lifespan. I picked 
1964, 1983 and 1997. In each election year, the Tories were in power. This diagnostic 
series shows that older people are more likely to vote for the Tories, even if education, 
income or gender are controlled for. Furthermore, the inclusion of the age dummies 
significantly increases the explanatory power of the model. Knowing whether a voter is 
60+ or younger, adds to the understanding of the voting decision. The differences
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between the coefficients finally hint at the fact that there are generational variations that 
make the difference in party choice between older and younger people unstable across 
time.36
All in all, the British findings seem to suggest that after de-alignment, 
generational differences due to varying socialisation experiences at a young age matter 
less than they did before. Instead, we see smaller, but simultaneous generational and life 
cycle effects that are equally strong. From a perspective that focuses on differences 
between age groups, it looks as if the grown volatility of voters as members of 
generations has opened space for life cycle forces. If the degree of de-alignment played a 
role, we should see results for West Germany that are somewhere in the middle of the 
results between the early and the late British periods.
36 The German data is better to the extent that measures for control variables are equivalent across time. I 
ran alternative British models with controls that I created myself, the equivalence of which might be 
doubted (see appendix 11.6) because, for example, question wording changed. The additional British 
models include trade union membership, religiosity, education and council house occupation The results 
do not change much.
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Table 7-7: Logistic regression models of party choice in West Germany 1977/1980 - 2002
Dependent Variable: Voted in last parliamentary for one party versus voted for another
SPD CDU/
CSU
FDP Greens Other
Valid N 242,409 225,460 242,409
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.027 0.015 0.141 0.063
Constant -0.31*** -0.07** -2.11*** -3.47*** -4.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10)
Young (18-29) -0.06*** -0.15*** 0.10*** 0.50*** 022***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Middle-aged (30-59) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Old (60+) -0.13*** 0.26*** -0.14*** -0.59*** -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Weimar Generation -0.04* 0.03 -0.16*** -0.81*** -0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08)
Adenauer Generation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Brandt Generation 0.15*** -0.47*** -0.04 1.29*** 0.10**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Kohl Generation 0.06** -0.45*** -0.18** 1.20*** 0.20***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Schroder Generation -0.04 -0.20*** -0.11 0.85*** 0.25*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10)
Female 0.00 0.01 0.05** -0.23*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
The same models with controls for education and religiosity
Valid N 215,795 199,911 215,795
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.063 0.029 0.141 0.072
Constant 0.97*** -0.91*** -3.04*** -4.33*** -3.70***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13)
Young (18-29) -0.10*** -0.08*** 0.02 0.42*** 0.23***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Middle-aged (30-59) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Old (60+) -0.10*** 0.18*** -0.08** -0.47*** -0.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Weimar Generation 0.00 0.00 -0.15*** -0.72*** -0.16
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09)
Adenauer Generation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Brandt Generation 0.19*** -0.40*** -0.15*** 1.07*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Kohl Generation 0.14*** -0.38*** -0.32*** 0.97*** 0.24***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Schroder Generation -0.08 -0.12* -0.08 0.71*** 0.24*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
Education -0.33*** 0.06*** 0.42*** 0.58*** -0.24***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Religiosity -0.26*** 0.33*** -0.05*** -0.19*** -0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.06** 0.12*** -0.03 -0.38*** 0.41***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
All models control for year (1977 baseline), standard errors in brackets, ***, **, * significant at 0.001, 
0.01,0.05, Data: Politbarometer.
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The German data set contains about ten times as many observations as the British 
data. Therefore, I will use a confidence level of 99 % as a minimum instead of 95 %. 
The first series of models (see table 7-7) uses generation and age dummies with the 
controls of gender and year. The second series makes use of the additional controls of 
education (highest formal qualification) and religiosity (frequency of church 
attendance). These additional controls capture the main dimensions of competition in the 
German party system and differ between cohorts. With those included, we can see to 
what extent, according to the logic of the shared social characteristic cohort hypothesis 
H6, older generations are less likely to vote for the liberal FDP and the postmaterialist 
Greens because mean educational level was lower and religiosity higher. Education and 
religiosity are sociological predictors of party choice, where more education and less 
religiosity works in favour of these two parties.
Table 7-8: Fit of political generational hypotheses in West Germany
Adenauer 
Brandt 
Kohl 
Schroder
Black boxes signify confirmed expectation as to a predicted movement relative to the previous generation.
We can test 16 predictions about the relative change of political generation with 
regard to their party preference vis-a-vis the preceding generation. Our expectations are
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CDU/
CSU
confirmed in nine out of 16 instances, which is more than with the British data over the 
same period, and is the same that confirmed for the early British period. Knowing the 
historical circumstances of the period when someone came of political age helps to 
predict that person’s vote better in West Germany than in strongly de-aligned Britain. 
Our predictions were mostly wrong about the latest Schroder Generation, a finding that 
suggests that this generation is not well-defined, although it is also the smallest in terms 
of observations.
The introduction of education and religiosity hardly changes the relative position 
of generations, but makes discrepancies bigger. The results conform with our predictions 
for the FDP and the Greens. For example, the odds of voting FDP are the same for the 
Brandt and Adenauer generations in model 1. However, with controls for education and 
religiosity, the change in odds are 13 % lower for the Adenauer Generation. This means 
that the increasing education and decreasing religiosity (factors that are favourable to 
FDP or Green vote) within the Brandt Generation increased the popularity of the FDP 
and Greens. In the case of the FDP, this benefit from changing social composition slows 
a downward generational trend. For the Greens, it accelerates an upward generational 
trend. I did not put forward explicit expectations for the SPD or CDU/CSU because their 
benefits from social compositional changes are ambiguous. More education is good for 
the Christian-Democrats and bad for the SPD. Less religiosity, however, is bad for the 
Christian-Democrats and good for the SPD. The changes in the coefficients between the 
model with and the model without controls, demonstrate that the increase in educational 
levels rather than the decline in religiosity impacts more strongly on the two parties. As 
a result, among more recent cohorts, the SPD loses some predicted popularity and the
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CDU/CSU gains. However, the effects are smaller than for the FDP and the Greens 
because the decrease in religiosity counterbalances the effect of education. For example, 
the change in the odds factor between the model with and without controls is 11 % for 
the Adenauer over the Brandt Generation with regard to the CDU/CSU vote.
Overall, the hypothesis H6 that older people vote differently because of a 
different endowment of social characteristics was confirmed with regard to the FDP and 
the Greens. An interesting additional finding is that the Greens were held in little favour 
in the earliest Weimar and Adenauer generations. They find most supporters in the 
Baby-boomer Brandt Generation. Then their electoral fortunes decline in the Kohl and 
Schroder generations. This is in tune with Inglehart’s postmaterialism thesis (1971): 
economic downturns occurred just before the Kohl and Schroder eras when those 
generation members were still ineligible teenagers (in 1973 and in the early 1990s). The 
experiences of these downturns just before they came of political age explain why 
postmaterialist values are less common in these generations and why their members 
share a lower likelihood of voting Green, relative to the Brandt Generation whose 
members grew up during the German Wirtschaftswunder.
The generational variations (all other things being equal) mean that older voters 
in the late 1970s (Weimar Generation) were not different from the middle-aged 
Adenauer Generation with regard to SPD or CDU/CSU vote. However, their odds to 
vote FDP was smaller by the factor 0.9. In relation to the then-young Brandt Generation, 
they were less likely to vote SPD (factor 0.9) or FDP (factor 0.7) and more likely to vote 
CDU/CSU (factor 1.5). The then oldest generation’s experience of the SPD and FDP 
(with different names) in Weimar and the breakdown of the Weimar Republic made
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them less likely to vote for them, in comparison to the then-young generation. The latter 
associated SPD and FDP with the first Social-Democratic governments under the SPD 
chancellors Willi Brandt (1969-74) and Helmut Schmidt (1974-82) that existed during 
their time of early political socialisation.
25 years later in 2002, however, older voters consisted of members of the 
Adenauer Generation, the middle-aged belonged to the Brandt Generation and the young 
were the Kohl and Schroder Generation. Older voters are less/more likely to vote for the 
SPD/CDU-CSU compared to the young Kohl and Schroder generations, but less/more so 
than the Brandt Generation. Older voters favour the Greens much less than the following 
Brandt Generation and still less than the more recent Kohl or Schroder generations.
The coefficients of the age dummies in West Germany are significant overall in 
more instances than in Britain. The SPD shows a small, but significant variation between 
age groups where middle-aged voters’ odds are about 1.1 times higher than the odds of 
young or old voters, a finding that we would not expect if the growing economic 
hypothesis (H8a) or its opposite competing hypothesis (H8b) were correct. This pattern 
runs counter to our expectations, as growing economic conservatism among ageing 
voters should show a decreasing tendency to vote for the SPD. Also, the FDP, the most 
economically conservative party, does not show any variations between age groups (at 
least not at a significance level of .01). The CDU/CSU, by contrast, shows a pattern by 
which odds to vote conservative increase with higher age. The odds of 60+ voters, 
regardless of generational membership, are 1.3 times the odds of a voter 29 and younger. 
The Greens also show, despite their strong generational variation, strong age effects. The 
odds of an older voter are 0.4 times the odds of a younger voter. Finally, other parties
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are more popular among younger voters than among middle-aged or older voters, a 
finding that supports the larger parties advantage hypothesis (HI 1). As I will 
demonstrate, these residual age variations are due to the incumbency and larger parties 
advantage effects.
If we combine the life cycle and generational effects, we see that the CDU/CSU 
has been the main beneficiary among older voters from the interplay of those two kinds 
of factors. The odds of an older person voting for the Christian-Democrats at the end of 
the 1970s was 2.0 times higher because of the gap between Weimar and Brandt 
generations (factor 1.5) next to the life cycle advantage of higher age (factor 1.3). 25 
years later, the odds of older voters were 1.7 times higher with a generational gap 
representing the factor 1.3, which is the average of the Kohl and Schroder generations, 
and the life cycle advantage of 1.3. In contrast, the Green Party suffers the biggest 
disadvantage among older voters today. A younger voter’s odds of voting Green are 5.5 
times higher than an older voter’s, due to the factor 2.3 coming from generational 
difference and factor 2.4 coming from life cycle difference.
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Table 7-9: Diagnostic single-election logistic regressions with socio-economic controls for CDU/CSU 
vote, West Germany, 1961,1983 and 1998
Dependent Variable: Voted in last parliamentary elections for CDU/CSU versus voted 
for another
1961 1983 1998
Valid N 1,270 848 2,127
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.017 0.068 0.069 0.031 0.041
Constant -0.08 -0.26 1.38*** -1.43*** -1.04*** -1.31***
(0.23) (0.24) (0.41) (0.41) (0.20) (0.21)
Education -0.20 -0.21 0.11 0.12 -0.12* -0.06
quintiles (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.05) (0.06)
Income 0.04 0.07
quintiles (0.04) (0.04)
Religiosity 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.37*** 0.34***
quintiles (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Female 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.15 0.14 -0.02 -0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09)
60 or older 0.34* 0.14 0.57***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.10)
Data: 1961 ZA0057,1983, 1998..
Table 7-9 reports the diagnostic test for West Germany similar to the one for 
Britain, although we could already control for gender, education and religiosity in the 
German time series analysis. It shows single-year logistic regressions for 1961, 1983 and 
1998 in which the conservative CDU/CSU was in power. Where available, the models 
controlled for gender, education, income and religiosity. For 1961 and 1998, the age 
coefficients are significant and add explanatory power to the model. In 1983, knowing 
whether someone was 60+ or younger did not matter to explain the voting decision. This 
is fully in accordance with the results of the time series analysis. In 1983, voters aged 59 
and younger who belonged to the Adenauer, Brandt or Kohl generations were on 
average (including the life cycle difference) not different than the average voter older 
than 60 who belonged to the Adenauer or Weimar Generations and had a life cycle edge 
to vote CDU/CSU. This is because the strongly pro-CDU/CSU Adenauer Generation is 
split between old and middle-aged voters.
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As the West German diagnostic test suggests, contemporary democracies can 
have variations between generations as well as between voters at different stages in the 
life cycle. This makes the differences between older and younger voters inherently 
unstable over time.
Overall, the party-by-party analyses of Britain and West Germany allowed us to 
test the generational hypotheses. It also has already given us some evidence on the 
nature of the life cycle hypotheses. Economic conservatism and its opposite, growing 
pro-spending voting with age, (H8a-b) can be ruled out as explanatory factors. This is 
because the most extreme parties in terms of economic stance do not show the variation 
between age groups that we would expect. For instance, neither the German FDP nor the 
Social-Democratic parties show a general advantage among older voters. That still 
leaves us to run decisive tests on the larger parties’ advantage hypothesis H ll (that 
ageing voters develop a preference for larger parties due to skewed media coverage), 
and the status-quo conservatism hypothesis H9 (that older people tend to prefer the 
incumbent more than younger voters).
Testing the larger parties and status-quo conservatism hypotheses
Table 7-10 shows six regressions that test these two hypotheses. The first three test the
individual ageing hypothesis that larger parties’ have an advantage among ageing voters.
For Britain, the dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted for the Liberals or
any other small party and 0 if she voted for Labour or the Tories. For Germany, the
dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted for the Greens or any of the very
small parties and 0 if she voted for the SPD, CDU/CSU or the FDP, which all have had
long reigns of governmental participation in German post-war history. Britain does not
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show any age effects that change the likelihood of voting for a small party. Germany, by 
contrast, shows a decreasing likelihood of voting for the Greens or other parties among 
older people, in accordance to the larger parties’ advantage hypothesis.
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Table 7-10: Logistic regression models for Britain and West Germany, small party and incumbent 
vote
Britain Britain Germany Britain Britain Germany
(1964-1979) (1979-2001) (1977- (1964- (1979- (1977-
2002) 1979) 2001) 2002)
Liberals and Liberals and Green and Incumbent versus opposition party
others others others
versus versus versus
Labour, Labour, SPD,
Tories Tories CDU/CSU,
FDP
Valid N 9,420 15,970 215,795 9,420 15,970 215,795
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.011 0.122 0.006 0.023 0.010
Constant -1.33*** -1.45*** -5.57*** -0.47*** -0.54*** -0.24
(0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies
Young -0.01 0.11 0.28*** 0.04 -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.13) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01)
Middle-aged 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Old -0.20 0.04 -0.21*** -0.02 0.20*** 0.18***
(0.15) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
Political
generations
Victorian -0.58
(0.32)
Inter-war -0.54*
(0.22)
-0.54***
(0.12)
1945 Cohort -0.40*
(0.16)
-0.30***
(0.09)
1951-66 -0.32* -0.28***
Cohort (0.14) (0.06)
1966-79 0.00 0.00
Cohort
Thatcher’s -0.26***
children (0.07)
Blair’s -0.31
children (0.19)
Weimar -0.49***
(0.07)
Adenauer 0.00
Brandt 0.77***
(0.03)
Kohl 0.54***
(0.04)
Schroder 0.48***
(0.09)
Controls
Female -0.11 -0.03 -0 14*** -0.06 0.05 0.00
(0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Education 0.37***
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.01)
Religiosity -0.17***
(0.01)
0.06***
(0.00)
Additional controls for election/survey year (baselines: 1977 for West Germany, 1979 for Britain), Data: 
BES, Politbarometer.
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The results are not due to the overall changes of the party systems where more 
and more small parties have established themselves. This is captured in gradual cohort 
effects in the political generation dummies. Nor is the result due to the fact that the 
smaller party versus larger party dichotomy is actually measuring an incumbency effect. 
The correlation between the two is only modest at 0.29. The difference between the two 
countries cannot lie in de-alignment. For one, the generation dummies capture the 
growth in vote share among new, smaller parties. Secondly, if we were to order the three 
time periods/countries according to the strength of de-alignment, West Germany would 
fall in the middle. So neither the most aligned system in Britain (1964-1979), nor the 
most de-aligned system in Britain (1979-2001) shows the age advantage for bigger 
parties. The reason might lie in the difference in electoral systems. In Britain, voting for 
a smaller party does not make any sense in most constituencies because the candidate is 
not likely to win. Therefore, even if larger parties leave a stronger impression on older 
voters than on younger ones, younger electors might be as likely to vote for the latter as 
older voters. This is because there is generally no instrumental sense to vote for smaller 
parties in Britain. In Germany in contrast, there is a stronger incentive to vote for smaller 
parties, because the electoral system of proportional representation guarantees that no 
vote is ‘wasted’. If this finding held generally true, party systems with low electoral 
threshold should show that younger people are more likely to vote for smaller parties 
that do not have a history of governmental participation. As to our hypothesis HI 1 about 
larger parties, we cannot accept it in its general form and must suggest these further 
refinements to be tested with new data.
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The last three regressions finally show that there is a life cycle effect in the 
second British period and in the German case that makes older people more likely to 
vote for incumbent parties. In both instances, the conservative party has been in 
government for more points in time at the time of the election (four out of six times in 
Britain and 16 out of 26 times in West Germany). Therefore, the finding might be an 
artefact of a conservative party in power. However, similar results appear if the number 
of elections in which the conservative parties were in power are randomly reduced. In 
Germany, the FDP is also the longest serving party in power in that period, meaning that 
the dependent variable is even less likely to approximate the conservative party vote. 
Therefore, the findings on the conservative parties in both countries in the first round of 
regressions (see tables 7-4 and 7-7) stem from the fact that the conservative parties were 
in power, rather than the fact that they are the most ideologically conservative parties.
Older people favour the incumbent party over the opposition party. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to test whether the amount of time a party is in power 
increases this tendency even more. The reason is that in the periods in question it was 
the conservative parties only that had longer periods of reign. Thus, we cannot compare 
a longer period of power for the Conservatives with the Social-Democratic parties. 
Nonetheless, at least with regard to the dichotomy of incumbent versus opposition, 
incumbent parties have an edge among older voters.
7.4 Summary
A mixture of macro factors and the combination of life cycle, individual ageing and
generational effects explain the differences between younger and older voters. Economic
conservatism (H8a) and its competing twin that older people vote for big-spending
216
parties (H8b) can be rejected as explanatory factors to explain older voters’ choice. 
Changes in the social composition of cohorts influenced the likelihood of voting for the 
FDP and Greens in addition to the political generation effects due to early socialisation 
experience. This is a finding that confirms the shared social characteristic cohort 
hypothesis H6. Both parties benefited from the increase in formal education and decline 
in religiosity among more recent cohorts. The CDU/CSU and SPD were also affected, 
but less strongly due to the fact that declining religiosity and increasing education had 
opposing effects. Moreover, growing postmaterialism socialised younger cohorts into 
voting for New Politics parties, such as the Greens in West Germany. Older voters today 
are still less likely for these parties, although that can change in the near future as the 
generation bom right after the war turns 60. Furthermore, the ‘pure’ senior interests 
being served by senior parties seem not to be an important factor at the moment, as the 
poor showing of grey parties demonstrates (rejected hypothesis H7).
Two life cycle hypotheses find conditional confirmation. The conditions can only 
be suggested here and need more research to test them. Older people seem to build up a 
stronger preference for larger or governmental parties over their lifetimes, relative to 
younger voters (partially confirmed hypothesis Hll), but only if the electoral system is 
conducive to smaller parties, so that younger voters have an instrumental incentive to 
vote for them and set themselves apart from older voters. Thus, the British party system 
with its low degree of proportionality does not have these age effects: older people 
might be more likely to have a preference for the larger parties (Labour and Tories), but 
this effect does not show in their voting behaviour. Younger people, who in West
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Germany are more likely to cast a vote for smaller and opposition parties, might not do 
so in Britain as the vote is likely to be ‘wasted’.
Older people are more status-quo conservative in their party vote. They are more 
likely to vote for the incumbent party, but only in a more de-aligned system that has a 
certain degree of electoral volatility (partially confirmed hypothesis H9). In a strongly 
aligned system like the early British period from 1964 until 1979, these effects are not 
apparent. This makes intuitive sense because that period was characterised by a lasting 
effect of early political socialisation, so that period effects like who is in government at 
the time of a later election do not come up. Voting for the incumbent means voting for 
something known or predictable. This does not mean that the incumbent makes smaller 
policy changes, but these changes appear to be more foreseeable than voting for the 
opposition party. Political generation effects are also present, but also seem to be a 
correlate of the state of alignment in the system. The more de-aligned a party system, the 
smaller the differences between socialisation experiences in early adulthood. This is 
because later volatility will even out, if not erase, these differences (partially confirmed 
hypothesis H4).
The analysis of this chapter was confined to ‘mean’ effects across a whole 
generation or age group. It is very plausible that generational effects differ, for instance, 
by social circumstances. The pro-CDU-CSU effect of the Adenauer Generation is likely 
to be less pronounced for someone who is from the traditionally Social-Democratic, 
Lutheran North of Germany. Also, further factors that we could not control for and that 
could potentially influence older voters differently from younger people are specific old 
age issues on the political agenda, such as public pensions.
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To conclude, ageing democracies will change in terms of the electoral outcomes, 
but not in a lasting way. The fact that older voters prefer the incumbent in more de- 
aligned systems and larger parties in systems with a high degree of proportionality, 
changes the overall electoral process, but does not have predictable policy consequences.
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8 Non-institutionalised Political Participation outside of 
Organisations in Europe
‘Young people enjoy the physical vigor, the freedom from day-to-day 
responsibilities of career and family, and have the time to participate in the 
pursuit of the energetic kinds of political activity implied by high protest 
potential. Protest potential is therefore held to be primarily an outcome of the 
joie de vivre of youth itself.’ (emphasis in the original Barnes, Kaase, and 
others 1979: 101)
We have seen in chapter 5 that -  generally speaking -  older people in Europe are 
less likely than younger people to commit political protest and other forms of 
participation outside of organisations. This chapter explains this difference between age 
groups. The Political Action Study in 1974, from which the quotation above is taken, 
was the first detailed study of what was then called ‘unconventional’ political 
participation. Protests were considered to be a domain of the young and associated with 
the energy and ‘wildness’ of younger people. In other words, the authors implicitly 
concluded that protest was something that older people were less likely to engage in 
because they had fewer of these characteristics.
The political process of participation has changed in Western Europe and the 
USA since the 1970s when the Political Action Study was carried out. Acts of non- 
electoral participation are much more common now than they were thirty years ago. 
Today’s older people, however, grew up before the end of the 1960s, a time that was 
often considered the period of the ‘participatory revolution’ (Kaase 1982) in European 
liberal democracies of the time. Older generations’ early political socialisation did not -  
generally speaking -  include political actions of the non-electoral kind. If their early 
formed preferences withstood the general change of the political process in the 
following years, older people would still be less likely to commit these forms because
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they did not experience them at youth, in contrast to younger people today (hypothesis 
H2). If this political generational explanation was true, we should also see variance 
across countries depending on whether a country experienced the long-term change of 
the political process. For example, the post-communist countries did not experience a 
gradual expansion of free non-electoral participation, but instead a sudden explosion 
with the advent of liberal democracy. The lack of experience of a free, liberal democracy 
at youth should make older people in some countries less likely to use non­
institutionalised political participation (hypothesis H3). Furthermore, the theoretical 
model predicts that older people could have less resources/motivation or 
mobilisation/opportunities, which could explain lower participatory levels (hypothesis 
H5). This lower level of endowment could be due either to life cycle or shared social 
characteristic cohort effects.
I will cover four modes of participation outside of organisations within separate 
multivariate regression analyses (contacting a public official or politician, boycotting or 
buying a product for political or ethical reasons, signing a petition or wearing a badge, 
and protesting). None of these actions requires long-term commitment within an 
organisation. They can be performed regularly or irregularly and require relatively few 
resources.37
The chapter shows that generational change (at least in Western Europe) made 
non-electoral forms of participation, which we must use as a proxy for non­
37 As I explained in the introduction and the methodology chapter 4, it does not make sense to make more 
extensive summative index. Since I am comparing groups across and within countries, I would need to 
show the consistency of each index for each constellation of group and country.
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institutionalised participation across time, more likely among older people, compared to 
older people in earlier decades. But these forms of participation still remain the domain 
of the young, compared to older fellow citizens today. Furthermore, differences between 
age groups with regard to two forms of political participation outside of organisations, 
namely contacting a public official or politician (mode 1) and buying/boycotting a 
product for political or ethical reasons (mode 2), can be fully explained with the help of 
individual-level variables. That means that the only factors that matter for these modes 
are life cycle or cohort effects that can be measured at the level of the individual. The 
residual age variable does not have an effect any longer.
The two other modes, signing a petition/wearing a badge (mode 3) and protesting 
(mode 4), cannot be fully explained by resorting to individual-level variables. There 
remains a sizeable chunk of unexplained differences between age groups that is captured 
in the coefficient of the residual age variable. However, the magnitude of the variance 
explained by residual age varies by country. This variation can be accounted for by 
various indicators of the old age culture of the country. Countries that have a more 
positive image of older people show much less difference between age groups (ceteris 
paribus) than countries with a more negative image. The image of older people was 
measured by several indicators that asked respondents to rate reasons why they would do 
something for older people. Thus, the social perception of ‘old age’ and its role in 
politics reflects back on older people. I will explore this finding further in chapter 9.
I will develop the analysis in the following steps. Firstly, I will look at the over 
time trend concerning differences between age groups in order to examine the change in 
the political process and its generational implications. Secondly, I will introduce the four
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dependent variables, the macro variables and the individual-level variables and run a 
series of multivariate regressions in section 3. I will then investigate the bivariate 
relationships of residual age coefficients of modes 3 and 4 and indicators of old age 
culture. Fourthly, I will discuss the political implications of the results.
8.1 The over time trend in non-electoralparticipation in Western Europe
Figure 8-1: Over time trend of non-electoral participation in Western Europe 1981-2000, 
probability of non-voting political activity of 50+ age group by that of 18-30 year olds
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Source: Topf (1995: 70) and own calculations from the World Values Survey 1999/2000.
It is very difficult to analyse any over time trend as to differences between age 
groups. As we are interested in generational changes, surveys that are used for our 
analysis must have been carried out across at least two decades in order for us to be able 
to discern any noticeable trend. Topf (1995a: 70) put together various surveys looking at 
the ratio of participatory levels of 18-30 year olds divided by that of 50+ year olds. I 
have expanded parts of his data set (which includes the World Values Surveys 1981 and 
1990) with data from the World Values Survey 1999-2000 (see figure 8-1). The data
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looks at political actions other than voting and three levels of participation: none 
committed, one to two (some) committed, and three or more (active) committed. Each 
data point is the percentage of the 50+ age group who belong to the respective 
participation level divided by the percentage of the 18-30 age group who are at that 
participation level. Similarly to the figures in the last two chapters, a number of one 
means that there is no difference between the age groups; a number larger than one 
signifies that the older age group is more prominent; and a number smaller than one 
signifies that they are less active than the younger age group. The data must be treated 
with some caution. Respondents were asked whether they ever committed the political 
actions in question. This question wording is especially relevant because the ‘ever’ 
question gives older people an advantage over younger people, simply because they 
have lived longer. The data is for Western Europe only.38
The trend started in 1981 with a state where younger people were definitely 
much more engaged in non-electoral acts of political participation than their older fellow 
citizens. The ratio for ‘none’ is clearly above one and the ratios for ‘some’ and ‘active’ 
are below one. For the most active, the greater participation of younger people is visible. 
In 1981, people aged 18-30 were four times as likely to have engaged in non-electoral 
forms of participation than the group aged 50 and older. This situation still resembled 
1974 that had been described with the quotation at the beginning of the chapter.
For the ‘active group’ (three or more acts committed), the 50+ group were 
catching up over time, constantly decreasing the ratios from about 0.25 in 1981 (i.e.
38 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, West Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain.
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younger people were four times as likely to be among the active group) to 0.8 in 1999. 
So in 1999/2000, the likelihood of the younger age group having committed several non- 
electoral acts of political participation is only 20 % higher than the older age group’s. 
The middle level -  with some activities -  shows a fairly linear line at around 0.8 where 
there is hardly any change visible. The same seems to be the case for the non-active 
group where the ratio hovers around 1.3. Overall, the levels of participation have risen 
for these forms of participation for all age groups (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005: 
248). If the ratio remains similar, it means that the rise for both groups has been roughly 
proportional.
In sum, there seems to be a generational change with regard to the very active 
group of people, where older people are catching up with younger people over time. 
This is a finding which we expect from the hypothesis H2. Still, there remains a youth 
bias. At no point in time have older people in Western Europe been as likely to engage 
in non-electoral participation at levels similar to younger people. Non-electoral 
participation remains a form of political action where younger people seem to maintain a 
comparative advantage. Probably the ‘real’ ratio measured through a question that is less 
likely to be biased by age groups might even show a relatively stronger popularity 
among younger individuals. This alternative question could have asked only about the 
preceding 12 months rather than whether respondents ‘ever’ committed that act. Having 
looked at the over time trend, the chapter will now turn to the cross-sectional analysis.
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8.2 Dependent and independent variables: predictions and
operationalisation
The dependent variables
The analysis will treat the four modes of participation separately. Each dependent 
variable can take the value 0 for not having committed the political action in question, or 
1 for having committed it in the previous 12 months. Mode 1 is whether the citizen has 
contacted a public official or politician or not. Mode 2 summarises whether the 
respondent has bought and/or boycotted a product for political or ethical reasons. Mode 
3 stands for having signed a petition and/or worn a badge. Mode 4 finally signifies 
whether the respondent has gone to a legal or illegal demonstration.
Macro-level independent variables
Differences between age groups vary between countries. Some of this variation can be 
explained by varying distribution of individual-level variables across countries. For 
instance, the educational gap between older and younger people is bigger in Poland than 
in Britain. Other differences between age groups can be explained by resorting to macro- 
level variables. There are three macro-level variables that we will employ in the 
statistical analysis and a fourth one later on.
1. Average level o f political participation per country: this variable captures the 
average level of participation per country from the same survey, using a 
summative index of all single political actions that are elements of the four modes. 
Thus, it can take a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 7. As we shall see, the 
differences between age groups are dependent on the mean level of participation in
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each country. The mean for this variable is 0.90, the minimum lies at 0.29 (Poland) 
and the maximum at 1.44 (Switzerland).
Years since transition to democracy: one of the differences between generations 
can be the length of experience of liberal democracy. In Britain, a 75 year old 
Adam and a 35 year old Henrietta differ in the time that they are consciously a 
member of a free political community that offers participatory opportunities. In 
Poland, in contrast, there is no difference between the two individuals. This is 
because the relatively recent transition to liberal democracy gives each the same 
amount of political experience. In addition, a democracy that has been established 
for a longer time is likely to show higher levels of political participation in general 
(Norris 2002: chap. 10; Roller and Wessels 1996). This variable takes the value of 
years that have passed since the first democratic election until the survey in 2002. 
The minimum value is 12 (for 2002 minus 1990) for post-communist countries 
like East Germany or Slovenia and a maximum of 80 for the established 
democracies like Britain or the Netherlands. The reason for this ceiling is that the 
experience of democracy is only of relevance within a natural lifespan, and the fact 
that mass participation was only readily available after the introduction of 
universal suffrage after Wold War I. Thus for example, the difference between 
Britain and Finland in terms of democratic experience is neglected.
Regions: this variable sorts the countries by European regions with Western 
Europe (Belgium, Britain, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Netherlands), 
Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), Central Europe 
(Austria, East Germany, Switzerland, and West Germany), Southern Europe
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) and Eastern Europe (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland). The reason behind this is the underlying cultural 
component. The Scandinavian countries are often believed to be more 
participatory, for instance due to higher levels of social capital (Norris 2002: chap. 
8). This effect could interact with age.
Old age culture (through four measures): whereas the previous three variables 
have been put forward in other comparative studies of political participation, old 
age culture is new. I use four variables that are derived from an analysis of the 
World Values Survey 1999/2000 and only cover 17 out of the 22 countries in our 
analysis. Social gerontologists hypothesise that there are cultural differences 
between countries in the way older people are valued. Sometimes, for example, it 
is maintained that Confucian societies like Japan or China have a high esteem for 
older people as the they possess social and political power resources (Williamson 
et al. 1982: chaps. 2-3). According to the theoretical framework, we expect the 
social life cycle to matter. Stages of the life cycle, like old age, influence one’s 
social identity. Factors that could potentially influence this culture are the 
perceived quality of welfare provisions for older people, or religious differences. 
These variables are highly exploratory in nature. There are no empirical 
investigations into this phenomenon to my knowledge. I used four items from the 
World Values Survey 1999/2000 (E168, E170-72):
‘There are several reasons to do something to help the elderly people in your 
country. Please tell me for each of these reasons I am going to read out, if 
they apply to you or not. (very much, much, to a certain extent, not so much, 
not at all)
1. Because you feel you have a moral duty to help (MORALDUT).
2. Because it is the interest of society (INTSOC).
3. Because it is in your own interest (OWNINT).
4. To do something in return (RETURN).’
Each variables can take values between one (agreed very much) and 5
(agreed no at all). I calculated the mean values for 17 countries. Table 8-1 shows 
the descriptives for the four variables. I decided not to combine these four items 
into one variable because the principal survey investigators were not interested in 
old age culture, but differences between sociotropic and egoistic attitudes. To treat 
these four variables separately does not impose the assumptions of any of the data 
reduction techniques, such as principal component analysis.
Table 8-1: Descriptives of indicators of old age culture, 17 European countries in 1999/2000
Name of World 
Values Variables
Mean Std.
dev.
Min Max
(3) MORALDUTY 2.05 0.19 1.71 2.43
(4) INTSOC 2.45 0.25 1.95 2.82
(5) OWNINT 2.87 0.45 2.30 4.16
(6) RETURN 1.87 0.43 1.87 3.75
Another variable that I first considered was the Human Development Index as a 
measurement of modernisation. Some social gerontologists (Cowgill and Holmes 1972) 
hypothesised that older people have a lower social standing (and therefore a different 
behaviour), the more a society has progressed in socio-economic terms. This is because 
older people are valued more in traditional societies within the framework of the family. 
However, the HDI variable correlates very highly with years since transition to 
democracy. Since years since transition to democracy had a better fit with the data, I 
kept it, bearing the correlation with HDI in mind for the interpretation. Democratic
229
practice is related to socio-economic development, and it is unclear whether the 
relationship is mutually reinforcing, or uni-directional.
39 See for example of one causal link between economic development and democracy (Huber, 
Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993: 84): ‘...capitalist development transforms the class structure, 
enlarging the working and middle classes and facilitating their self-organisation, thus making it more 
difficult for elites to exclude them politically.’
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The individual-level independent variables
Table 8-2: List of individual-level independent variables of models of non-institutionalised political 
participation
Independent Variables Resource/ 
motivation (R) or 
mobilisation/ 
opportunities (O)
Theoretical reasoning for life cycle and cohort classification Confirmed bivariate 
association with age
Cohort
Education R The mass expansion of higher levels of education occurred only 
three to four decades ago.
0.18**
Postmaterialism R Post-war value change towards greater interest in self- 
actualisation.
0.16**
Religiosity R Societal process of secularisation in Europe since the 1960s 0.18**
Left-right self-placement R Voters are socialised into ideology when they are young. The 0.17** or-0.14**
(where higher values are ‘average’ position can change over time.
further to the right)
Size of town O Depending on the degree o f urbanisation and path of industrial 
development, older cohorts can live in more rural regions.
Between -0.17** and 
0.00
Experience of R In some countries, older people differ from younger people in -0.39**
democracy before the having not experienced a free democracy at youth (such as Spain). (-0.83** in some
age of 30 The lack of democratic experience during the early socialisation younger democracies)
period can make adults subsequently less participatory.
Life cycle
Gender R Men have a shorter average life span. n/a
Internal political efficacy R Elderly people feel less inclined towards political activism 
because of internalised social stereotyping towards old age.
-0.08**
Living with partner R Divorce and widowhood occur more frequently at a higher age. -0.26**
Number of minor R Decreases with higher age. -0.47**
children in household
Employment status, R Older people are more likely to be retired. 0.67** (pension)
pension as main source -0.34** (employed)
-0.04** (self- 
employed)
of income
Subjective evaluation of R Deteriorates with age. -0.36**
health
Duration of residence, R The older you are, the longer you have lived in certain area. 0.54**
logged
Social networks with O Elderly people have on average fewer social networks because -0.09**
friends they do not replace lost friends with new ones.
Disputed (Life cycle and/or cohort)
Political satisfaction R The older we get, the lower our aspirations get and the easier we Between -0.05* and
General satisfaction are satisfied. Newer cohorts, however, are less satisfied with 0.12** (political)
formal politics. between -0.14** and 
0.09** (general)
Political interest, R Older people concentrate their interests on fewer areas. On 0.08** (interest)
political information average, politics is one o f them. Newer cohorts show less interest 0.22** (information)
in politics. Use of media to get political information follows the
same reasoning.
Income R The income of retirees is in general lower than that of the middle- 
aged. However, newer cohorts of seniors have accumulated 
increasingly higher pensions.
-0.15**
Membership of parties R Older cohorts are more likely to be party and trade union 0.03**
and trade unions members, hi addition, the latter type of membership is tied to 
professional life
* Significant at 0.05, ** significant at 0.01 one-tailed, weighted by design weight, coding in the appendix.
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Table 8-2 lists the variables that will be controlled for at the individual level. 
Most of them have been introduced in chapter 6 in the analysis of voting participation. 
Full operationalisation can be found in the appendices 11.1 and 11.2. The second 
column shows whether the factor needs to be considered on the resources/motivation or 
opportunities/mobilisation side. Each factor has been checked for bivariate relationships 
with age as a first test for hypothesis H5. Like in chapter 6 ,1 do not specifically test the 
nature of the age-related age effect, but rely on the interpretation of the literature and 
treat the assessment as assumptions from then on. All bivariate relationships were 
confirmed, apart from the one between age and political trust. Some variables, like the 
two measures of satisfaction, varied across countries in their sign. But this was in line 
with expectations that they have a life cycle and a cohort root that can account for a total 
effect that is either positive or negative. The table also includes a short summary of why 
the factor is included. Because the reasoning as to why some factors have an influence 
on participation outside of organisations is similar to voting participation, I will not 
repeat them and refer the reader back to chapter 6. Here, I will only present some 
additional variables that I have not employed before.
Shared social characteristic cohort effects
Postmaterialism, left-right self-placement: non-institutionalised behaviour outside of 
organisations has been associated with left politics and more importantly with new left 
politics. Younger cohorts in post-industrial societies are thought to have been socialised 
into a new set of values that include the desire to express themselves and care about non­
material public goods such as the environment (Inglehart 1971, 1990). Non­
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institutionalised political behaviour is one way of expressing oneself individually. The 
attachment of certain cohorts to specific parties leads to a moderate correlation of age 
with left-right ideological position. Elderly people are not becoming more conservative 
in terms of shifting to the right on a socio-economic conflict dimension. Rather, they 
stay where they are when they were socialised at a young age (see chapter 7 for the 
cohort effects on party choice). However, society and party politics change. Thus, 
elderly people in post-communist countries position themselves more to the left as they 
grew up in an era of socialism, and the party system has now moved relatively to the 
right. In other countries, the elderly stand more to the right because the post-materialist, 
new left dimension of politics that became part of politics in many European countries is 
new to them.40
Size o f town: the size of town one lives in is a proxy for the amount of opportunities for 
non-institutionalised participation. Protest marshes especially are more likely in larger 
places as the amount of publicity is likely to be higher. In some countries such as the 
Netherlands, older cohorts are more likely to live in more rural areas as newer cohorts 
moved to bigger cities due to available professional opportunities.
Disputed cohort and life cycle effects
There are again some variables for which life cycle and shared social characteristic 
cohort expectations exist.
40 The elderly are not more moderate, i.e. they do not position themselves more to the middle of the left- 
right scale. I have checked this empirically with bivariate correlations between age and a transformed left- 
right scale. The left-right scale was transformed to span -5 to + 5 and was then squared.
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Political information: it is measured here via politically relevant media usage. Like 
political interest more generally, this is another side of the elderly’s concentration on 
politics, which might go down for later cohorts as a correlate of growing political 
disenchantment. Access to political information is important to take a decision because 
more information decreases uncertainty.
General satisfaction, political satisfaction: frustration and dissatisfaction in both 
general and political terms are put forward as mobilising attitudes in theories of protest 
(Barnes, Kaase, and others 1979; Marsh 1977). General dissatisfaction in life could 
make citizens take risks by engaging in protest-related activities. Political 
dissatisfaction stems from dissatisfaction with political institutions, so that a lack of 
satisfaction propels institution-challenging behaviour. The older you are, the more 
satisfied you are on both dimensions, although the correlation is modest in most 
countries. Tentatively, I would assume that this age effect is a mixture of generational 
and life cycle effects. When being asked general questions on satisfaction, e.g. with 
regard to the quality of health service, older people above 50 onwards always tend to be 
more content than younger age groups. This is the case even if the objective markers, 
such as the waiting time and duration of stay in hospital, are not different. Thus, 
subjective standards (‘aspiration’ as it is called in social psychology) seem to be 
systematically different across age groups. It could be that our perceived standards 
decline with ageing. The older we are, the less we expect and the more easily we are 
content. This is plausible since more life experience teach us the limits of expectations.41
41 An example of this systematic finding can be found in a British quality assurance report (BMRB 1995). 
The aged report higher levels of satisfaction across Western nations. Research on this is still in its infancy.
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Younger cohorts are less satisfied with the democracy in their country (see for Britain 
Henn, Weinstein, and Wring 2002). The correlation coefficients with age in table 8-2 
varied between positive and negative numbers to confirm the double-rooted causation.
Life cycle effects
Number o f minor children living in household: it is ambiguous to predict the impact on 
participation of having children. On the one hand, looking after them (as parents or 
grand-parents) can decrease the time budget (takes away resources of participation); on 
the other hand, however, it increases the interest that one takes in public provisions, such 
as nurseries, health centres and schools (motivational factors in engaging in political 
actions, especially on specific, local issues).
The four modes of non-institutionalised participation differ to some extent in the 
resources that they need, meaning that we can expect some independent variables to 
have no or smaller effect in some regressions than in others. For example, the size of 
town a person lives in is of importance for street demonstrations because they tend to 
take place in bigger towns or cities. In contrast, the place of residence can be expected to 
be negatively related to contacting a public official because residents of smaller towns 
are more likely to know the official or politician personally. Nevertheless, I will -  out of 
practicality - keep the same set of variables throughout, because the high number of 
observations allows not to worry about using up degrees of freedom.
The relationship varies somewhat between more general and more specific domains. Besides the reasoning 
indicated in the main text, the higher age might just lead respondents to use the more extreme values of 
response scales (Herzog and Rodgers 1986).
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8.3 Results o f the cross-sectional analysis 
Average levels of participation and the age ratio per country
Before the detailed multivariate analysis, an overview of simple differences between 
countries can be illuminating (see figure 8-2).
Figure 8-2: Bivariate relationship between average participation levels and age ratio per country
■  L U  ♦ D R W
TO C D
4 - G R
TOC£
.6 .8 1 1.2 
Mean level of additive index in country
Democratisation
*  after 1989 + in the 1970s
♦  right after World War II ■ before World War II
AT (Austria), BE (Belgium), CH (Switzerland), CZ (Czech Republic), DK (Denmark), DE(E) (East 
Germany), DE(W) (West Germany), ES (Spain), FI (Finland), FR (France), GB (Great Britain), GR 
(Greece), HU (Hungary), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), LU (Luxembourg), NL (Netherlands), NO (Norway), PL 
(Poland), PT (Portugal), SE (Sweden), and SI (Slovenia).
The figure plots the average level of non-institutionalised participation outside of 
organisations per country on the horizontal axis, versus the ratio of participation of older 
people divided by that of younger people. There is a linear trend: the higher the 
participation level in a given country, the more active older people are vis-a-vis younger
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fellow citizens. Since the age ratio is below one in all instances, this linear relationship 
also means that the more common participation outside of organisations in a country, the 
smaller the gap between older and younger people.
In Figure 8-2, I also marked countries according to the time of their 
democratisation. The oldest democracies (like Britain or France as boxes) and post-1945 
democracies (like West Germany as diamonds) tend to be to the right (more general 
activity and more active older people). Younger democracies (like post-communist or 
post-1975 democracies like Spain) tend to be on the left. East Germany is a clear outlier 
from the post-communist countries and hardly differs from West Germany. Italy and the 
Netherlands are further to the left than their democratic age would predict. As far as the 
linear relationship is concerned, however, there is only one clear outlier, Great Britain. 
The senior activity in Britain is disproportionally high relative to its general activity 
level. This extraordinary activity level will be one reason why the next chapter looks at a 
case study of senior protest in Britain.
The relationship between average levels of participation, time since 
democratisation and the magnitude of the age ratio suggests a historical interpretation 
that is congruent with the previous over time finding that older people are catching up 
with younger people in Western Europe. Imagine a new liberal democracy that does not 
yet have any significant mass participation apart from voting. The first group to pick up 
participation outside of institutions are the young. The reason could be that social and 
political institutions’ power positions tend to be taken by older people (Williamson et al. 
1982: 135-7), so that participation outside of them could be an outlet for young people. 
As the democracy gets older, non-electoral forms of participation become more
237
widespread, which can also be a product of the growing socio-economic development, 
and older people start to catch up with younger people. This process of the catching-up 
of older people is strengthened by the fact that the generation that took up non-electoral 
participation when they were young gets older. At some point, there might no longer be 
any difference between younger and older people as to these forms of participation. This 
finding gives further evidence for the generational explanation that we also saw in the 
same countries (see section 8.1). It is primarily younger individuals who take up the 
growing popularity of political participation and carry it with them as they become 
older.
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C o n t a c t e d  a  p o l i t i c i a n  o r p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l B o u g h t  o r  b o y c o t t e d  p r o d u c t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  o r
e t h i c a l  r e a s o n s
W o r n  a  b a d g e  a n d / o r  s i g n e d  a  p e t i t i o n
M o d e  1 M o d e  2 M o d e  3 M o d e  4
V a l i d  N 3 0 , 6 6 4 3 0 , 5 6 8 3 0 , 7 2 8 3 0 , 7 2 8
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d - 7 4 7 6 . 2 7 - 8 1 9 8 . 2 2 - 1 0 5 1 3 . 0 2 - 7 5 7 . 6 8
P s e u d o  R 2  a c c o r d i n g  t o  ( S n i j d e r s / B o k e r s 0 . 2 2 4 0 . 2 8 6 0 . 2 6 3 0 . 3 1 0
1 9 9 9 :  2 2 5 - 7 )
c o n s t a n t - 4 . 5 6 * * * 0 . 5 0 - 3 . 9 4 * * * 0 . 9 5 - 3 . 4 6 * * * 0 . 7 6 - 3 . 5 4 * * 1 . 2 6
Macro factors
Y e a r s  s i n c e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  d e m o c r a c y 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1
C o u n t r y  a v e r a g e  a d d i t i v e  i n d e x  p a r t i c i p a t i o n
o u t s i d e  o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n s 0 . 7 7 * * * 0 . 2 3 2 . 1 6 * * * 0 . 2 6 2 . 4 2 * * * 0 . 2 8 2 . 5 8 * * 1 . 0 0
R e g i o n s  ( W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  b a s e l i n e )
N o r t h e r n  E u r o p e - 0 . 2 3 * 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 5 - 0 . 6 1 * * * 0 . 1 2 - 1 . 2 6 0 . 6 8
C e n t r a l  E u r o p e 1 . 0 7 * * * 0 . 1 7 0 . 4 1 0 . 2 7 0 . 4 3 0 . 2 4 1 . 3 7 0 . 8 0
S o u t h e r n  E u r o p e - 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 1 4 0 . 1 1 - 0 . 7 1 * * * 0 . 1 4 - 0 . 7 4 0 . 5 8
E a s t e r n  E u r o p e 1 . 3 7 * * * 0 . 2 5 0 . 1 6 0 . 5 5 0 . 1 6 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 4 3 0 . 9 3
A g e 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 1 * * * 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 2 * * * 0 . 0 0
Cohort effects
E d u c a t i o n 0 . 0 9 * * * 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 1 * * * 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 6 * 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4
L e f t - r i g h t  s c a l e - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 1 2 * * * 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 8 * * * 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 2 0 * * * 0 . 0 4
S i z e  o f  t o w n - 0 . 1 7 * * * 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 8 * 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 1 * * * 0 . 0 6
P o s t m a t e r i a l i s m 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 8 * * * 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 5 * * * 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 9 * * * 0 . 0 5
R e l i g i o s i t y 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 3 * * 0 . 0 1
E x p e r i e n c e  o f  d e m o c r a c y  b e f o r e  3 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 1 5 0 . 2 9 0 . 2 9 0 . 2 7 0 . 1 7 0 . 1 3 0 . 2 0
Cohort/Life cycle effects
P o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t 0 . 3 8 * * * 0 . 0 5 0 . 4 1 * * * 0 . 0 3 0 . 3 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 5 5 * * * 0 . 0 7
P o l i t i c a l  m e m b e r s h i p 0 . 4 3 * * * 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 3 * * * 0 . 0 5 0 . 4 2 * * * 0 . 1 0
P o l i t i c a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n - 0 . 0 2 * * 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 * * * 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 * * * 0 . 0 1
P o l i t i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  l o g g e d 0 . 1 6 * 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 3 0 . 0 7 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 3
H o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e 0 . 0 3 * 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3
G e n e r a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n - 0 . 0 2 * 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1
Life cycle effects
S o c i a l  n e t w o r k s ,  l o g g e d 0 . 7 8 * * * 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 0 * * * 0 . 0 3 0 . 6 7 * * * 0 . 0 4 0 . 7 6 * * * 0 . 0 7
I n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  e f f i c a c y 0 . 4 0 * * * 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 9 * * * 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 1 * * * 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 1 * 0 . 0 5
F e m a l e 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 5 0 * * * 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 4 3 * * * 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 7
E m p l o y e d - 0 . 1 2 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 3 2 * * * 0 . 1 0
S e l f - e m p l o y e d 0 . 3 3 * * * 0 . 0 5 0 . 3 3 * * 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 7 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0
D u r a t i o n  o f  r e s i d e n c e ,  l o g g e d 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 1 3 * * * 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 5
L i v i n g  w i t h  p a r t n e r 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 2 6 * * 0 . 0 9
#  o f  m i n o r  c h i l d r e n  i n  h o u s e h o l d 0 . 0 9 * * 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 3
H e a l t h - 0 . 0 7 * 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 3 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 6
P e n s i o n  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  i n c o m e - 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 1 - 0 . 2 7 * 0 . 1 1 - 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 3 7 * 0 . 1 6
S i g m a  u 0 . 2 4 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 2 0 . 4 2 0 . 1 5
I n t r a - c l a s s  c o r r e l a t i o n 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 3
* ’" ’" s i g n i f i c a n t  w i t h  a t  0.001 l e v e l ,  * *  0.01 l e v e l ,  *  0.05 l e v e l ,  t e s t e d  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t s :  a g e X  g e n d e r ,  p e n s i o n  X  i n c o m e .  W e i g h t e d  b y  p w e i g h t  a t  c o u n t r y  a n d  d w e i g h t  a t  i n d i v i d u a l  l e v e l .
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Multivariate regression analysis
I use random-intercept logistic regression due to the binary outcome of the dependent 
variables and due to the residual systematic noise per country that the random effects 
can filter out. The four models include all macro variables (except the four measures of 
old age culture) and all individual-level variables. The summative index of participation 
levels per country is strongly significant with a positive sign in all four modes, but is less 
strong for contacting a public official. Years since transition to democracy has no effect 
for any mode, meaning that -  if there is any difference between polities of varying 
democratic age -  it is captured through the other macro and or individual level variables. 
Regional variations occur as well. Western and Central Europe tend to be the regions 
which are most conducive to these modes of participation, followed by Northern Europe, 
then Eastern, then Southern Europe. Buying or boycotting a product and protesting are 
not influenced at all by regional variations.
For modes 1 and 2, we see that the coefficients of the residual age variable are 
not significant and zero. That means that by including all the various cohort and life 
cycle individual variables, we could explain all the variance between age groups. This is 
an important finding; it means that accounting for all the resources/motivation, 
opportunities/mobilisation, and the macro country contexts, we can fully explain 
differences between age groups. At the individual level, the shared social characteristic 
cohort and life cycle hypothesis H5 is a sufficient explanation for these two modes when 
the macro differences between countries that are the same for all age groups are being 
controlled for.
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Modes 3 and 4 in contrast still have strongly significant coefficients of residual 
age. In other words, the measured resources/motivation and motivation/opportunities are 
not enough to explain the differences in participatory levels. How big is the explanatory 
power of these residual age variables? In terms of changing the overall probability of 
doing one of the political actions, age does not play the most important role per se. But 
bear in mind that the model explains variance between as well as within age groups. We 
need to turn to differences between age groups to see how much variance residual age 
still explains.
I additionally ran models (see appendices 11.7 and 11.8) for modes 3 and 4 for 
different sub-samples divided by the average level of participation, and for country 
groups defined by years since transition to democracy. This was to see whether there is 
any interaction effect between age and these macro variables. The coefficients of the 
residual age variable hardly changed and remained significant in all instances but one 
(badge/petition for high level of participation). This means that there is still a level of 
robust variance between age groups to modes 3 and 4 that we cannot explain with the 
individual-level variables. Before looking at the magnitude of the coefficient of the 
residual age variable, I will assess which group of variables dominates the model so far.
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Table 8-4: Overview of significant individual-level independent variables in models of participation 
outside of organisation
Contact Product Petition/badge Protest
Cohort effects 
Education 
Left-right scale 
Size of town 
Postmaterialism
Cohort/Life cycle effects 
Political interest 
Political membership 
Political satisfaction
Life cycle effects 
Social networks, logged 
Internal political efficacy 
Female 
Employed 
Self-employed
Duration of residence, logged 
Living with partner 
# of minor children in household 
X  b e f o r e  b l a c k  b a c k g r o u n d  s i g n i f i e s  t h a t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  a t  l e a s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  0 . 0 1  l e v e l .
Table 8-4 sketches the variables that are significant at 0.01 level (which we 
should take given the high number of N). Significance does not mean substance. Some 
of these variables can have a systematic but small effect. However, just by looking at 
these rows, we can also say that neither life cycle, cohort nor the disputed effects seem 
to be dominant in terms of significance. We need to look at actual differences between 
age groups to assess the importance of these significant effects for our model.
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Figure 8-3: Mode 1 (contact) - differences between 30-39 year olds and 70-79 year olds in Britain,
Poland and Europe in 2002
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Figure 8-3 shows the differences in predicted probabilities between a person in
her 30s (Henrietta) and a person in his 70s (Adam) for mode 1. The probabilities are
broken down by independent variables and are compared for Europe in general, as well
as for Britain and Poland. The latter were chosen as countries that are at the opposite end
of the scales of the macro variables. Each column stands for the difference in predicted
probability between a person in her 70s minus that of a person in her 30s. A column that
lies below the zero line means that older people have a disadvantage on that variable. So
for example, a -0.02 means that an Adam in his 70s is 2 % less likely to commit that
form of participation than a Henrietta in her 30s because of their difference on that
variable. For mode 1 (contacting a public official or politician), there are five major
243
factors (looking at Europe), all of which (education, internal political efficacy, self- 
employment, political membership and number of minor children in household) make 
older people less likely to contact a public official or politician. Generally, the column 
for Poland is smaller in size because participation in general is less common in Poland. 
Education is a difference that goes back to cohort differences. It is a resource that helps 
us to understand politics, and older people in both countries possess less of it because 
they belong to a generation that has not had access to the same educational possibilities 
as younger generations. Political membership is seen as a confounded life cycle and 
cohort effect in the literature (see chapter 6). The other three major impact variables are 
pure life cycle effects. Their sum makes up the biggest difference in any of the groups of 
age effects. Older people feel less motivated to contact an official because they feel less 
politically efficacious. This is due to the fact that they live in an ageist environment that 
projects its negative stereotypes on older people (to which I will come back). Being self- 
employed or having minor children gives younger people the motivation to take an 
interest in public issues. Since older people are not generally self-employed and do not 
usually have minor children, they miss out on this source of motivation. Finally, being 
less involved in social networks gives older people less exposure to mobilisation , and 
thus decreases their likelihood to contact an official on a given issue.
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Figure 8-4: Mode 2 (product) - differences between 30-39 year olds and 70-79 year olds in Britain,
Poland and Europe in 2002
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The four life cycle effects are arguably more stable into the future than the 
generational effect of education. The latter effect will fade away as cohorts become 
replaced. The life cycle factors by contrast will continue to exist in the next decades. The 
disputed age effects do not play a large role in this age-centred model of contacting a 
public official.
Figure 8-4 shows the analogous diagram for buying or boycotting a product for
political or ethical reasons. There are again four major factors, two of which are the
same as with mode 1: education and internal political efficacy. A third factor is duration
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of residence. Older people tend to have lived in an area longer and are thus more socially 
embedded. They know the area and its problems. It is imaginable that especially buying 
and boycotting of local produce is more prevalent because of this local embeddedness.
The fourth factor of tremendous importance for Britain is receiving a pension as 
a main source of income (although it is only significant at the 0.05 level).42 The direction 
of impact is also contrary to our expectations. We hypothesised that receiving a pension 
would enable older people to participate more in politics for two reasons: because they 
have more time; and also because, as recipients of public pensions, they have more of an 
interest in public policy. Pensioners are, however, less likely to buy or boycott a product. 
In the public discussion, pensioners are often portrayed as a group of people prone to 
political participation because they have time and a fixed income. Generally speaking, 
this relationship does not exist for modes 1 and 3. Mode 2 (and also to a smaller extent 
for mode 4) shows a relationship between pension and participation that is contrary to 
this widely held notion. In sum, buying or boycotting a product in Britain and Poland 
shows a combination of effects in which life cycle effects dominate over cohort or 
disputed effects.
42 Although pension and age are correlated, their simultaneous usage as independent variables does not 
pose any problems with multicollinearity.
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Figure 8-5: Mode 3 (badge/petition) - differences between 30-39 year olds and 70-79 year olds in
Britain, Poland and Europe in 2002 D i s p u t e d  c o h o r t  o r  
l i f e  c y c l e  e f f e c t s
L i f e  c y c l e  e f f e c t s
C o h o r t  e f f e c t s
0.02
0.01
o  - 0 . 0 2  ■ -
8  -0 .0 3  -
-0 .0 4  -
-0 .0 5  -
-0 .0 6  -
□  Britain 0  Poland Europe
-0 .0 7  - -
-0 .0 8
-0 .0 9
In d ep en d e n t v a r ia b le s
Figure 8-5 shows the differences in predicted probabilities for mode 3 (wearing a 
badge or signing a petition). Residual age is still in the picture and represents the biggest 
difference between older and younger people in Britain , Poland and Europe. All the 
other variables together have a bit more impact than age alone. A similarly large impact 
of age will be visible in the last mode in the next paragraph, and I will discuss the 
meaning of this effect later on. The magnitude of that effect in the residual age variable 
demonstrates that this effect is not only significant, but far from negligible. There are 
three other major effects besides residual age: education, internal political efficacy and 
social networks. All of their underlying causal chains have been discussed before.
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Figure 8-6: Mode 4 (protest) - differences between 30-39 year olds and 70-79 year olds in Britain,
Poland and Europe in 2002
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Figure 8-6 looks at the last mode (protest). This time, residual age is the most 
important predictor of difference between age groups. Only employment has an 
additional, large impact (at least for Great Britain). Older people benefit from the 
freedom from professional exigencies and from more leisure time, which acts as a 
resource for them to be more likely to engage in protests. This is a line of argumentation 
that became visible in many of the interviews that I led for the next chapter. Quite a few 
other factors have small to moderate influences on differences between age groups. 
Added together, they are roughly similar to the influence of residual age on protest. It is 
thus impossible to say which class of age effects is more important, because they explain 
a fair share of variance between age groups.
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In general, the predictions proved to be sustainable for resources/motivation and 
opportunities/mobilisation that vary between age groups, either for life cycle or cohort 
reasons. Contrary to our hypothesis H3, I could not find any systematic effect of the 
experience of democracy at youth. What individuals experience at youth as to the 
‘quality’ of the polity, does not find any evidence in this regard. Contrary to the findings 
of the macro cohort analysis at the beginning of this chapter (where we could seen a 
generational catching-up), the directly measured experience of democracy does not have 
a lasting influence that could affect generations differently.
Explaining the source of the coefficient of residual age
Modes 1 and 2 showed no leftover effect of residual age, once all the other individual- 
level variables have been controlled. Differences between age groups in the 22 countries 
can be fully explained with respect to these variables that are theoretically and 
empirically linked to chronological age. However, for modes 3 and 4 the coefficients of 
residual age still have sizeable effects, the magnitude of which could only be matched by 
all other variables together. The size of this impact is stable as I tested sub-samples of 
countries. We can now further disaggregate the data to look at each country individually. 
Running separate regressions for 22 countries (see appendix 11.9 and 11.10), I get a set 
of 22 coefficients per mode. Some of these coefficients that result from single-country 
regressions, controlling for all the other variables, are not significant any more, although 
all have a negative sign. Each age coefficient stands for the slope of a graph that 
captures the differences between age groups once all the other effects are being 
controlled. The greater the negative number of such a coefficient, the bigger the gap
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between more active younger people and older people. It is thus comparable to the age
ratios that I used at the beginning of the chapter.
Figure 8-7: Badge/petition - bivariate relationship between mean level of participation and residual 
age coefficient after single-country analysis
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Figure 8-8: Protest - bivariate relationship between mean level of participation and residual age 
coefficient after single-country analysis
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Figures 8-7 and 8-8 show the relationship between the mean level of 
participation and the residual age coefficients of modes 3 and 4. Clearly, the difference 
between age groups, once all the conceptual variables have removed part of the variance 
of the dependent variables, no longer depends on the average level of participation 
outside of organisations in a given country. Accounting for the individual-level variables 
took that relationship away.
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Table 8-5: Correlation matrix between four measures of old age culture and residual age 
coefficients of modes 3 (signing a petition or wearing a badge) and mode 4 (protesting)
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) residual age coefficients 1.00
(protest) -  mode 4
(2) residual age coefficients 0.04 1.00
(badge/petition) -  mode 3
(3) MORALDUTY -0.20 -0.11 1.00
(4) INTSOC -0.46 -0.11 0.70 1.00
(5) OWNINT -0.31 -0.26 0.35 0.05 1.00
(6) RETURN -0.60 -0.34 0.37 0.58 0.44
So far, we have not used the measures of old age culture in the model. Table 8-5 
presents the correlations between the four measures and the two variables that represent 
the coefficients of residual age from the single country analysis once the other variables 
have been controlled for. As the first two columns show, all four measures of old age 
culture that I calculated from the World Values Survey are negatively correlated with the 
coefficients of residual age for modes 3 and 4. Figures 8-10 and 8-11 show the 
relationship in graphical terms for the variable RETURN that correlates highest with the 
coefficient of the residual age variables.
Mode 3 has a negative correlation coefficient of -0.34 with RETURN; mode 4
one of -0.60. RETURN captures the mean value of those answers that rated the interest
of doing something for older people in return. The higher the RETURN value, the less
likely respondents were to agree to that motivational factor. Give the correlational
structure of all four measures of old age culture, we can conclude the following: the less
older people are valued in a given society, the bigger the gap is between them and
younger people as to these two modes of participation (ceteris paribus: under the
controls of education, postmaterialism etc.). In other words, relative to younger people
of the same country, older people in Poland where they are more valued are more active
than in a country like Greece where older people are less valued. This is a surprising
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finding because one could have expected that older people feel that they are being taken 
care of more in a society that values them highly, and so become more passive in 
politics. If this finding was corroborated in other research, we could state that older 
people with the same resources and opportunities as younger people will give most input 
in the political process (via wearing a badge, signing a petition and protesting) where 
they are highly thought of.
Figure 8-9: Badge and petition - bivariate relationship between RETURN and coefficients of 
residual age
•  PTO - •  NL
•  DE(E)
•  LU
•  AT
•  PL •D E (W )
•  BE
•  IT
•  FI■g
'< £  CM2> o - •  cz •  GR
•  DK
•  ES
P “ •  FR
•  SI
2 2.5 3 3.5 4
RETURN
253
Figure 8-10: Protest - bivariate relationship between RETURN and coefficients of residual age
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This analysis of country variation is only a ‘least worst’ option. Actually, the 
explanation of individual behaviour must take place at the individual level. Whether an 
older person feels valued as such, is a matter of individual perception rather than solely a 
macro difference between countries. In other words, a proper test must demonstrate the 
internalised belief at the individual level as well as its effect in activity levels. It is 
imaginable, too, that older people in certain circumstances, perhaps those who are rich in 
money, health and political interest, might be ‘immune’ to less senior-friendly country 
contexts. Also, it is likely that there is a causal link that we cannot measure through 
internal political efficacy, an independent variable that we included in the regression 
analysis. In addition, the correlation for petition/badge is quite low, so there might be
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other macro factors that can also explain the variation of residual age coefficients. One 
could, for instance, hypothesise that the quality of welfare provisions from an old age 
perspective makes a difference as to whether older people are prone to protest or not.
The images that a society holds can reflect back on the self-identity of older 
people. The next chapter will explore this link even further. What I crudely measured 
here, was the outer image of older people, i.e. not the image that older people have of 
themselves in the first place. In a society that values older people less, older individuals 
might have the motivation to act politically, e.g. by protesting, but they might feel 
inadequate to do so as society’s expectations do not conform with such actions. Older 
people’s preferences as to the choice of a form of political participation would thus be 
determined by the social situation they find themselves in.
In the exploratory chapter 5 ,1 showed that older people are generally more likely 
to be party members and more likely to be members of other political organisations, 
relative to younger citizens. The old age image of the society might be one partial 
explanation these modes of participation as well. More senior-friendly countries might 
not only have more active older people in joining demonstrations, signing a petition or 
wearing a badge, but also have more active older people in political organisations.
8.4 Political implications of the empirical findings
Older people participate less in politics outside of organisations. From a normative point 
of view, one might argue that equal participation is desirable. I will therefore discuss the 
results of each mode in turn, looking at the sources of why older people are less likely to 
perform that political action and the implications for the political process as a whole. At
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this point, we have to remember that we are relying on the literature for the assessment 
of the nature of the independent variables. If these judgements are wrong, the following 
implications would need to be re-stated.
Mode 1: contacting a public official or politician
One contacts a public official or politician if there is a specific issue that one cares about 
and wants to have more information or see something done regarding that issue. Less 
participation by older people can mean that the specific interests of older people are less 
sought after because of the lack of pressure or inquiries from them. Older people use this 
form of political action less, mostly because they are less educated, feel less politically 
efficacious and have no minor children in their household whose interests they want to 
take care of. Differences in education are likely to vanish once all cohorts will have had 
the same exposure to mass education at all levels. The other factors are ingrained into 
the social life course. Although it can be changed, for instance, by a fight against 
negative stereotypes around politics and old age, these effects are arguably rather stable 
into the near future. If older people remain less likely to participate in this mode, their 
specific interests will feed inadequately into the policy process through participation.
Mode 2: buying or boycotting a product for political or ethical reasons
This mode differs from the other three with regard to the degree of specificity and
visibility of the action. The political intention behind such an act is a broader statement
of general support or lack of support for a producer or a producing country. Lower
participation of older people is unlikely to make their interests less heard. However, life
cycle effects are stronger than disputed or cohort effects for the contexts of Britain,
Poland and Europe, meaning that this difference between age groups is likely to be more
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stable into the future. Only if there will be less important cohort differences in the future, 
can we argue that older people remain less active on this mode.
Mode 3: signing a petition or wearing a badge
These political actions are now classic forms of political expression that are offered or 
encouraged by all organisations who want to influence public policy outside of the 
electoral process, or want to exert pressure on electoral actors. The high degree of 
unexplained variance captured by the residual age variable poses something of a puzzle. 
The propositions do not seem to explain the variance very well. Measures of old age 
culture can give a partial answer for the unexplained lower participation rate of older 
people. In societies that value older people more highly, the gap between younger and 
older people is much closer.
Mode 4: Protesting
This political action needs most resources in physical terms. The intention of protest can 
be broad as well as very specific. Again, there is a large amount of unexplained variance 
between age groups, but old age culture plays a stronger role in explaining it, compared 
to mode 3. If a country has a more positive image of older people, older people (ceteris 
paribus) will find it easier to close the gap vis-a-vis younger fellow citizens. Moreover, 
concluding from our analysis of the over time trend of non-electoral participation as a 
whole, we cannot ignore the fact that there remains a generational bias in the lower 
participation rate among older people.
Political protests can serve three functions: the organisers want to change 
policies, they want long-term access to the policy-making process, or they want to
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change social values of the society (Rochon and Mazmanian 1993). Through the 
increasing protest of older people, the social values of society towards older people can 
be changed (and thereby decrease the negative stereotypes currently held about older 
people and politics). This objective of protest would actually lie outside of my definition 
of political participation, as the intention of protest would not be to change existing 
institutional structures or governmental policy.
Overall, the lower participation levels of older people outside of organisations 
stand in contrast to the levels of voting participation. Older people are more likely to 
vote due to a combination of life cycle and ageing factors. It is the electoral process that 
is dominated by older people’s participation and the non-electoral process that is 
dominated by younger people.
8.5 Summary
Older people caught up with younger people as far as non-electoral participation at a 
high level is concerned. In 1981, older people were only 25 % as likely to be very active 
as younger people. In 1999, they were 80 % as likely. This conforms with the political 
generation hypothesis H2 that predicts that older cohorts are less likely to commit acts of 
non-institutionalised participation. However, the gap between cohorts is declining with 
respect to the group of active participants.
The level of overall participation outside of organisations correlates highly with 
the age ratio in each country: the higher the participatory level of a country, the smaller 
the gap between younger and older people. If we start introducing age-related variables, 
capturing shared social characteristic cohort and life cycle effects, this relationship
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vanishes. Furthermore, measures of old age culture can explain how much passivity a 
national group of seniors have once the individual-level variables are controlled for 
(with regard to signing a petition/wearing a badge and protesting). The more older 
people are valued in a society, the more active older people (ceteris paribus) are in that 
society.
Among the groups of age-related variables, life cycle effects dominate the lower 
probability of contacting a public official or politician and the probability of boycotting 
or buying a product for ethical or political reasons. Signing a petition or wearing a 
badge, as well as protesting, show that half of the difference between age groups is 
explained by the residual age variable, the other half being explained by a mix of life 
cycle and cohort effects. Thus, the predicted life cycle and shared social characteristic 
cohort effects are mostly true. Older people do differ systematically on levels of 
endowment of predictors of non-institutionalised participation (ambiguous evidence for 
hypothesis H5). The experience of free democracy at youth did not play a role for any 
mode, so that this socialisation experience is only of no significance to explain 
differences between age groups.
Among the conceptual individual variables, three come up regularly. The first is 
education, a resource that the older generation has less of at its disposal. The second is 
internal political efficacy, a life cycle resource that makes it more difficult for older 
people to participate in politics because they have internalised negative societal images 
about old age. The final variable is employment status. It sometimes supports older 
people because they have more time to participate and less to be afraid of (such as not 
being employed and protesting). But it can make older people less likely to participate at
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other times, because they have less personal interest in particular public affairs (such as 
not being self-employed and contacting a public official or politician). From a 
generational perspective, the gap is closing, but there remains a strong youth bias.
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9 The Experience of Older Participants in the English 
Council Tax Protests in 2004/5
‘We [older people, AG] are becoming more protesting.’
Interviewee J, a 68 year old woman from the Southwest of England, in an 
interview with the author in November 2005
Non-institutionalised political participation outside of organisations is less 
common among older than among younger people. Within the English Council Tax 
protests in 2004/5, however, older people regularly and over some time engaged in 
various forms of protest behaviour. Therefore, these protesters represent unusual cases 
according to the model in the last chapter. Interviewing them promises to tell us more 
about older people’s experience of political protest and why they chose a form of 
political participation that is uncommon for their age group, but becoming more popular 
when we look across time. These cases are not necessarily deviant cases that we might 
be unable to predict. Indeed, we can gather from the interviews that these individuals are 
protesting because they are rich in resources and motivation, as well as highly mobilised.
This chapter is not an empirical test of an a priori derived hypothesis, but an 
inductive exploration to enrich the tested model. The findings of the interviews are much 
more exploratory in nature than the survey findings of the last chapter, mostly because 
representative sampling was not possible for the interviews. Therefore, the findings 
represent evidence for the interviewees rather than for a wider population. However, the 
interviews were carried out with the findings of the survey analysis in mind. That means 
that questions and structure of the interview are based on a theoretical framework that 
finds confirmations in the large-N study of the last chapter. From that perspective, the
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interviews help us to understand the causal chains that make older people participate and 
also helps us to further explore resources that are difficult to measure in large-N surveys.
As part of this qualitative in-depth analysis, I will place particular emphasis on 
the idea of the old age culture of a country influencing participatory behaviour, which I 
have investigated quantitatively in chapter 8. The theory postulates that the social 
situation of an individual can shape her preferences both as to the content of 
participation, and also as to the choice of form of political participation. The social 
perception of the roles of older people in politics seems to discourage them from being 
active in non-institutionalised forms of political participation. There remained 
unexplained variance between older and younger people for mode 3 (signing a 
petition/wearing a badge) and mode 4 (protesting) in chapter 8. This gap could partially 
be explained by the old age culture of a country, a measure for which Britain lies more 
towards the end where older people are highly valued. In other words, Britain appears to 
be a society where negative images about older people and active political behaviour are 
not as widespread as in other countries.
By internalising images of politically passive older people, the preferences of 
older individuals change. The range of political actions they want to pursue narrows 
down. The importance of stereotypes and images of social groups prevalent in a society 
has been explored, for example, with regard to women’s political participation that 
tends to be lower on some measures of political participation. One explanation is the 
internalisation of stereotypes of passivity (Welch 1977: 713). If older individuals are 
socialised into believing stereotypes about passive older people, this would then also 
lead to less participation.
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In addition to the societal expectations, the last chapter has shown that older 
people in Britain, compared to younger people, are less likely to protest because they are 
on average more to the right of the political spectrum, less postmaterialist, more likely to 
live in rural areas, more religious, feel less internally politically efficacious and are less 
likely to be trade union/party members. Older people’s likelihood to protest is increased 
by their greater political interest and the fact that they are rarely employed.
All of the interviewees -  whose statements form the evidence of this chapter -  
were active in non-institutionalised forms of behaviour. Some of them were also actively 
organising the local groups or managing the daily affairs of ‘Isitfair’, a grassroots protest 
group that formed over the issue of Council Tax in 2003. Can the interviews tell us 
something more to enable us to understand protest activities in later life? The interviews 
cannot show us how the older protesters compare to younger ones because I only 
interviewed older people. However, I asked them several questions to reflect how their 
age mattered to their political involvement. I was especially interested to see whether 
these protesters experience any of the youth bias of protest and the generational trend 
that we detected in the analysis of the large-N survey. We saw in the over time trend in 
chapter 8 that older people caught up on measures of non-electoral participation, but also 
that there remained a sizeable gap between older and younger people.
I will discuss the interview findings around several themes by separating 
circumstances and factors that are unique to the Council Tax protests from more general 
results that should hold if tested in different contexts. There are some aspects about the 
Council Tax protests that are not surprising in the slightest. If you take away growing 
chunks of a fixed disposable income, individuals will be mobilised to do something
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about it because their personal material outcome is diminished. If activists further see 
the system that is responsible for their shrinking share as unfair, the mobilisation 
potential is even higher. This is because the expressive benefit from the participatory act 
increases. When asked about their main motivation to become active, eight respondents 
indicated that they were personally put into difficulties because of the rises in Council 
Tax. 13 out of 22 described the whole system as unfair or unjust. Only four mentioned 
their dissatisfaction with the level of services, compared to the money they have to pay. 
We would expect similar motivation from younger people on a small income. But there 
are a range of factors and circumstances that make older people different from younger 
people and influence their protest behaviour, such as their richer political experience and 
images of old age.
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part (sections 1 -  3), I explain 
the background to the Council Tax protests, describe the sampling procedure and the 
social characteristics of the sample. In the second part (sections 4 -  9), I look at the 
factors of influence that the theoretical model suggests: resources/motivation at old age 
(history of political engagement, retirement, ill health, experience of ageism and 
stereotypes, and senior identity); mobilisation/opportunities at old age; and the 
generational change in protesting from the point-of-view of older people.
9.1 Explaining the case context
The Council Tax is a unique system of local finance in Britain (England, Wales and
Scotland). It is the only tax that a local council can raise, but makes up only about 25 %
of local budgets. Local authorities are not entirely free to set the tax, but sometimes face
a cap given by national government. Council Tax has to be paid by the residents of a
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property unit (which can be a whole house or just one flat in a house) to the local 
government authority. The amount of the Council Tax depends on the value of the 
property that was assessed in 1991 to belong to one out of eight or nine bands. If the 
occupants of the unit receive Council Tax benefit or are full-time students, they are 
totally or partially exempt from the tax. A person who is aged 65 or older and living on 
her/his own gets a discount of 25 %. The tax does not affect the poorest because they are 
exempt as recipients of welfare benefits. The tax burden per person is fixed regardless of 
income for those who do not receive Council Tax benefit. Thus, for those who have to 
pay, Council Tax is a de-facto regressive tax that places a heavier burden on those with a 
small fixed income, such as recipients of the state pension, and those who co-habit with 
a small number of people, such as couples or widowers.
This tax is unusual because its value base is the property and not income or 
residency. The value of the property is based on a valuation in 1991 and will be adjusted 
to the rises in value due to the property boom in the 1990s and early 2000s after the next 
General Election in 2009/2010 (in England and Scotland). In Wales, the revaluation took 
place in 2003 and led to a wide scale upgrade of properties moving up one band, which 
increased the tax burden for residents. Between 1993 and 2003, the average Council Tax 
in England rose 95 % while public pensions and prices (across Britain) only rose 30 % 
and earnings 50 %. The 2003 Council Tax increase in England of 13 % was the biggest 
ever seen (Help the Aged 2005: 4).
Since many interviewees made references to earlier finance systems, it is helpful 
to put the Council Tax into historical context. The present Council Tax system is a 
successor to the Community Charge, which was often called the poll tax and which was
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in place between 1989 (Scotland)/ 1990 (England and Wales) and 1992. The Community 
Charge had followed a rates system which levied tax depending on the rental value of 
the property. The poll tax was a per-head tax, counting the residents of a property rather 
than being based on the property value. There was widespread opposition against the 
poll tax and its annual rises. It led to massive occurrences (estimated 18 million people) 
of non-payment in 1990. The protests culminated in violent street demonstrations (the 
‘poll tax riots’), the biggest of which was a rally of 200,000 protesters in London in 
March 1990. The governing Conservatives decided to abandon the Community Charge 
after Margaret Thatcher, a staunch supporter of the tax, resigned in late 1990.
The Council Tax protests under study here include all those activities that were 
committed in England from January 2004 to October 2005 to express discontent either 
with the rises in Council Tax or with the system as such. The activities include signing a 
petition, collecting signatures for a petition, writing letters to councillors and MPs, legal 
and illegal demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience such as withholding parts of 
one’s Council Tax bill. Central, national occurrences of these Council Tax protests were 
two street marches in London, one at Trafalgar Square on 17 January 2004 and one on 
Whitehall on 2 October 2004. The January march attracted approximately 2,000 -  3,000 
protesters, and its leaders gave a petition of about 40,000 signatures to No 10 Downing 
Street (Tapper 2004; Wills 2004). At the October rally, a few hundred protesters handed 
over another petition with 60,000 signatures (Danks 2004; Independent on Sunday 
2004). Locally, a plethora of demonstrations took place, typically protests in front of 
county halls. There were also protests in Wales and Scotland, but they were not as 
widespread as in England and will be excluded from further analysis here.
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Protests of older people are not a new phenomenon. Historically, England saw 
several periods of senior protests. Pension reforms were part of the public debate in the 
late 1930s, and the National Association of Old Age Pensions Associations was formed 
in 1938. It mobilised its members to demonstrate, to write petitions to ministers and to 
lobby members of Parliament (Blaikie in Thane 2000: 331-2). Pensioner organisations 
after World War II always used their members as a political leverage to make 
themselves heard in Westminster. The large national organisations declined, however, in 
the 1980s due to the increasing availability of local funding for local pensioners groups 
(Pratt 1993: 143). It is difficult to assess to what extent the protest activities of members 
made a difference in terms of impact. But it is clear that the organisation of pensioners to 
induce them into participation has a historical tradition.
The Council Tax protests are similar to these past senior protests as the main 
participants are pensioners. However, their main issue is not only of concern to older 
people, but affects people from all age groups. For example, those young families with 
low incomes who are not exempt are also heavily affected by rises in the Council Tax. In 
theoretical terms, pensioners share similar concerns about Council Tax with other 
groups due to a similar social situation (i.e., low level of income).
9,2 The Social profile of interviewees
The Council Tax protests were concerted by a group called Tsitfair’. It is a campaigning
organisation that claims to be non-partisan. It has numerous frilly and partially affiliated
local pensioners groups across England. Anecdotal evidence from the interviews
suggests that there might be about 120 of them, varying significantly in size and activity
levels. Isitfair is a loose organisation that does not have a membership system and
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finances itself purely from donations. Local groups often started independently and 
joined the Isitfair campaign in late 2003.
As Isitfair does not have a full list of all individual members who were active in 
protest activities, there was no population frame from which to sample. Therefore, I 
decided for convenience sampling to try to reach a minimum number of 20 interviewees, 
who were as diverse as possible (as to residence and involvement in local group), by 
way of recommendation (snowball principle). Recall from chapter 4 that I contacted the 
main Isitfair organisation, and all local groups that are connected to Isitfair according to 
the Isitfair website, explaining my research and its non-commercial purpose. I also 
posted my project on the Isitfair internet news forum, asking for volunteers. The sample 
that I interviewed consisted of people who had been recommended by the main 
organisers as potentially willing to be interviewed and further recommendations by this 
first group. In total, I interviewed 22 older people between 15 November and 7 
December 2005. The interview guide with a list of questions, briefing and de-briefing 
procedures can be found in the appendix 11.11. My original notes (anonymised) are on 
the data CD-Rom.
There are three potential major sources of bias in the sample compared to a 
representative one. Many interviewees were heavily involved in organising local groups,
i.e. they showed high levels of participation; they were known to be willing to talk about 
their experiences by those who recommended them; and were personally known to local 
or even national group leaders. Finally, it is plausible to assume that the recommended 
individuals shared opinions with those who recommended them. However, the actual
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opinions about Council Tax are only secondary in this chapter because the experience of 
political protest as such stands in the foreground.
All respondents were 60 and older. The minimum age was 60, the maximum 82 
and the mean 72. Two respondents were between 60 and 65 years old, six between 66 
and 70, eight between 71 and 75 and six between 76 and 82. Five respondents were 
women, 17 were men. Eight respondents left school at the age of 16 or younger; 12 at a 
higher age (two unknown). Two interviewees had graduated from university. Most 
respondents’ last jobs were white-collar jobs. Two respondents worked in skilled, 
manual professions, one in a non-skilled manual position. Apart from one respondent 
who still engaged in freelance work, all respondents older than 64 were retired.
The places of residence of the respondents can be divided into three regions: the 
Southeast with four respondents (Surrey, West Sussex), the Southwest with 15 
respondents (Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Somerset) and 
‘Other’ with three respondents (Essex, London, Yorkshire). Of the retired interviewees, 
all but one received an occupational pension next to their state pension (unknown in two 
cases).
Overall, most interviewees are roughly in the Third Age that is commonly
assumed to be between 50 and 75 (Walker and Maltby 1997: 17). It is this age group, the
young-old, that is less likely to be frail, compared to the later Fourth Age, the old-old.
Furthermore, the socio-economic profile suggests that the respondents are
predominantly middle class: white collar, medium range of education and not poor.
Geographically, the large number of interviewees from the Southwest and Southeast
mirrors the high level of activities of local pensioners’ groups in those regions. No doubt
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this is down to the high rises in Council Tax in these areas, and their high population of 
older residents.
Table 9-1: Overview of English respondents by ID letter, gender, age and wider region
ID Gender Age
Southeast (Surrey, West Sussex)
A Male 71
B Male 74
C Male 74
D Male 76
Southwest (Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Somerset)
E Male 60
F Male 60
G Female 67
H Male 69
I Female 70
J Female 68
K Female 70
L Male 74
M Male 71
N Male 73
0 Male 72
P Male 76
Q Male 78
R Female 77
S Male 82
Other (Essex, London, Yorkshire)
T Male 68
U Male 74
V Male 76
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Table 9-1 shows an overview of all respondents. In order to ensure anonymity, 
respondents are referred to by letters and their region of residence is very wide. Now I 
will discuss the interview findings around several themes by separating circumstances 
and factors that are unique to the Council Tax protests from more general findings that 
should hold if tested in different contexts.
9.3 Resources and motivation to protest at old age 
Political engagement prior to Council Tax protests
One pool of resources that older people can draw upon is experience of the political 
actions in question. For example, prior knowledge of a street demonstration makes it 
easier to decide for or against it. This is because you know what it will be like, including 
the practicalities, like taking something to drink and to eat. In general, most (14) 
respondents had never demonstrated before the Council Tax street marches. Another 
five had demonstrated once before, some a few years, others a few decades before the 
Council Tax protests. These previous demonstrations included: the poll tax protests in 
1990 (E), a demonstration for gay rights in 1980s (K, N), a demonstration against a 
development scheme in a nature reserve in the 1980s (L), and a trade union strike in the 
1960s (U). The other four had been more regularly involved in demonstrations. 
Interviewee I had been a professional union official for a few years and had been active 
in protest politics during that time. Respondent S had first demonstrated against the 
British accession to the European Community at the beginning of the 1970s and had 
been active in the Referendum and UKIP parties since, also going to their street rallies. 
Respondent Q had started regular protests ten years ago, campaigning for the installation 
of a local council.
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However, apart from two respondents, all had been involved in some kind of 
political participation other than street demonstrations or voting, before the Council Tax 
issue. Seven (B, E, H, L, Q, S, U) had been party members at some points in their lives. 
Not surprisingly, only the UKIP member was still a party member at the times of the 
protests. The protests -  as they were portrayed in the press -  were a reaction to 
disenchantment with the main political parties who were seen as responsible for the 
Council Tax system and its double-digit rises.
The most common form of participation, other than voting, had been contacting a 
public official or MP prior to the Council Tax protests. 18 respondents had engaged in 
some kind of political letter-writing prior to 2004. Three of those had written on the 
issue of Council Tax (D, F, S) before they joined the activities of the local group. I asked 
the respondents whether they had been active on any other issue since the beginning of 
their commitment on the Council Tax. 15 Interviewees reported no other political 
engagement. Two respondents (A, G) had participated in one-off actions on the issue of 
housing for older people and as a reaction to a party politician’s public utterance that 
pensioners should sit back and wait to see what the government could do for them.43 
Four respondents (D, M, Q, S) were regularly engaged on other issues.
In sum, the reported experience of previous political engagement show that the 
interviewees predominantly belonged to the pool of politically interested citizens, who at 
a younger age had not been very active, but who demonstrated the occasional motivation 
and willingness to engage in political activity. So, learning from repeated experience
43 Respondent G had watched a party politicain make such a statement on TV. She publicly confronted 
that politician during a press conference with that statement.
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along the logic of individual ageing proved to be important for voting participation, but 
is less important here. The lack of experience of street demonstrations can probably be 
explained with regard to the fact that protesting grew in popularity while the 
interviewees got older. It would have been unusual for them to have engaged in protest 
at a young age, as protests had been uncommon in the 1950s and early 1960s.
The onset of political activity varies, but is predominantly found from the age of 
40 onwards. Four respondents (C, P, T, V) got active for the first time in the Council 
Tax protests. Another three (B, D, G) became active shortly before or after their 
retirement. Ten (A, E, F, K, L, N, O, Q, R, S) began their political engagement in their 
forties or fifties. Only four (I, J, M, U) reported a first political activity other than voting 
in their twenties or thirties. Some respondents showed uncertainty about actual dates, but 
were able to identify the decade of their lives by aligning the political events to their 
personal circumstances of the time. It could be, however, that these recollections are not 
equally correct and that events longer in the past, for instance, were systematically 
discounted. Nevertheless, most respondents mirror the image of an apolitical first half of 
life. The respondents gave their impression on the reasons for this when being asked 
about the impact of retirement (see next section).
In these interviews, it was clear that these older people could draw on a history 
of political interest and non-electoral participation when they became active on the issue 
of Council Tax. Even if most of them had been unfamiliar with street demonstrations, 
their personal experience of other political activities provided a potential resource for 
them.
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Voting history
It is illuminating to look at the protesters’ voting history, party identification and last 
voting decision at the last General Election in May 2005. This allows us to see to what 
extent their electoral experiences and behaviours are related to non-voting activities. All 
22 interviewees had voted in that election. None of them voted for Labour, nine voted 
for the Lib Dems, eight for the Conservatives, one candidate for himself as he stood as 
an independent, and one for UKIIP (three interviewees did vote, but declined to disclose 
whom they had voted for). It is not surprising that none of these Council Tax protesters 
voted for Labour. Many respondents live in rural constituencies where the Labour 
candidate is often unlikely to win. In addition, the Council Tax protests are aimed at 
Labour that has been in power for a few years and is seen as complacent on the Council 
Tax issue by the protesters.
Very few interviewees had a strong sense of party identification: only three 
indicated a long-term preference for the Lib Dems, one for Conservative, one for Labour 
and one for UKIP. Some expressed their general dissatisfaction with all major political 
parties. For example, interviewee F would like to have seen ‘none of the above’ as an 
option on the ballot and told me that he had deliberately spoilt his ballot a few times in 
the past. Respondent N voted for what he called ‘protest’ parties, the Greens and UKIP, 
in local elections. Other respondents described their decision to vote for some of the 
main parties as a choice for the least evil rather than one out of conviction.
Some respondents also stated not to have voted in earlier elections, although the 
general picture was one of regular voting in this group. Many respondents switched 
votes many times in their lives. These pieces of evidence seem to suggest that these
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protesters belong to the group of volatile rather than strongly identifying voters. Most of 
them are prepared to cast their vote differently at each election. The fact that some of the 
irregular voters had voted in the last election could be due to the mobilising factor of 
protest participation as well as the general tendency to vote among older people (see 
chapter 6). In line with the findings of chapter 7, these older interviewees in 2005 were 
not strongly captured by any early socialisation effects that we probably would have 
found if we had interviewed older people in the 1960s.
In the 2005 General Election, the three main political parties campaigned on 
different positions as to the future of Council Tax (see their respective election 
manifestoes Kimber 2006). Thus, it was like a natural experiment to see how the stance 
on this policy would influence the voting decision. Labour offered a one-off discount of 
£ 200 in 2005 for people over 65 who paid Council Tax. The Conservatives promised to 
halve the Council Tax permanently for people over 65. The Liberal Democrats promised 
to abolish the system of Council Tax altogether and to introduce a local income tax 
based on the ability to pay. That system would -  according to the Liberal Democratic 
manifesto -  make 8 out of 10 pensioners better off and free 6 million pensioners from 
paying anything at all. In contrast to Labour and the Conservatives, the abolition of the 
Council Tax system and its replacement was given more emphasis in the manifesto of 
the Lib Dems, putting the issue into the context of a strategy to have fairer taxes. The 
official standpoint of the Isitfair group, the umbrella organisation for many of the local 
protest groups, was that they welcomed the Lib Dems’ suggestion, but would prefer a 
rise in general taxation to pay for local expenses (Isitfair 2005).
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Since the main parties provided some choice on the (for this group at least) 
salient issue of Council Tax, I asked a few questions concerning the reasons of then- 
choice for or against the Liberal Democrats. My intention was to see whether this group 
of protesters was prepared to cast their vote on this issue and thus to combine their 
protesting objectives with the objectives of their voting participation. Out of the nine 
Liberal Democratic voters, four (A, M, N, P) indicated that the proposed abolition of the 
Council Tax had been their major reason to vote for the Lib Dems. Another three (G, J, 
U) put the issue further down their list of voting issues, and two stated that this had not 
been an issue when they had taken their decision to vote for the Liberal Democrats. 
Within the group of voters who had not voted for the Liberal Democrats, two stated that 
they liked the Liberal-Democratic proposal on Council Tax, but did not like the party for 
other reasons, such as their pro-European stance (S) or their weak leader Charles 
Kennedy (T). Three (F, Q, V) had concerns about the suitability of the alternative system 
of local income tax, such as it not being transparent enough, or the administrative costs 
of it being too high (the latter being one of the reason Isitfair puts officially forward 
against the proposal). One Conservative voter thought that the Lib Dems were too small 
to vote for and liked the Conservative proposal to scrap 50 % of the Council Tax bill for 
pensioners. The answers suggest that this group of pensioners is -  on the whole - 
prepared to cast their vote on the issue of Council Tax. To some extent, this is not 
surprising because almost by definition, Council Tax protesters care immensely about 
Council Tax. This also means that the protesters are willing to use the path of party 
politics to advance their interests despite their apparent disenchantment with political 
parties.
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In sum, the selected group of interviewees are not that much different from other 
voters in the country. They might be more sceptical and vote-switching than the average 
voter, but their choices are within the normal confines of the electoral process. It is 
reasonable to assume that the protest activities have educated these activists in terms of 
party positions on the Council Tax and related matters of local and national finance. 
Therefore, their voting behaviour has been influenced to be critical of all party proposals 
in General Elections. In contrast to younger voters, these people are disenchanted with 
all major parties because of a long-term memory. For example, one respondent assessed 
Labour with reference to the series of strikes in the 1970s under the Callaghan 
government. Even if one party did everything right from the perspective of these voters, 
such scepticism is likely to remain in the future. The deep disenchantment with political 
parties is definitely another motivational factor to seek to address the issue via the 
protest group.
Retirement
Retirement is a clear source of resources for older people making it easier for them to 
engage in acts of political participation. Retirement means more time to think about 
political issues, more time to become active on political issues, no (or less) responsibility 
to raise a family or earn money, and the freedom to express one’s opinion without 
having to respect one’s role as an employee. Also, the discrepancy between what 
respondents expected from retirement and their experienced reality in terms of material 
well-being seems to be an important motivational factor.
Retired respondents were asked to what extent retirement had made a difference
on their ability to be politically active. Three interviewees (G, K, R) reported that there
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was no difference. However, one of them was a housewife before she started drawing 
state pension. For another the lack of any occupational pension suggests that she did not 
have a full employment history. The third had a job that allowed her to work half-days 
from home. All other 15 respondents who were asked the question told me that 
retirement had given them more time. Some respondents noted a difference between 
having more time to think about issues that they had not been concerned about when still 
working, and having time to actually engage in activities that they are interested in, such 
as political actions. One interviewee (H) mentioned the stressful nature of his previous 
job and his personal inability to ‘sit still’. He saw his high-level of engagement within 
the Council Tax protests as a means to keep himself busy. Another respondent (M) 
described the vacuum that retirement had left and explained that he sought to fill with 
his activity in the pensioners group.
Some respondents (C, U) stressed the nuisance that they felt having to become 
active on the issue of Council Tax; they would have preferred not to have had to get 
politically involved. One respondent (U) explained that his involvement on the issue of 
Council Tax prevented him from working on his wood work in his garage, a typical 
example of opportunity costs of political participation. Many respondents emphasised 
that retirement had freed them from responsibility in financial terms and, at a higher age, 
from the responsibility of raising a family. Respondent S summed this notion up by 
saying that younger people ‘have ties that we [pensioners] don’t have.’
Respondent J also told me that she felt not to have been in a position to be 
politically active while she had still been in employment because it would have caused 
problems in her job. By contrast in retirement, she felt she had nothing to lose. Some of
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the interviewees had withheld parts of their Council Tax and only paid the outstanding 
sum in pennies once ordered by court. Typically, they delivered the pile of pennies to the 
local authority and tilted the bag over in the presence of press photographers. 
Interviewee S described the embarrassment that this spectacle caused to his spouse and 
children and highlighted at the same time that he was not afraid of these social 
repercussions any longer. The widespread willingness to commit civil disobedience, 
which is also the policy of Isitfair, seems to suggest that many of these pensioners take a 
position of ‘nothing to lose’, a position that suggests a low estimate of personal risk. The 
reason could be that older mobilised people are just less fearful of potential 
repercussions because they are no longer dependent, for example, on employers to make 
a living. Also, individuals can control their own actions, but not that of elected 
politicians, an explanation that would also account for this finding.
Respondent D described his motivation to protest from his disappointment with 
his financial situation. He had thought he would be comfortable in retirement and know 
his income for the rest of his life. But instead he felt that ‘we [the pensioners] are being 
wronged every day.’ He judged that pensioners just wanted their pension income and to 
live a quiet life. Respondent N said that in post-war Britain you had been expected to 
‘take your silver bloc’ at the age of 65 and ‘sit down’.
Respondent G thought that people who worked hard to accumulate their pension 
credits were treated unfairly because part of their pensions were taken away through 
Council Tax. According to interviewee Q, his generation was punished for being 
‘thrifty’, as people on benefits were not affected by Council Tax. Respondent C 
described that since his retirement ten years ago his whole outlook on personal finances
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had changed. The income was now fixed and costs could still vary: ‘When you are 
retired, it is a different ball game.’
Respondent E said that he found it ‘disgusting’ that pensioners had to protest to 
secure their income. Respondent O held that he should not have to be in a position to 
protest and should not have to worry about where the money comes from. Respondent M 
raised the issue that retirement should allow people to stand back from the struggles of 
life, especially if they had been through World War II and experienced the post-war 
period of hardship. According to sociological studies, this experience of World War II 
typically shapes that British generation in many regards (see Vincent 2005).
Respondent G felt that the impingement of Council Tax on pensioner income 
was aggravated by the fact that older people find it difficult to take up a job to earn more 
money. Respondent L expressed along similar lines that ageism in employment made it 
more difficult for older people to raise extra cash, something that younger people could 
easily do.
Retirement plays an important role for these protesters. It not only gives them
time to think and act, but it also frees them from job responsibility. The mismatch
between their anticipated, financial retirement situation and the social situation they
were actually experiencing caused widespread anger. They were expecting a time free
from material worries, an expectation that was threatened by the Council Tax system.
Thus, the theoretical framework might need to be refined. It is not the direct experience
of a social situation that creates political preferences, but the comparison of expectations
with the actual experience. This kind of discrepancy between what retirement feels like
and what had been expected of it is likely to occur on various dimensions in the near
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future for the current older generation. The British as well as other European welfare 
states are partially re-cast at the moment. Many welfare programmes have the 
pensioners’ group as its main beneficiaries; die most widespread programmes are 
probably public pensions, social care and health care. If changes to these programmes 
affect pensioners in a way that they had not anticipated, this is likely to be as much a 
motivating factor as is the Council Tax. These findings also cast further light on the 
quantitative results. Employment was also seen as a factor not conducive to protesting in 
the street. Retirement is a social situation that is shared by many individuals. If they 
share expectations about it (and thus certain preferences, like the expectation not to 
worry about material endowment), they can also share similar disappointment. This can 
then motivate all of them to act together.
Ill health and the choice of political action
111 health can -  as I originally hypothesised -  decrease the resources and motivation of 
older people to engage in political activities. It proved, however, to be insignificant in 
the quantitative analysis. In contrast to younger age groups, ill health is much more of a 
problem for older people due to the physical effects of ageing and the accumulative 
effects of unhealthy lifestyles. I was interested to see in what respect these older 
protesters or other people in their group were hampered by their health in engaging in 
political participation. The group of interviewees is probably relatively fit in comparison 
to an average group of British older people because one of the sampling requirements 
was engagement in street protests.
I asked the interviewees to compare their situation now with the situation their
parents were in when they were older and whether they thought it was easier, more
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difficult or not different for them today to engage in political protest. Respondent T 
noted that his generation today was living much longer and that his parents had already 
been old in their 50s. Other respondents judged along similar lines.
Although today’s older people live longer and are healthy for longer, ill health 
plays a role. Several respondents reported that they had to give up going to a street 
march or group meetings because they were less mobile due to new, artificial hips or 
other health problems. However, they substituted their going out by concentrating on 
writing letters. This activity with low physical requirements was also expected from 
other older people who were not able to protest in the streets by respondents K, L and R. 
Some respondents also reported protesters in wheel chairs and crutches at street 
demonstrations who were being helped by others, so that physical disabilities were dealt 
with as much as possible. One group leader (Q) provides a monthly newsletter to cater 
for the needs of the housebound members of his group.
Respondents U and M who were very active in organising local groups told me 
how ill health can be a problem in recruiting enough older protesters who do not want to 
stand outside for long periods of time. Also, ill health is an inherent problem for older 
people’s political organisations. If a leading volunteer has to stop activities due to ill 
health, the organisation suffers a sudden weakening disruption of its organisational life.
9.4 The experience of ageism and images about old age and protest
The last chapter showed that the culture of old age plays a limited but discernible role in 
discouraging older people from political participation. The more older people were on 
average valued in a society, the less residual variation between age groups there was for
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protesting in the streets, signing a petition or wearing a badge, ceteris paribus. However, 
since all interviewees had been active, they were certainly not discouraged by ageist 
stereotypes, but might at least have experienced some of these pressures during their 
participation. We have already seen some images of old age in some of the perceptions 
of what retirement should look like, namely a role model of a politically passive older 
person who should live off the pension and keep quiet. I wanted to venture deeper into 
that territory and asked a series of five questions to capture any stereotypes that the 
respondents might feel or have been confronted with:
1. In the press coverage of the street demonstrations in London, journalists highlighted 
the higher age of protesters. They wrote with an undertone of surprise about the 
higher age of protesters; for example, they wrote about the ‘grey army that is 
marching’. Can you understand why they should be surprised?
2. Do you think it is unusual to protest at your age?
3. How did your friends, family and neighbours react when they heard about your 
protest involvement? Did younger people react differently?
4. FOR FIRST TIME PROTESTERS: When you were at the protests, did you feel 
awkward in any way because of your age?
5. Were there people who let you understand that you should not have marched in the 
streets because you are too old?
The last question, which is certainly the most direct one, only received negating 
answers. Respondent C, however, added that he looked very young, so that that might 
have been the reason why he had not received these kinds of comments. In other words, 
he expected these comments could come if someone looks ‘old’, which probably means
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frail, sick or wrinkly. However, it could be that stereotypes are more subtle and seen as 
socially inappropriate to utter. Question 4 was also negated (when it was asked). Some 
respondents highlighted that the whole group of protesters had been older, so that there 
was a feeling of solidarity, to which I will come back.
The answers to question 3 concerned a whole variety of reactions by people in 
the immediate environment of the respondents. Most respondents reported a supportive 
environment and no differences in the reactions between younger and older people in 
their immediate environment. A few respondents (O, S) had encountered less interest 
among younger people.
Respondent R who was 77 years old and primarily engaged in letter-writing 
without regular group involvement reported that some of the other older people in her 
environment asked her: ‘Why do you bother at your age?’ They let her know that these 
activities were a waste of time. Whereas this is a point of criticism directed to the impact 
of letter writing to politicians and public officials, the addition of ‘at your age’ is very 
interesting. It suggests that -  in some of her peers’ opinions -  she should even be less 
willing to use this form of participation because (a) she should know better at her age, 
(b) she should be aware of the limited lifespan that she still has, or (c) she should not be 
as active at her age. Respondent J reported that some younger people still in work were 
thankful because the pensioners were putting in the time that they did not have for a 
cause that they supported.
In answers to question 1 about the press coverage, some respondents (F, H, M, P)
identified the way the press covered the marches as sensationalist journalism.
Respondents H, F and P were even annoyed because of the way that the media
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represented their marches and objectives because the Council Tax affected everybody 
and the marches also attracted some younger people. Others perceived the fact that it 
was older people who were of most interest to the public because this group had not 
been known to be protesting before (D, I, J, K, L, N, S). Protester K described how 
journalists thought that older people ‘have lost it, but they actually haven’t’. Respondent 
L emphasised that he thought pictures with older protesters sold well. In sum for that 
question 1, some respondents were aware of the fact that older protesters are more 
interesting to newspapers than younger protesters because (a) they are unlikely to protest 
and have been known not to be protesting so far, or (b) older people are perceived not to 
be in a position to protest. Question 2 asked the direct question of whether it was 
unusual to protest at the respondent’s age.
The majority of respondents said that it was unusual, but gave rather different 
shades to their answers. Many described the overall change towards protest becoming 
more common. I will come back to these answers in section 9.7 about generational and 
life cycle changes. Here, I will only consider answers that allow us to draw conclusions 
about underlying images and stereotypes about older people and protest. Two 
respondents (M, O) said it was unusual because retirees should not be in a position 
where they have to protest. Interviewee K stressed that people at their age can often not 
be bothered about getting involved. Respondent A reported to have seen a 92 year-old 
female protester, the sight of whom he described as inspiring. The first two respondents 
emphasised a clash between their image of retirement and old age on the one hand and 
the protesting situation they were in on the other. In an ideal world, they as pensioners 
ought not to be protesting. Their underlying logic was founded on the perception that
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retirees had earned their right not to protest through their hard effort in working life. As 
a consequence, protest was perceived as something like a last resort and not as a 
‘regular’ political activity.
All in all, the interviews show the existence of some images about old age and 
politics. Some respondents had internalised these themselves, other respondents 
encountered them in their environment. Negative images about old age and protest imply 
that you should not engage in protest activities because: (a) you should know better 
about the unlikely impact of your engagement; (b) you should not waste the last part of 
your life with these activities; (c) you should generally not be as active politically; and 
(d) you should not be in a position where you have to protest. One protester described 
the inspiration that he drew from seeing a 90+ year old protester. This can be interpreted 
as a personal experience that defies internalised pre-conceptions about old age and 
passivity.
Obviously, the protesters were not held back by theses images and stereotypes 
about old age and political behaviour. However, seen together with the quantitative 
findings from the last chapter, we can suggest that images about the social roles of older 
people might prevent them -  on average -  from participating in these non­
institutionalised forms of political participation. The findings about expectations, 
stereotypes and images vis-a-vis politics and old age give substance to the quantitative 
measure of old age culture as well as to the importance of internal political efficacy that 
was measured in the last chapter. Given that Britain scored relatively low on the various 
measures of old age culture in chapter 8, negative stereotypes about old age and politics 
might be more de-capacitating for older people in other countries.
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9.5 The lack of a common senior identity
A common identity is a powerful motivating force in group politics (Abrams and Hogg 
2001; Miller et al. 1981). I was interested in whether die protesters had any feelings 
about a common senior or pensioner identity or whether they had any feeling of 
solidarity with their peers. The findings confirm the results of earlier studies (Day 1990): 
identity and solidarity are detectable with some individuals, but are not very common 
among the group of interviewees as a whole.
At different parts of the interview, I asked questions about the experience of 
marching together with a group of older people and whether the respondents felt 
motivation to engage in protest while knowing that there are other older people who are 
unable to participate because they are ill or do not have the minimal, monetary resources 
to be active. Experiencing the group event with many other, older people did create 
some feeling of a common bond for some, albeit in different variations, and not for all. 
For four respondents (B, C, D, Q), the age of the other protesters did not matter at all. 
For some, it was important to see that they were not alone in their protest and that there 
are other people who care about the same issues (I, O, R), rather than there were other 
people of the same age group. Interviewee A put emphasis on the common experience of 
a first street demonstration that many protesters shared, like an experience of political 
initiation. This experience is directly linked to that generation of older people because 
their cohort as a whole is less likely to have protested at a younger age.
Some respondents complained that there were so few young people at the 
demonstrations in London (F, M, P, V). By contrast, respondent S saw it as a driving
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factor to be active on behalf of younger people who had to work. One respondent 
highlighted the satisfaction to have marched with younger people (I).
Two respondents mentioned feelings of solidarity with other pensioners (L, V) 
on the march. One respondent (K) said that it was important for them as older people to 
protest because ‘they [mainstream party politicians, AG] think, because we are old, we 
are not able to do these things and protest’. She would have liked to see even more older 
people on the marches. Respondent J argued along similar lines that it was important for 
older people to come together, not only on the issue of Council Tax, but also on others 
that Isitfair was looking into (e.g. pensions).
The majority of interviewees were not conscious about their own age or the age 
of the other pensioners. Only two hinted at the fact that their protest should actually 
concentrate on engaging a broad group of older people. The interest to gain support 
among younger people for their cause prevailed in a majority of respondents. One 
respondent described the support that older people, who are rich in time, could give to 
younger people. After all, younger people are similarly affected by the Council Tax, but 
do not have the time to protest. This is an interesting notion of inter-generational 
solidarity and stands in contrast to a political group identity that is based on an ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ dichotomy.
Besides the potential solidarity with fellow older protesters, the interviewees
could also experience feelings for the vulnerable sub-group of older people who are
unable to engage in protest activities. The experiences of the interviewees can be
classified into three groups. Eight respondents (F, H, K, O, L, N, R) said that knowing
about this vulnerable group did not have any impact on their own behaviour. They
288
expressed feelings of sympathy and pity, but no feelings of responsibility. Four alluded 
to the substitution of protest in the streets by letter- writing that is open to anyone 
immobile and poor in resources. Respondent A described that some people used their 
age as an excuse not to become active. Respondent N also highlighted that some people 
in wheelchairs and with crutches made it to the protests nevertheless. Interviewee H 
expressed his admiration for disabled older people who joined them despite their 
disability.
The second group (B, C, T) drew motivation from the fact that they were 
themselves still physically active enough to engage in all kinds of protest activities, 
whilst knowing about other, vulnerable seniors.
The last group (E, G, I, J, M, P, Q, S, U) felt that the current system of Council 
Tax was especially unjust to this vulnerable group and felt responsibility to be active on 
their behalf. These protesters described their feelings towards vulnerable pensioners with 
reference to justice and responsibility. Furthermore, interviewee U thought that it was a 
good feeling to have this group of people behind them when protesting.
In sum, it would be hard to speak of a common identity of older people or 
pensioners among the group of respondents. Some of them draw some motivation from 
the knowledge of vulnerable other people in their situation. These other people are 
defined by illness and inability rather than by age or by the fact that they receive 
pensions.
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9.6 Mobilisation and opportunities for older protesters
So far, we have dealt with resources and motivation for participation. But what does the 
mobilisation or opportunities side of the equation look like for these older protesters? 
The evidence of the interviews seems to suggest that local organisations that are run by 
retirees can mobilise other retirees into protest activities, by providing them with 
information, setting up transport facilities and by representing role models. In other 
words, older people can create further participation opportunities for other older people 
who might otherwise have found it difficult to engage in any kind of protest activities.
The respondents predominantly live in rural areas with patchy public transport. 
Most of them benefited from buses that had been organised by local groups of the Isitfair 
family. Others reported to have used their own car to attend local or London 
demonstrations. The organisation plays an important role to overcome the transport 
problem for these rural dwellers. This fact, as such, would not be different for younger 
protesters, although access to a motor vehicle is more widespread among younger people 
(Age Concern England 2006a).
However, a difference exists in the volunteer structure of the local Isitfair groups. 
Those respondents who are local group leaders were all retirees themselves. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the whole Isitfair organisational structure 
rests on the shoulder of retired people. The pool of retirees who can potentially be active 
in local groups can increase the mobilisation potential for those older protesters who 
have difficulties in attending street rallies.
Many respondents had individually been active on the issue of Council Tax
before they joined their local pensioners groups. As single individuals, they had not been
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able to have much of an impact. Once the Isitfair campaign kicked off, most importantly 
through press coverage of the engagement of Christine Melsom, their national leader, 
the isolated individuals were able to get into contact with each other locally. They could 
then set up local support networks for those who lived away from where demonstrations 
took place, and for those who could not leave their homes, but could write letters. The 
pool of homebound older people can be used by local senior groups because they can 
provide them with the information they need in order to write effective letters to 
newspapers, MPs, and councils. Local groups can also co-ordinate the work of these 
‘isolated’ individuals, so that a meta-community of older protesters arises.
A further mobilisation potential comes from the role models of local and national 
leaders who are older themselves. If we assume that images about older people being 
less active in politics can decrease the likelihood of some people to participate, the 
threshold will probably become lower if they see other older people being active. 
Respondent M, for example, spoke very fondly of Albert Venison, the 80 year old group 
leader of the Devon Pensioners Action Forum, and the achievement at his age that 
brought him two awards and an invitation to a reception at No 10 Downing Street. 
Another example is the admiration of respondent A for the 92 year old protester.
It is interesting to note that these examples were given from the area of protest 
politics. No respondent mentioned older career politicians as a motivating source. For 
example, some of the then-leading British party figures were 60 or older, such as 
Michael Howard or Sir Menzies Campbell (both bom in 1941). A reason could be that 
these politicians aged while they were engaging in politics whereas the older protesters 
were old when they started that protest activity. The meaning of older role models and
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senior group activities has not been captured in the general survey, but could if a 
specifically designed survey was carried out.
9.7 A new generation ofprotesting older people
We have seen in the last chapter that the gap between older and younger protesters is 
shrinking with regard to non-electoral participation. The last chapter has also shown that 
older people are less likely to protest, across all countries and controlling for all 
resources and mobilisation factors. I asked protesters: (a) whether they thought it was 
unusual to protest at their age; (b) how they felt that their own situation had changed 
over their lifetime as to protest opportunities; (c) to compare their situation now with the 
situation their parents had been in at the same age and; (d) to assess whether they 
thought that protesting had gotten easier, more difficult or had remained similar.
Most interviewees thought that they were in a better position today as older 
protesters than their parents when they had been at the same age.44 There were four 
reasons given why their parents had been unlikely to protest at old age. Firstly, 
respondents O and U thought that there had been no need to protest back then. 
Respondent E maintained that it was Margaret Thatcher who was responsible for many 
things to protest about. Secondly, their parents’ generation had had different attitudes. 
Their parents had been more deferential (A) or had had respect for authority (Q). 
Thirdly, their parents’ generation were pre-occupied with re-building the country (M). 
Fourthly, demonstrations were very rare (P), or people beyond 40 were unlikely to take 
part in them (N).
44 Some respondents seemingly had problems with differentiating between the time their parents had been 
old (in the 1970s) and their own youth at home with their parents (in the 1950s).
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Most interviewees judged their own situation today to be more conducive to 
protest. Interviewee J summed this notion up by stating about her age group: ‘We are 
becoming more protesting.’ She described that older people are not afraid any longer 
and quoted the involvement of pensioners in the poll tax demonstrations. Protest had 
become ‘part of political life today’ (P). Interviewee K also thought that protesting was 
much more acceptable now. By contrast, respondent H held that the facilities to protest 
had remained the same, but that pensioners today are faced - for the first time -  with the 
need to engage in protest. Interviewee C also thought that protest was easier, but that the 
impact of a single protest activity had become less because there were so many of them. 
The availability of groups for all kinds of political interests can ensure that there are 
channels of political participation for everybody’s interests (L).
Some respondents (B, I, L) thought that protests were facilitated by the more 
widespread availability of free information and means of mass communication. These 
could ensure that older people can make each other aware of issues (I). Respondent M 
highlighted that the availability of more and freer TV channels as well as the citizen- 
friendly Freedom of Information Act ‘raised the political temperature’ that was 
conducive to political protest.
Moreover, older people have of a richer variety of resources at their disposition 
now, compared to their parents. They include: better health because of better medical 
treatment (K, L), longer lives (T, U) and more material resources like money or a car (S, 
U). Respondent T described that his parents had already been ‘old’ in their fifties, by 
which he probably meant frail.
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Finally, there were three respondents who thought that protesting had partially 
become more difficult. They felt they lived in a more ‘dirigiste’ police state and were 
concerned about the freedom of political expression after the passage of anti-terror 
legislation and expanded police powers (D, F, T). Despite the changes towards making 
protests easier for older people, some respondents still held the belief that protesting 
remained unusual for older people.
Overall, the respondents reiterate the widely confirmed notion that protesting is 
becoming more common in contemporary liberal democracies. It is important to stress 
the impact of better means of mass communication for older people who live in isolated 
circumstances and might be homebound. The group of interviewees certainly confirm 
the generational trend towards more non-institutionalised participation. They indicated 
better means of transport and communication, and a change in the political process 
(protest activities generally more common) as reasons for this.
9.8 Political implications
The evidence seems to suggest the advent of a new generation of older people who feel 
motivated to engage in protest and have the resources and opportunities to do so. The 
nature of their resources suggests that there is potentially a whole new reservoir of older 
retirees who are ready to protest if necessary and have the time to think about and 
engage in politics. From a normative perspective, this development ought to be 
welcomed because it means that more older people are using non-electoral means of 
participation to make their voices heard.
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One might hypothesise that the issues of their participation are likely to be local 
in nature as older people have lived in areas on average for much longer than other age 
groups. Interviewed group leaders told me that they had tried to mobilise political 
support against the Council Tax locally first and only went national when the impact 
was low on the local level. At the same time, England might be an example of an 
institutional context where this local political participation cannot easily be channelled 
into the political institutions of the polity. The localised group of older protesters exerted 
pressures on local authorities and counties on the issue of Council Tax, which were 
finally dependent on central government. Local government in England is weak in the 
sense that its does not autonomously have many resources at its disposal. Therefore, the 
protesters ended up taking the national stage at Trafalgar Square and other central 
locations to put pressure on central government. The centralised nature of the British 
polity might not be conducive to an effective channelling of senior grassroots 
movements who mobilise on local issues. Thus in more general terms, a conflict might 
arise between a growing potential pool of protesters in the form of older retirees and 
irresponsive local government in centralised unitary polities.
9.9 Summary
The qualitative interviews largely confirm the findings of the last quantitative chapter 
and cast more light on some additional resources/motivation and 
opportunities/mobilisation factors that are difficult to capture in large-N surveys. The 
experiences of the 22 interviewees bore out the generational change that is taking place 
through which older people become more likely to engage in protest activities. They also 
reported the still-existing gap between themselves and younger people.
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Previously unmeasured resources for older people to participate are their prior 
political interest, their prior engagement within the electoral process and their prior 
engagement outside of the electoral process. The scope of these resources is much richer 
for older than for younger people. All respondents were politically interested (and active 
at least at low levels) before they became active on the issue of Council Tax. Most of 
them had a history of regular voting and vote-switching, a finding one could expect for 
politically interested British protesters who engage outside of political parties. In the 
2005 General Election, Council Tax was an issue of consideration for some to cast their 
vote according to where parties stood on the issue.
Health -  as found in the quantitative chapter -  does not play a role for older 
people’s activities. They might use letter-writing to support their cause instead of street 
demonstrations. But ill health -  in general -  is not a factor for those who want to become 
involved.
Additionally, some of the respondents reported stereotypes or images about old 
retirement/old age and political passivity. The images, which they held themselves or 
had heard, revolved around the notion that older people have ‘earned’ a phase in their 
lives where they should not need to become active or they should have learnt that these 
forms of activities are not effective. These images and stereotypes confirm the cross­
national findings that old age culture plays a role in determining the levels of 
participation at old age. The social situation of old age inflicts certain expectations and 
images on those individuals externally. Political protest appears to be an action that is 
not ‘appropriate’ for someone of a certain age.
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In contrast to the social expectations, a common identity as a motivational source 
can hardly be detected. Answers diverged massively on these questions. Most 
interviewees did not feel solidarity with other older people per se, but put forward -  if at 
all -  a common cause (reform of Council Tax) or situation (reception of low pension 
income) as a feature of common identity. This finding mirrors the fact that older people 
are a very heterogeneous group that finds it hard to organise around old age as such. 
This is because other personal characteristics like income, class and place of residence 
divide the group of older people. Just the social situation of ‘being old’ is not enough to 
create an identity across older individuals, i.e. internally from the group perspective, and 
is insufficient to shape their political group consciousness.
There are two new factors of mobilisation that we have not found in the large 
survey yet. Older people, during a time of generational transition, when protest activities 
are still described as unusual, draw mobilisation potential from other older people who 
are already active. Additionally, emerging protest groups that are run by older people 
and focused on recruiting older people can also provide isolated older people, who might 
be without access to a motorised vehicle, with the information and meta-community to 
engage as members of a group. This can occur even though they might not physically 
see each other. This is a new phenomenon facilitated by means of communication being 
readily and cheaply available.
The political implications of such a growing generation of senior activity could 
be an increasing demand on the political system. Since older people tend to be 
embedded locally due to long duration of residence, the local level might be their first 
port of call. Since political systems differ in their level of responsiveness at the local
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level, they might also differ in the way they can cope with growing local senior demands 
to respond to older people’s needs.
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10 Conclusions
This thesis has sought to answer two questions: to what extent and why do older people 
in Europe participate differently from younger people in politics? By introducing 
concepts from social psychology and social gerontology to theories of political 
behaviour, I synthesised an age-centred model of political participation. As part of this 
model, I identified four groups of age-related effects on political participation that have 
testable implications for Europe: (a) political generation effects that signify the 
importance of early political socialisation in later life; (b) shared social characteristic 
cohort effects that stand for the common exposure of cohorts in attaining certain social 
characteristics; (c) life cycle effects that describe the variations of resources, motivation, 
opportunities and interests along the life cycle; and (d) individual ageing effects that 
emphasise older people’s potential to fall back on past experience when making a 
decision, and their tendency to comply with social norms.
Firstly, I will summarise the evidence for the hypotheses from which we set out. 
Secondly, I will assess the empirical validity of the age-centred model and will then 
suggest avenues for future research. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the 
empirical findings for an ageing Europe.
10.1 Summary of findings 
An age-centred model of political participation
I defined political participation as all voluntary individual actions that are intended to 
influence or change public policy, the institutional structures of the political system or 
die selection of political personnel. I described older people as all citizens who are 60
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and older. A political action is assumed to be the outcome of a decision on the content 
and the form of political participation. In liberal democracies, all forms of legal political 
actions are held to be open to everyone. The decision to participate is influenced by a 
particular decision-making process that makes the individual maximise her personal 
outcome based on personal preferences. The personal outcome of an individual is the 
sum of personal material as well as expressive benefits, which can include altruistic 
motivations.
The individual decision-making process is characterised by limited rationality. 
The social and political world is too complex for the individual to be able to process all 
information or to weigh all alternative potential outcomes. She therefore uses cognitive 
short-cuts in order to deal with this complexity. There are two devices available to an 
individual: first are schemas, i.e. reference systems that help her to process the new 
piece of information on the basis of organised prior knowledge; and secondly, the 
availability heuristic, a cognitive mechanism through which the individual can recall 
similar instances in her personal experience in order to assess political situations.
To consider participating in politics, the individual assesses her motivation and 
resources as intrinsic factors on the one hand, and the extrinsic factors of opportunities 
and mobilisation on the other. Individuals share certain preferences for a repository of 
political actions or political preferences for two reasons: firstly, they have experienced 
similar social situations during early adulthood when they are most impressionable in 
politics; and secondly, because they may find themselves in similar social situations that 
shape their preferences at a later age.
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I conducted a basic assessment of differences between older and younger people 
and found that in 2002, older people in Europe did not differ systematically in a whole 
range of political activities. Most importantly, there was a lack of difference concerning 
the high-intensity forms of political participation, such as activism in parties or other 
political institutions. That means that for the largest part of the universe of political 
actions, older people’s political participation is indistinguishable from younger people’s. 
In contrast, the elderly demonstrated higher levels of participation for voting 
participation, party membership and donations. I also traced lower levels of older 
people’s membership of and donations to single-issue organisations. In addition, I found 
lower probabilities among older people of them committing non-institutionalised 
political actions. These actions are committed outside of political organisations, and are 
characterised by low levels of necessary resources and no long-term institutional 
commitment.
The theoretical model suggests four major groups of age-related effects. None of 
them can claim unique explanatory importance. Tables 10-1 to 10-3 summarise the 
explicit hypotheses and their empirical validity. There are three categories. The first 
category labels hypotheses for which I found unambiguous evidence. The second marks 
hypotheses for which the evidence does not support the proposition as it stands, but 
suggests that the hypothesis is true in a constrained way and should hold in a re­
formulated form when tested against new evidence. For example, older people do tend to 
vote for larger parties, but this only shows in -  as I suggest -  electoral systems with high 
proportionality. I have not hypothesised these constraints at the onset of my research,
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meaning that any generalisation must be proven with new research. The last category 
stands for propositions that are untenable in the light of the empirical evidence found..
Political generation hypotheses
Table 10-1: Summary of political generation hypotheses and their empirical validity
Empirical evidence for or 
against propositions
Tested in 
chapter(s)
Unam­
biguous
evidence
for
Evidence
that asks for 
a refined 
hypothesis
No
evidence
HI: Older people are more likely to direct their 
organisational engagement towards political parties 
and are less likely to direct it towards single-issue 
organisations than younger people.
X 5
H2: Older cohorts are less likely to commit non­
institutionalised forms of participation than more 
recent cohorts.
X 8
H3: The lack of experience of free, liberal 
democracy at young adulthood decreases the 
likelihood of non-institutionalised participation.
X 8
H4: Older people belong to a cohort that shares party 
preferences that are stable across time. X 7
Older people share preferences about the repository and the content of political 
participation as members of a political generation that went through similar socialisation 
experiences at young adulthood. These preferences are not necessarily shared by 
younger people because the political context during their youth was different. The first 
piece of evidence for this general proposition came through the basic assessment in 
chapter 5 (see table 10-1). The change in the political participatory process away from 
parties and towards single-issue organisations is reflected in more common party 
membership and less common membership of single-issue organisations (and donation 
patterns along similar lines) among older relative to younger people. In those countries
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where political parties in the past (for example, in the 1970s in West Germany) had 
managed to attract younger members and these parties had been less successful later on, 
party membership among older people was more common in 2002. This is because the 
young party members from back then had aged (unambiguous evidence for hypothesis 
HI).
In addition, the political generation hypotheses H2 finds evidence with regard to 
non-institutionalised participation. Whereas at the beginning of the 1980s, older people 
were only 20 % as likely as younger people to commit non-electoral forms of 
participation (a proxy we used for non-institutionalised participation), the gap narrowed 
to 80 % in 1999/2000. This is a result that we would expect from the recent rise in these 
forms of political participation. Today’s older people thus lack the early experience of 
such participation, as the interviews with English Council Tax protesters also showed 
(unambiguous evidence for hypothesis H2).
However, the impact of early socialisation in terms of experiencing a liberal 
democracy could not be shown for any of the modes of non-institutionalised political 
participation (no evidence for H3). The experience per se is not a vital factor to define 
older people from younger people.
Finally, the differences between political generations, cohorts which are shaped 
by specific historical context in young adulthood, make older voters cast their vote 
differently from younger ones. This difference seems to be the stronger, the less de­
aligned a party system is. Political generations play more of a role in an aligned party 
system like Britain between 1964 and 1979 than in the later decades that are
characterised by less ‘tribal voting’. Since both the approaches towards the de-alignment
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process and towards political generations place emphasis on early socialisation, the 
correlation seems plausible and could be shown for Britain and West Germany. The 
evidence was ambiguous because I had not hypothesised about this macro factor 
concerning the state of de-alignment. Also, the division of cohorts into political 
generations according to known historical circumstances did not work equally well for 
all party choice predictions. Some political generations were not different from 
preceding generations as I had hypothesised (ambiguous evidence for hypothesis H4).
Overall, there is evidence for the importance of early political socialisation for 
type and content of political participation in later life. If the nature of the political 
participatory process remained as it is now for a few decades without change, these 
differences in socialisation effects between age groups would die out.
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Shared social characteristic cohort and life cycle hypotheses
Table 10-2: Summary of shared social characteristic cohort and life cycle hypotheses and their 
empirical validity
Empirical evidence for or 
against propositions
Tested in 
chapter(s)
Unam­
biguous
evidence
for
Evidence
that asks for 
a refined 
hypothesis
No
evidence
H5: Older people differ on predictors of political 
participation from younger people. X 6,8
H6: Older cohorts have a different endowment of 
social characteristics that are predictors of party 
choice.
X 7
H7: Senior parties become successful in countries 
with growing proportions of older people. X 7
H8a: Economic conservatism - Older people are 
more likely to vote for the most economically 
conservative party. Older people are less likely to 
vote for the least economically conservative party.
X 7
H8b: Pro-state-spending - Older people are more 
likely to vote for the least economically conservative 
party. Older people are less likely to vote for the 
most economically conservative party.
X 7
H9: Older people are more likely to vote for the 
incumbent. X 7
Older people have higher or lower levels of political participation because they belong to 
a cohort that has on average more or less resources/motivation or 
opportunities/mobilisation of a certain kind to participate. I showed cross-sectional 
correlations and assessed the nature of the variation (cohort or life cycle) with the help 
of the literature. Some variables became insignificant in the multivariate regression 
analysis (ambiguous evidence for hypothesis H5). Formal education was the most 
important of these cohort effects throughout the analysis. With regard to voting 
participation, older people are at a disadvantage because they have lower levels of
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formal education. Formal education increases the understanding of the political system 
and exposes citizens to social circles where the norm of voting is more widespread. 
However, the older voters are, the less formal education plays a role. This is because 
experience of voting and politics can replace the function of education over the life time 
(see the later section about the individual ageing hypotheses).
For non-institutionalised participation, education is among the most important 
predictors of the differences between younger and older people in two out of four modes 
(contacting a public official or politician, buying or boycotting a product). This puts 
older people at a disadvantaged position. The other cohort effects that repeatedly make a 
difference are the size of town that individuals live in, postmaterialism and ideological 
left-right position. Older people lack the opportunities to protest by living in smaller 
places in most European countries. They are at an advantage, however, in terms of 
contacting a public official or politician because living in smaller places seems to reduce 
the distance felt to these official figures. Due to a long-term generational change towards 
greater postmaterialism and move to the left in most European countries -  social 
changes that are conducive towards non-institutionalised participation -  older 
generations which are less postmaterialist and more to the right are less likely to buy or 
boycott a product for political reasons, wear a petition or sign a badge and to protest. 
Other cohort effects play a subordinate role for non-institutionalised behaviour and 
voting participation, although their accumulative effect -  mostly to decrease older 
people’s participation levels -  can be as large as that of other effects.
Another testable implication of a shared social characteristic cohort effect was 
the impact of the decline in religiosity and the rise in education across cohorts for the
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party vote (unambiguous evidence for hypothesis H6). As I could demonstrate with 
regard to West Germany, lower education and higher religiosity among older cohorts 
decreases their chances of voting for those parties that tend to be voted for by social 
groups with higher education and less concern for religion, such as the German Liberals 
and the Greens.
In addition to their cohort experience, older people are at a different stage of the 
social life cycle. Old age differs from youth and middle-age, both in terms of societal 
expectations, and due to a potentially different set of material as well as expressive 
benefits. Old age also entails a different level of endowment of certain 
resources/motivation and opportunities/mobilisation to participate in politics. Besides, it 
means different political interests related to the life cycle, such as present public pension 
levels. Generally speaking (see table 10-2), the predictions about resources/motivation 
and opportunities/mobilisation were largely confirmed in a cross-sectional manner 
(ambiguous evidence for hypothesis H5).
Predictions about behaviour contingent on interests arising from old age were 
wrong (rejected hypotheses H7, H8a and H8b). There is no ideological tendency 
traceable on the economic dimension of party choice. Older people neither have a 
stronger tendency to vote for economically conservative, nor to vote for economically 
progressive parties. Also, the lack of successful senior parties in most countries (no 
evidence for hypothesis H7) that are campaigning on these old age issues suggests that 
not many older people vote for them. There is no trend visible of growing electoral 
popularity of senior parties in ageing democracies. I propose the following alternative 
answers: other interests seem to prevail in the voting choice, or the major parties are all
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equally well-suited to serve senior interests, meaning that old age becomes a non-issue 
in terms of determining the decision.
In addition, I found partial evidence for one life cycle effect on party choice that 
does not necessarily have an ideological dimension (ambiguous evidence for hypothesis 
H9). Older voters tend to favour the incumbent over the opposition parties, a sign of 
growing status-quo conservatism. Older people want to avoid the occurrence of 
unforeseen changes. With incumbent parties, they have a sense of what those parties will 
implement in government. This effect was only visible, however, in the more de-aligned 
systems of the late British period 1979-2001 and West Germany where early political 
socialisation effects seem to be less important for electoral choice in later life.
In addition to their presence in party choice, life cycle effects on intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors increase the participation levels of older people as much as they can 
decrease them. For voting participation, older people find it easier to vote as they tend to 
have lived in an area for longer. This means that they have more knowledge about local 
issues. Their voting participation is decreased, however, by a lack of a cohabiting, 
mobilising partner and worse health.
For non-institutionalised behaviour, two life cycle effects repeatedly decrease the
resources and mobilisation potential for older people. Lower internal political efficacy
demonstrates that older people internalise the negative societal images about older
people and politics. As the interviews with older English Council tax protesters revealed,
even those who are active in participation are exposed to these images and partially
believe in them. Retirement is portrayed as a stage in one’s life where one should not
need to worry about material resources, should just follow one’s well-earned pleasures
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and keep politically quiet. Additionally, older people suffer from being in fewer social 
networks, the members of which could mobilise them into participation. This decline in 
networks is due to the decease of friends and the lack of non-replacement with new 
friends for older people. Thus, older people have less exposure to the mobilisation 
efforts of friends, relative to younger people. Senior interest groups, like the English 
Council Tax group Isitfair play an important role in mobilising ‘socially isolated’ older 
individuals who might not be able to participate in politics because of physical 
limitations. The group can provide these older individuals with the incentive and 
information material to become politically active.
Other life cycle variables that are only of importance for some forms of non- 
institutionalised behaviour are: (a) the duration of residence which, like with voting 
participation, gives older people more motivation to participate in the mode of buying or 
boycotting a product for political reasons; (b) the low probability of caring for minors 
that makes older people less likely to contact officials or politicians; (c) the receipt of a 
pension that makes older people less likely to commit the mode of buying or boycotting 
a product; and (d) a lower likelihood of being employed which increases their 
willingness to protest because they -  as the interviews with the Council Tax protesters 
demonstrate -  are not concerned about the impact of protest activities on their 
professional lives. Also, the lower likelihood to be self-employed decreases the 
probability to contact a public official or politician or use product consumption as a form 
of political expression.
Chapter 9 explored the meaning of senior identity and senior solidarity for 
protest behaviour. The findings of these interviews mirrored the general tenet in the
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literature that older people are too diverse a group to possess a group consciousness 
simply based on their life cycle experience of old age. Solidarity with other older people 
as a motivation to participate in politics similarly does not concern all older people. 
When it was expressed, only certain sub-groups such as vulnerable and frail fellow older 
citizens were identified as motivating older people’s participation.
In sum, life cycle and shared social characteristic cohort effects played a role in 
voting participation, party choice and non-institutionalised participation. For none of 
these modes, could one leave out any of the two kinds of effects without seriously 
reducing the explanatory power of the model. However, the evidence was less clear in 
support of the hypotheses when compared to the political generation effects. Future 
models can be improved by including macro factors and by reducing the number of age- 
related variables.
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Individual ageing hypotheses
Table 10-3: Summary of individual ageing hypotheses and their empirical validity
Empirical evidence for or 
against propositions
Tested in 
chapter(s)
Unam­
biguous
evidence
for
Evidence
that asks for a 
refined 
hypothesis
No
evidence
H10: Ceteris paribus, older people are more likely to 
vote than younger people. In the cross-sectional 
analysis with pooled data from all European 
countries, the residual variation between age groups 
(from young to old) follows a concave curve in 
contrast to the single country analyses.
HI 1: Older voters are more likely to vote for larger 
parties or smaller parties that are regularly part o f  
government.
H12a: The higher the average turnout in a country, 
the smaller the gap is between the voting probability 
o f  older and younger people, ceteris paribus.
HI2b: The higher the formal education and 
expressed sense o f  duty to vote, the smaller the gap is 
between the voting probability o f  older and younger 
people, ceteris paribus.
H12c: Among citizens with high education and low 
sense o f  duty to vote, older people do not have a 
higher voting probability than younger people, 
ceteris paribus.
X
Older people find it easier to make a decision for participation as they have more 
past political experience that they can draw on, be it from their own behaviour or their 
past knowledge. As individuals age, they are more increasingly part of a society through 
networks and through their intensifying identification with that society. Thus, 
compliance with social norms becomes more rewarding for ageing individuals.
The strongest evidence for this group of hypotheses could be found with regard 
to voting participation (see table 10-3). Older people show a strong and consistent higher 
likelihood of voting across countries. They benefit from their own past experience that 
can also replace the function of formal education over the lifetime. The empirical
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evidence revealed a clear learning curve that remained in a pooled analysis, compared to 
the zigzag residual differences in voting participation between age groups in individual 
countries (confirmed hypothesis H10). In addition, the social norm of voting is 
widespread. Voting in national elections is usually done by a majority of eligible 
citizens. The habituation of the socially conformist behaviour of voting is all the 
stronger, the lower the average of likelihood of voting in a country and the less educated 
the individuals are. The lower the average turnout in a country and the lower the formal 
education of a citizen, the lower is the starting probability of voting at a young age. This 
means that there is more room for habituation alongside the ageing process. In countries 
with high turnout rates and among citizens with high education, habituation is less 
important to increase the likelihood of voting (unambiguous evidence for hypotheses 
H12a-c).
Past experience through the ageing process can also have an impact on the 
content of the vote. Seemingly, in electoral systems with higher levels of proportionality 
such as Germany, parties that are smaller and rarely part of the government have fewer 
followers among older voters than younger voters (ambiguous evidence for hypothesis 
HI 1). Voters of all age groups have namely got little instrumental incentive to vote for 
smaller parties in disproportional electoral systems, like in Britain. Small parties can 
leave less of an impression than all larger or smaller, governmental parties. They can 
impress ageing voters less through the media and during election campaigns where they 
have fewer resources. Past experience of them is less developed, meaning such parties 
are at more a disadvantage the older voters are. Individual ageing displayed no 
discernible effect with regard to non-institutionalised participation. This is mainly due to
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the fact that experience of these forms of participation is not as frequent and common as 
voting. Also, the generational gap that makes the older generation less likely to resort to 
these political actions prevented them on average from performing these activities 
before. Thus, many English Council Tax protesters went to protest for the first time in 
later life.
In sum, individual ageing proved to be very important to explain voting 
participation of older people where hypotheses were all correct. Also, mixed results 
suggest the importance of learning for the choice of larger parties among older voters in 
party systems with a high level of proportionality.
10,2 Model assessment: empirical validity, limitations, and potential 
avenues for future research
The empirical validity of the model
I used an adapted version of a resource-based model of political participation and 
brought it together with a conceptual framework about the nature of age-related effects. 
Overall, the model seems to have explained empirical reality well. Measures of 
goodness-of-fit were reasonable and most variables significant with the expected 
direction. Some hypotheses were only partially confirmed. Since it was the first model 
that has been suggested for a comparative study of political participation that 
investigates differences between age groups, it needs to be tested further against other 
models in the future.
The model is based on the psychological and economic traditions of political 
behaviour. The inclusion of sociological and psychological factors into this model 
proved to be necessary given the crucial impact of learning, habituation and norm-
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compliance. The importance of socialisation and the nature of human decision-making 
through limited rationality are important processes of the model. Without these 
processes in the model, I would have been able to explain much less. Also, the linkage 
of individuals with other individuals concerning those preferences due to common social 
situations proved to be vital. For example, retirees share the higher preference for 
demonstrations. Employed people do not share this preference due to their concerns 
about the potential repercussions of political activities for their jobs. Furthermore, the 
analysis of images and the impact of internal political efficacy that gives older people 
the feeling that they are less able of participating in politics is a reminder of the 
importance of psychological thought processes. The weight of these social and 
psychological factors highlights a general necessity to keep models of political 
participation open to these non-political factors. At its core, political participation has its 
foundation in the social and psychological foundations of our social living.
There were some factors that I suggested as controlling factors that proved to be 
of little use. For example, political trust did not prove to be age-related. A more 
parsimonious model -  if tested with a new data set -  could leave those factors out, as the 
current analysis suggests that they are not important. There are two major refinements 
that future models need to address more closely: the role of structural macro factors and 
the conditions that determine which type of age-related effects are of stronger 
importance for a political action. Firstly, I only used macro differences between 
countries in order to control for some effects. This is because they could be of 
importance for differences between age groups, such as the socialisation experience of 
growing up in a liberal democracy. The analysis, and in particular the analysis of voting
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behaviour, brought to light further inter-linkages between macro and individual factors, 
such as the state of de-alignment and the type of electoral system. These need to be 
addressed in future model-building. Secondly, my model could not predict which type of 
age-related effect would be important for which type of political action. It seems 
reasonable to assume the higher relevance of learning for the more frequent voting 
participation and choice in future models. The more frequent a form of political 
participation in general, the more likely we are to witness effects of habituation and 
norm-compliance.
Limitations of the empirical analysis
The empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation has its limitations. Most obviously, 
it can only make inferences about specific countries at certain points in time. However, 
the findings encourage testing of the model in other contexts as well, for example in 
other non-European states with ‘European’ traditions of the life cycle such as the USA, 
Canada or Australia. Secondly, the statistical analysis could only infer average effects 
for groups. Indeed, the first part of the empirical analyses in chapters 6 and 8 rests on a 
bivariate assessment of independent variables and age. Thus, older people are on 
average less educated than younger people are on average. This approach poses certain 
problems. For instance, when estimating political generation effects for party choice, I 
am only able to test the average difference of certain political generations vis-a-vis 
others. The pro-CDU lenience of the West German Adenauer generation is likely to be
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less pronounced in regions that are traditionally strongly pro-SPD, such as the regions in 
the Lutheran North.45
A third limitation concerns the type of political participation that I looked at. 
With regard to voting, I only analysed national parliamentary elections and only looked 
at parties. The picture might look rather different for local elections and more 
candidates-based assessments. For example, does the age or experience of candidates 
play a role in the voting behaviour of older people? It could be plausible that older 
voters find more trust in experienced candidates that they have known for some time. 
This would be another version of the status-quo conservatism that I demonstrated in my 
analysis of party choice. In addition, I only analysed non-voting forms of political 
participation from a very general point-of-view as far as content is concerned. I could 
not differentiate between signing a petition to oust the prime minister from office and 
signing it to support the installation of a local library. Anecdotal evidence from my 
interviews suggests that older people are more likely to care about local issues that are of 
immediate benefit or interest to them. ‘Grand’ or long-term issues seem to be less of 
interest to them. If this was true, some of the findings in my analysis could be 
strengthened, such as the large impact of the duration of residence, which makes older 
people more likely to vote and to contact a public official or politician.
45 Interaction effects with age that could theoretically be included in the model run a high danger of 
multicollinearity. Indeed, the danger is very imminent already due to the age-cohort-period identification 
problem.
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Avenues for future research
I propose that future research into the political participation of older people be carried 
out in quantitative and qualitative analyses. I will suggest two possibilities for each 
strand: firstly, future quantitative analysis should be based on surveys that boost people 
who are 50 and older. These surveys have rarely been carried out, such as the 
Eurobarometer in 1992 and 1999, and often only include few variables of interest to 
assess political participation. Boost surveys have the advantage that they allow one to 
make better estimates about smaller, but systematic differences within the group of older 
people. It is, for example, plausible that the decline in networks and the decline in 
political efficacy mostly affects a small sub-group of disadvantaged older people. Boost 
surveys could give more evidence to explore such questions about sub-groups of older 
people.
Secondly, secondary analysis of existing voting studies should look at local, 
national and European elections simultaneously to explore further the impact of macro 
factors on differences between younger and older people. For example, in British 
national elections we are unable to witness a generational trend to the benefit of a 
postmaterialist party, like the Greens, that would make older voters less likely to vote for 
them. This is most probably due to the effect of the electoral system which hinders 
smaller parties. By contrast, in European and local elections in Britain -  with different 
electoral systems -  the Green party does have some following, which could be 
structured by generational membership.
Thirdly, I suggest much more in-depth interviewing and focus group work with 
older people. Whereas sociologists and social psychologists are using these techniques
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on a regular basis to increase their knowledge about older people, these research 
techniques are rarely used in political science. In particular, its combination with 
quantitative survey analysis seems to be a rewarding avenue for future research. For 
example, models can be tested using a mixed approach (Lieberman 2005).
Fourthly, a qualitative cross-national study seems to be another way of 
answering questions about old age culture and the political participation of older people. 
An interesting possibility would be a most similar research design with, for example, a 
European country and Japan. Both countries would be very similar in terms of their old 
age welfare state provisions and demographic composition, but would differ immensely 
in terms of their culture of old age. Asian countries in the Confucian cultural traditions 
tend to value older people very highly. For example, one could ask the question as to 
what extent the culture is reflected differently in the political behaviour of the older 
population.
10.3 Politics in ageing Europe -  the political implications of the empirical 
findings
‘There’s an iceberg dead ahead. It’s called global aging, and it threatens to 
bankrupt the great powers. As the populations of the world’s leading 
economies age and shrink, we will face unprecedented political, economic, 
and moral challenges. But we are woefully unprepared. Now is the time to 
ring the alarm bell.’
Peter G. Peterson (1999: title page)
‘An ageing society is too often - and wrongly - seen solely in terms of 
increasing dependency [of older people]. But the reality is that, as older 
people become an ever more significant proportion of the population, society 
will increasingly depend upon the contribution they can make.’
The British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the 2005 Green Paper Opportunity
Age (HM Government 2005: iv)
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The dissertation started from the outlook that European democratic societies are ageing. 
Furthermore, I identified the political participatory process as an input factor into 
politics and policy decisions. Thus, the content and determinants of the political 
participation of older people become salient issues for political scientists. The general 
discussion about population ageing and the growing numbers of older people -  be it in 
the social science literature or popular writing -  is structured between two opposite 
poles. I am going to introduce these two extreme visions and discuss my evidence in the 
light of them.
At the one end, there is the ‘apocalyptic’ vision that is, for example, visible in the 
first quotation. Put simplistically, it entails that people aged 50 and older will soon be in 
the voting majority due to sheer numbers and high voting probability. This majority will 
be long-lasting. In democratic systems that are based on majority decisions, this group of 
older voters will then determine all policy outputs. It will do so to advance its material 
interests: generous pensions, low value-added tax, free social and health care for older 
people. It will exploit the shrinking younger workforce and deprive it of most resources 
and thus create a permanent antagonism between younger and older people at the 
detriment of social cohesion and at the risk of a ‘generation war’. In the near future, this 
group of older people will be dominated by the baby-boomers who have so far managed 
to change politics in their favour at every stage of their ageing process.
At the other end, there is the ‘optimistic’ vision put forward in the policy 
documents of national governments, such as the British one quoted above. It 
acknowledges the challenges of an ageing society, such as the urgency to adapt public 
pension systems. At the same time, however, it portrays the growing number of older
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people as a resource and opportunity for the future. Societies will change their images of 
old age. Recent anti-discrimination legislation in European Union countries (following 
the Council Directive 2000/78/EC) that outlawed discrimination because of age can be 
seen as just such an attempt to fight these images and stereotypes. The new images of 
old age will be ‘productive’ or ‘active ageing’. Older people will increasingly contribute 
to the labour force, will provide volunteer services to communities and generate 
intergenerational solidarity. Politically, an ageing society will remain the same because 
older people and younger people will learn about each other and not have political 
preferences that are far away from each other. In this view, the nature of political 
participation will not matter much because differences between age groups will be 
erased by growing knowledge about each other, as well as solidarity and interaction 
between age groups. Even if age groups show differences in behaviour, their interests 
will not vary. The participatory political process will benefit from a growing pool of 
older volunteers who try to influence policies not only for their own good, but the good 
of other generations. Ageing Europe is thus not doomed, but only entering a new era that 
needs social adaptation.
I will now assume for the moment that my empirical explanations are a good 
description of reality and that the causal mechanisms are stable into the next thirty years. 
I will discuss the implications of my findings within the two poles that I just described. I 
will particularly highlight two aspects: (1) how the nature of the age-related effects 
determines the stability of inter-age group differences in the future, i.e. how the 
participatory process will change due to the empirically identified, causal factors that
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make older people different from younger people, and (2) what the likely impact of the 
findings is for the equality of age groups in the political process.
The results -  on balance -  give little support for the apocalyptic vision, and lend 
more credence to the optimistic one. But they also show that ‘grey democracies’ will in 
some respect be permanently changed.
The nature of age-related effects and its lasting consequences for future differences 
between age groups
The four age-related effects differ in their implications for ageing societies. One can 
make a distinction between on the one hand life cycle and individual ageing effects, the 
impact of which is relatively stable across time, and on the other hand political 
generation and shared social characteristic cohort effects, the impact of which depends 
on specific cohorts. I will argue that those findings that are mainly rooted in life cycle or 
individual ageing effects will be permanent characteristics of ageing democracies.
Life cycle and individual ageing effects make the differences between age groups 
independent of generations and thus stable across time. For example, retirement has a 
positive impact on political protest because retirees have the time to engage in protest 
and are no longer concerned about any repercussions of their protests on the sphere of 
employment. This effect is independent in its nature from specific generations. The 
effect on political behaviour today, all other things being equal, should be similar to the 
effect of retirement on political behaviour in ten years.
Generational effects, be it political generation or shared social characteristic
cohort effects, are specific to generations that constitute certain age groups at a given
time point. Therefore, differences between age groups are unstable across time. For
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example, the baby-boomers in Germany belong to the Brandt Generation that is more 
pro-SPD and pro-Green than preceding generations. The impact of these generational 
preferences is visible in the political process as long as members of the Brandt 
Generation vote, but will be gone once its members die.
The process of demographic ageing, which we witness all over Europe, is a 
permanent social change of the population. If differences between age groups are stable 
across time, as are life cycle and individual ageing effects, ageing democracies will have 
enduringly changed. If the differences between age groups are unstable across time, 
ageing democracies will only experience changes insofar as a generation, when it is old, 
will have a strong influence due to its demographic weight. The importance of that 
generation will not linger. This is because a new generation will soon be old and carry 
the demographic power. Therefore, I will now discuss the findings on life cycle and 
individual ageing effects that will have a lasting impact in ageing democracies. In the 
next sub-section, I will assess the findings about generational differences as part of the 
discussion of equality between age groups in determining political outcomes.
In the near future, the voting process appears to be tilted permanently in favour 
of older voters. Life cycle and individual ageing dominate as causes that make older 
people more likely to vote. This argument is even further strengthened by the fact that 
life cycle and individual ageing are sociological and psychological factors that stand 
outside of the political process. They are embedded in the way we live our lives and the 
way we think, and are not easily amenable to influences by policy-makers. This finding 
supports one fundamental assumption of the apocalyptic vision. It is precisely the high
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voting participation of older voters and the development of a permanent older people’s 
majority that could allow for a permanent change of politics in favour of older people.
Another example of lasting change is the prevalence of status-quo conservatism 
among older voters in de-aligned party systems. The more volatile that voting in a party 
system is, the more older voters appear to be likely to vote for the incumbent. Policy 
implications of this finding are, however, ambiguous and do not support the apocalyptic 
vision. Incumbent governments can be radical policy-makers as much as overly cautious 
reformers. The tendency to vote for the incumbent does not imply a distortion of public 
policies in favour of older people. Also, I found some evidence in party systems with 
higher levels of proportionality of an increasing tendency for older people to vote for 
large parties or small parties that are regularly part of the government. Again, this 
tendency does not directly imply any policy consequences. But it does give established 
parties an advantage against newer or niche parties in ageing democracies.
Other political actions that are strongly influenced by life cycle factors are 
unlikely to have an impact on the political process. This is because life cycle factors 
decrease and increase the likelihood of older people participating, meaning that they 
balance each other out. For example, older people are more likely to buy or boycott a 
product for political reasons because they have lived in an area for longer, but less likely 
because they are connected less in social networks and feel politically less efficacious.
In sum, there will be some permanent changes of the voting process that does 
not, however, necessarily lead to an antagonism between old and young. Whereas the 
discussion has so far assessed the enduring changes of ageing democracies in the future
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due to the nature of age-related effects, the next sub-section will deal with the 
implications of the findings as to the equality of age groups in the political process.
Age group equality in the political process
The voting power of older people is not yet stronger than that of younger people, 
although voters aged 60 and older are already outnumbering voters who are younger 
than 30. For example, in the United Kingdom (2004 estimates), there were 11.8 million 
voters aged 60 and older, but only 8.6 million voters younger than 30. Given the huge 
discrepancy in voting probability, the 2005 British General Election saw an estimated 
8.7 million voters aged 60 and older, but only 3.7 million voters younger than 30.46 
Voting is a form of political participation that is less suitable for conveying preferences, 
but apt for exerting pressure on the elected elites. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence 
for life cycle influences on party choice -  apart from status-quo conservatism and the 
advantage of larger parties in certain circumstances -  the potential threat of older people 
as a voting bloc is massive. But what does this bloc tell political entrepreneurs who 
might want to offer policies to gain votes? Older people share very few broad interests, 
such as public pensions and social and health care provisions. At the same time, older 
people have allegiances towards younger age groups. They have children and grand­
children whom they want to live comfortably as well. Surveys, for example in Britain, 
show that older people are not very different from younger people as to the priorities of 
spending. In 1996, among people aged 66 and older, 57 % indicated health as a first
46 Population estimates are from the ONS (2006). Turnout estimates are from MORI (2005). I averaged 
the 18-24 and 25-34 age group to get the mean likelihood for those younger as 30 (43 %). I did the same 
for the 55-64 age groups and the 65+ group for the older people’s voting probability of 73 %. I further 
assume that 95 % of British residents were allowed to vote.
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priority as opposed to 51 % among 18-29 year olds. For education, the numbers stood at 
20 and 28 %. There is only a small life cycle effect in the direction of older people’s 
material interest (Jarvis 1998).
The ‘grey vote’ is furthermore even more heterogeneous because education does 
not determine who votes among older voters. Education increasingly loses the more its 
importance to predict voting participation, the older voters are. Thus, higher educated 
individuals have a stronger share of the vote among younger than among older citizens. 
Education is the most important social marker in society that can influence class, 
income, status, life expectancy and health. Among younger voters, those with high 
formal education are more likely to vote. This shifts the pressure on elites to respond to 
the interests of those with higher education rather than those with lower education 
(which is essentially a middle class bias). For the group of older voters in contrast, 
education does not play a role for turnout. Thus, the pressure is on the political 
entrepreneurs to concentrate on those issues that are most common among all older 
people, not only those of the more educated. The ‘undifferentiated’ pressure of older 
voters of all socio-economic backgrounds means that old age interests must be defined 
even more narrowly -  the lowest common denominator - by political elites. The strong 
voting power of older people does not speak with one voice, with socio-economic 
background playing less of a role in determining who votes among older people. These 
two findings about allegiances to younger age groups and the narrow definition of old 
age issues weakens the apocalyptic vision and gives credibility to the optimistic one. 
Older people are not ‘greedy’ self-materialist voters. They are heterogeneous, continue
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to be divided by many factors and have very few, narrowly defined common interests 
that just form part of a bigger set of political interests.
However, old age issues -  different from young age issues -  are of interest to all 
voters as all citizens aspire to be old. Younger age issues, such as welfare provisions for 
children, are not of interest to everybody. Those who have no children, for instance, 
might care less about these issues, and children cannot vote. This fact stands against the 
prophecy that a generation war will develop, as all age groups share concern for old age 
issues. However, it still supports the notion of a public agenda tilted in favour of old age 
issues. The electoral agendas of ‘grey democracies’ are likely to include old age issues 
not because of a unified voting pattern of older people, but because of their latent 
numerical threat and the general interest of narrowly defined old age issues to all age 
groups. Although older people are very diverse and far from feeling a common political 
group consciousness, their main issues will probably be taken care of by political 
entrepreneurs. In contrast to the optimistic vision, I do expect a permanent presence of 
old age material interests on the public agenda in European democracies, but at the same 
time not an ‘us versus them’ antagonism between generations.
Whereas the voting process is likely to be tilted to some limited extent in favour 
of older people, other patterns of political participation show stronger generational 
trends and therefore have less predictable implications for the near future. At the 
moment, participation through membership of conventional political parties tends to be 
distorted towards older people due to a generational effect in many European 
democracies. The influence on political outcomes might, however, be limited as party 
activists rather than members influence the organisations most strongly. Party activists
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are a group where older people are not more likely to be active (seen from the evidence 
of a mass survey).
For single-issue organisations, there is an advantage among younger people who 
tend to be more likely to be members of them than older people in many European 
democracies. But similarly, the influence of pure members might not be bigger than that 
of the actual activists. Taking these two avenues -  parties and single-issue organisations 
-  together, we are currently witnessing a split of organised political participation in 
much of Europe. The channel of party participation is distorted towards older people, 
and that of single-issue organisations is tilted towards younger people. However, the 
evidence suggests that this difference is transitional. If the nature of the political process 
will have been stable for some decades, the oldest generation will have caught up with 
the most recent changes.
With regard to non-institutionalised forms of political participation, older people 
are still under-represented. Whereas the evidence suggests that the generational gap 
between age groups is closing, I also found evidence of the impact of old age culture on 
the modes of protest and signing a petition or wearing a badge. In those countries where 
citizens express on average a more senior-friendly position, older people are also more 
likely to engage in these forms of participation. This brings about an additional 
representational distortion. In countries where the elderly are valued more highly, older 
people have in addition to this higher, social appreciation more influence through non­
institutionalised forms of participation. Thus, their relatively more positive position in 
society is even more strengthened by their own political actions through non­
institutionalised channels. Non-institutionalised forms of participation are better for
327
conveying the preferences of the participants than they are for exerting pressure on 
elites. In the apocalyptic vision, antagonism against the elderly and stereotypes of old 
age will increase among younger people. But as the group of older people grows, older 
people’s images of themselves in politics are less likely to be dominated by feelings of 
socially constructed, political inferiority. Thus, the effect of internalised negative images 
should vanish. In the optimistic vision, tackling stereotypes is of utmost importance to 
overcome any misconception and to create intergenerational solidarity. The interviews 
that I led also brought to light the dynamics of older people’s volunteering activities. 
With more and more older people active in politics in the public domain, the role model 
function of these older activists has the potential to weaken commonly held stereotypes 
about old age and set free the volunteering potential of this group of the population. This 
is a development foreseen in the optimistic vision. Also, expanding old age political 
groups will provide a better infrastructure for future political volunteering activity at old 
age.
Finally, there remains participation through trade unions and professional 
organisations to be discussed. These organisations are mainly concerned with 
employment, but also with some retirement benefits that are strongly related to 
employment. Older people are at a disadvantage here as they tend not to be employed 
anymore. Like the interests of the unemployed who are outsiders in wage negotiations, 
the interests of older retirees are not within the remit of trade unions. However, the 
interest of currently working employees in their own old age provisions might provide 
for representation of retirees via the trade unions. According to the optimistic vision, the 
representational function of trade unions will change as more older workers re-enter or
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stay in the labour force. In other words, if society changes its ageist notions about 
workers, so will the politics of trade unions in order to gamer support among older 
workers.
In conclusion, my findings only support the main behaviourist aspect of the 
apocalyptic vision. Grey democracies will see a stable voting majority of older people 
due to dominant life cycle and individual ageing factors. Other findings give credibility 
to the optimistic vision. Older people are unlikely to tilt the political outcomes in their 
material favour. This is (a) because their interests are shaped by inter-generational 
allegiances, and (b) because their massive voting power only gives a vague picture of 
interests to political entrepreneurs, with socio-economic differences among older people 
not playing a major role in determining who votes. Differences in non-institutionalised 
behaviour and in preferences for conventional over single-issue organisations are not 
stable across time given that cohort effects are important determinants. As long as 
cohorts continue to differ in their preferences for channels of political participation, 
there will be differences between age groups at any point in time. Since political history 
in Europe is unlikely to be smooth and without major changes in the next thirty years, 
the input of older people relative to younger people through participation will be 
different in 2006 and 2036 due to varying socialisation effects. Trade unions, which are 
currently a little used channel for older people, will change their nature as more older 
workers stay in or re-enter the workforce. The explorative findings about negative 
images of older people in politics highlight the necessity for public awareness-raising in 
this field. The more older people become active, the more their role model function will 
de-construct images of older people being passive in politics.
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We have now come full circle. We started out from the observation that 
European democracies are ageing and asked ourselves whether this could matter for 
politics and public policy through the political participation of older people. The 
multitude of evidence in this dissertation suggests that it does so in many ways. 
Demographic ageing in Europe is the most fundamental social change since the 
expansion of mass education at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The latter 
ultimately led to increasing demands on reigning elites for more mass political 
participation and more elite responsiveness, and finally changed the world of politics. 
Ageing is also very likely to alter the political world, but in a gradual, non-dramatic 
way. There is no evidence for a permanent political conflict between older and younger 
people in Europe. However, the nature of the participatory process and its expected 
agenda will change.
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11 Appendix
All STATA data sets, STATA do files, transcripts of telephone interviews are on a CD- 
Rom that accompanies this PhD dissertation. The original data sets are available from
• http://www.europeansocialsurvev.org (European Social Survey)
• The UK Data Archive at the University of Essex (British Election Studies and 
British Gallup Polls)
• Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung Cologne (German Election 
Studies, Politbarometer)
• http://www.worldvaluessurvev.org (World Values Survey)
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11,1 Variables in models of voting participation and non-institutionalised participation (chapters 6, 8)
Table 11-1: Descriptives of variables used for models of voting participation and non-institutionalised participation: mean, minimum, maximum, 
standard deviation and description
Variable Name Values Min Max Mean SD Question wording in survey Comments
Voting Participation
Age dummies
0 = No, 1 = Yes
Duration of residence, 
logged
Education
0 = 18-29 (baseline), 1 =30-39, 2 = 40-19, 0
. . . ,6  = 80+
0
0 = not completed primary education, 0
1 = Primary or first stage of basic 
education
2 = Lower secondary or second stage of 
basic
3 = Upper secondary
4 = Post secondary, non-tertiary
5 = First stage of tertiary
6 = Second stage of tertiary
External political efficacy, low value = low level of political efficacy 0 8.20 1.87
logged
1 0.80 0.4 B13: Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or
another. Did you vote in the last [country] national [This 
refers to the last election of a country’s primary legislative 
assembly] election in [month/year]?
6 In what year were you bom?
98 23.77 18.87 E28: How long have you lived in this area?
6 2.86 1.47 What is the highest level of education you have achieved?
Age calculated by 2002-answer
To overcome heteroscedasticity, 
natural logarithm of the original value
1.45 B5: Do you think that politicians in general care what One factor Principal Component 
people like you think? Hardly any politicians care what Solution: 80 % of variance explained, 
people like me think, very few care, some care, many Pairwise deletion of missing data, 
care, most politicians care what people like me think Missing values replaced by mean.
B6: Would you say that politicians are just interested in To overcome heteroscedasticity,
getting people’s votes rather than people’s opinions? natural logarithm of original values
Nearly all/most politicians are just interested in votes, with minimum set to 1
some politicians are just interested in votes some aren’t,
most people are interested in people’s opinions, nearly all
politicians are interested in people’s opinions
Gender 0 = female, 1 = male 0.48 Coded by interviewer
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Income 1-12 Scale 1 12 6.1
Internal political efficacy, low value = low level of political efficacy 0 4.83 3.53
logged
Living with partner
Number of minor children 
in household
Party identification
0 = otherwise, 1 = yes
0 = not closer to any party, 1 = closer to 
one party, but not close at all, ... 4 = very 
close
1 0.64
10 0.71
4 1.33
Pension main source of 
income
1 0.26
Political interest 0 = not interested at all,..., 3 = very 0 3 1.41
interested
Religiosity 0 = not religious at all, ..., 10 = very 0 10 4.97
religious
2.51 If you add up the income from all sources, which letter 
(show card) describes your household’s total net income?
If you don’t know the exact figure, please give an 
estimate. Use part of the card that you know best: weekly, 
monthly or annual income: scale 1-12
1.16 B2: How often does politics seem so complicated that you One factor Principal Component 
can’t really understand what is going on? Never, seldom, Solution: 57 % of variance explained, 
occasionally, regularly, frequently Pairwise deletion o f missing data.
Missing values replaced by mean.
B3: Do you think that you could take an active role m a
group involved with political issues? Definitely not, To overcome heteroscedasticity, 
probably not, not sure either way, probably, definitely natural logarithm of original values
with minimum set to 1
B4: How difficult or easy do you find it to make your 
mind up about political issues? Very difficult, difficult, 
neither difficult, nor easy, easy, very easy
0.48 Original variable: partner
1.03 F3: In what year was she/he bom [all current members of Added up number of people under the 
household]? age of 18 living in household
1.49 B25a: Is there a particular party you feel closer to than 
any other party?
B25c: How close do you feel to this party?
Very close, quite close, not close, not close at all
B.44 F29: Please consider the income of all household Coded 1 if  pensions mentioned, 0 
members and any income which may be received by the otherwise, 
household as a whole. What is the main source of income 
in your household? Please use this card.
Wages and salaries, income from self-employment or 
farming, pensions, unemployment/redundancy benefit/ 
any other social benefits or grants, income from 
investment, savings, insurance or property, income from 
other sources.
0.97 How interested would you say you are in politics? Are 
very interested, quite i., hardly i., not at all i.?
2.95 C13: Regardless of whether you belong to a particular 
religion, how religious would you say you are? Please use 
this card.
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Each organisation that was not a trade 
union, humanitarian aid, an 
organisation for human rights, 
minorities or immigrants, party was 
counted as one and added up
To overcome heteroscedasticity, 
natural logarithm of (number +1)
Social networks, logged 0 = none, ...
Subjective evaluation of 0 = very bad, 1= bad, 2= fair, 3 = good, 4 = 
health very good
Trade union and party 0 = no membership, 1 = membership of
membership trade union or party, 2 = membership of
party and trade union
years since transition to 2002 -  year of first free parliamentary
democracy elections, maximum = 80
Average non-
institutionalised political 
participation per country
Employment status
(employed, self-employed, 
not in paid work)
12
0.29
2.40 0.53 0.56 El-12b: Do you have personal friends within this
organisation?
Sports club/club for outdoor activities, an organisation for 
cultural or hobby activities, a business, professional or 
farmer's organisation, a consumer or automobile 
organisation, an organisation for environmental 
protection, peace or animal rights, a religious or church 
organisation, an organisation for science, education, or 
teachers and parents, a social club for the young/the 
retired/elderly, women or friendly societies, any other 
voluntary organisation such as die ones I've just 
mentioned
4 2.80 0.91 How is your health [physical and mental health] in
general?
2 0.27 0.49 E3,E9
84 60.96 28.68
1.44 0.91 0.37 Seven political actions were summed up on the individual
level; mean per country
1 0.45 0.50 E29: Can I just check? Are you currently: Employed and self-employed were
(empl) t . . .  coded to be two dummies
Employed, self-employed, not m paid work, don’t know
0.09
(self-
empl)
0.29
Left-right self-placement 0 = very leftist,. ..,10  = very rightist
Number of children in 
household
10 5.05 2.13
10 0.71 1.03
B28: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and 
“right” on this scale. Using this card, where would you 
place yourself where 0 means the left and 10 means the 
right.
F3: In what year was she/he bom [all current members of Added up number of people under age 
household]? of 18 living in household, took natural
logarithm of value (+1)
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political information, 
logged
Post-materialism
subjective religiosity
size of town
Political satisfaction
0 = no time at all, 1 = less than Zi hour, 2 = 
Vi hour to 1 hour, 3 = more than 1 hour, up 
to 1 1/2 hour, 4 = more than 2 hours, 5 = up 
to 2 Vi hours, 6 = more than 2 Vi hours, up 
to 3 hours, 7 = more than 3 hours, don’t 
know
3.09 1.74 0.35 A2, A4, A6: And again on an average weekday, how Scores added up, took natural
much of your time watching television/listening to the logarithm of value added by 1. 
radio/reading is spent watching/listening to/reading the 
news or programmes about politics and current affairs?
Still use this card
-2 2 -0.04 0.52 Male and female respondents received separate self- If respondents answered E or N (F or
completion sheets (GS1/GS2): Here we briefly describe S) with not like me or not like me at 
some people. Please read each description tick the box on all, they got a 0, otherwise -1 (+1). 
each line that shows how much each person is or is not Then the scores were added up to 
like you. span from-2  to + 2.
E: It is important for her/him to live in safe surroundings. N/A for Hungary or Italy
F: He/she likes surprises and is always looking for new Missing values replaced by mean, 
things to do. He/she thinks it is important to do lots of 
different things in life.
N: It is important to him/her that the government ensures 
his/her safety against all threats. He/she wants the state to 
be strong so it can defend its citizens.
S: He/she strongly believes that people should care for 
nature. Looking after the environment is important to 
him/her.
Very much like me, like me, somewhat like me, a little 
like me, not like me, not like me at all.
0 = not religious at all, 10 = very religious 0
1 = a farm of home in the countryside, 2 = 1
a country village, 3 = a town or small 
village, 4 = the suburbs or outskirts o f a big 
city, 5 = a big city
10 4.97 2.95 C13: Regardless of whether you belong to a particular
religion, how religious would you say you are? Please use 
this card
5 3.03 1.19 F5: which phrase on this card best describes the area
where you live?
20 9.90 4.20 B31: Now thinking about the [country] government, how Added up the two coded answers,
satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? Still use 
this card.
B32: And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the 
way democracy works in [country]? Still use this card.
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General satisfaction 0 20 11.69 3.88 B29: All tilings considered, how satisfied are you with Added up the two coded answers.
your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this 
card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means 
extremely satisfied.
B30: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present 
state of the
economy in [country]? Still use this card.
0 1 0.83 0.38 1 = if respondent has experienced liberal democracy
before the age of 30,0 otherwise
Experience of democracy 
before the age o f 30
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11.2 Bivariate correlations independent variables (chapters 6, 8)
Table 11-2: Pearson's r bivariate correlations of variables used for models of voting participation and non-institutionalised participation
u.
1. age 2. transeas 3. avidprtout 4. edu 5. lrecale 6. townsize 7. p ostm al 8. religion 9. ythdemexp 10. polint polmem_l 12. satpol 13. logpolin
1. age 1
2. Years since transition to democracy -0.0202* 1
3. mean index non-inst. participation 0.0043 0.6801* 1
4. Education -0.2057* 0.1738* 0.1970* 1
5. Left-right scale 0.0658* 0.0132 -0.0245* -0.0174* I
6. Size of town -0.0421* -0.1237* -0.0548* 0.1568* -0.0503* 1
7. Postmaterialism -0.1557* 0.0906* 0.0765* 0.1290* -0.0402* 0.0431* 1
8. Religiosity 0.1882* -0.0935* -0.1898* -0.1541* 0.1742* -0.0616* -0.0722* 1
9. Experience o f democracy before the
age of 30 -0.3893* 0.5181* 0.4761* 0.1850* -0.0014 -0.0268* 0.1116* -0.0869* 1
10. Pol. interest 0.0814* 0.1240* 0.1515* 0.3192* -0.0194* 0.0610* 0.0741* -0.0301* 0.0639* 1
11. Political membership 0.0156* 0.2357* 0.2320* 0.1670* -0.0303* -0.0403* 0.0411* -0.0709* 0.1282* 0.1814* 1
12. Pol. satisfaction 0.0105 0.2126* 0.1895* 0.0836* 0.0968* -0.0108 0.012 0.0645* 0.1188* 0.1165* 0.1034* 1
13. Pol. information, logged 0.2333* 0.0072 0.0224* 0.009 0.0121 0.0205* -0.0128 0.0410* -0.0405* 0.2320* 0.0545* 0.0331* 1
14. Household income -0.1396* 0.4046* 0.4295* 0.3824* 0.0230* 0.0164* 0.1015* -0.1331* 0.3474* 0.2233* 0.2159* 0.1865* 0.0097
15. General satisfaction -0.0332* 0.3612* 0.2979* 0.1485* 0.0978* -0.0547* 0.0518* 0.0088 0.2567* 0.1057* 0.1622* 0.5835* 0.0172*
16. Social networks, logged -0.0281* 0.2767* 0.2913* 0.2607* 0.0122 -0.0667* 0.0868* -0.0125 0.1917* 0.2334* 0.2299* 0.1058* 0.0514*
17. Internal pol. efficacy -0.0632* 0.0507* 0.0920* 0.3610* 0.0049 0.1031* 0.1217* -0.0815* 0.0858* 0.5404* 0.1772* 0.1036* 0.1258*
18. Gender -0.0192* 0.0139* 0.0254* 0.0507* 0.0290* -0.0154* 0.0264* -0.1716* 0.0149* 0.1529* 0.0785* 0.0427* 0.0511*
19. Employed -0.3111* 0.1319* 0.1358* 0.2695* -0.0481* 0.0326* 0.0732* -0.1462* 0.1878* 0.0590* 0.2601* 0.0301* -0.0753*
20. Self-employed -0.0036 -0.0530* -0.0484* 0.0266* 0.0651* -0.0579* 0.0260* 0.0284* 0.0172* 0.0504* -0.0507* -0.0061 0.0259*
21. Duration of residence, logged 0.4395* -0.1837* -0.1782* -0.2401* 0.0470* -0.1741* -0.1189* 0.1235* -0.3004* -0.0519* -0.0615* -0.0656* 0.0765*
22. Living with partner 0.2094* 0.0114 0.0141* 0.0513* 0.0454* -0.0660* -0.0375* 0.0437* -0.0552* 0.0897* 0.1116* 0.01 0.0959*
23. Number of minors in household -0.0948* -0.0214* -0.0511* 0.0503* 0.0123 -0.0761* -0.0085 0.0571* 0.0245* -0.0082 0.0529* -0.0222* -0.0162*
24. Subjective evaluation of health -0.3566* 0.1660* 0.1471* 0.2371* 0.0371* 0.0158* 0.1203* -0.0654* 0.3188* 0.0674* 0.0857* 0.1555* -0.0693*
25. Pension main source of income 0.6441* -0.0863* -0.0578* -0.2403* 0.0359* -0.012 -0.1305* 0.1465* -0.3169* 0.0015 -0.1129* -0.007 0.1435*
26. Strength of party identification 0.1561* 0.0428* 0.0565* 0.0755* 0.0051 0.0105 0.0096 0.0335* -0.0182* 0.3262* 0.1766* 0.1181* 0.1195*
* = significant at .01 level.
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14. hinctot 15. stlfec 16. lo g n c tl  17. rnteff 18. sex
14. Household income i
15. General satisfaction 0.3199*
16. Social networks, logged 0.2607*
17. Internal pol. efficacy 0.2399*
18. Gender 0.0701*
19. Employed 0.2691*
20. Self-employed 0.0368*
21. Duration of residence, logged -0.1874*
22. Living with partner 0.1691*
23. Number of minors in household 0.0701*
24. Subjective evaluation of health 0.2572*
25. Pension main source o f income -0.2506*
26. Strength of party identification 0.0771*
* = significant at .01 level.
0.1987* 1
0.1119* 0.2042* 1
0.0299* 0.0771* 0.2309* 1
0.0916* 0.0956* 0.1020* 0.0682*
-0.0158* 0.0332* 0.0891* 0.1177*
-0.0941* -0.0383* -0.0960* 0.0262*
0.0550* 0.0287* 0.0453* 0.0220*
-0.0206* 0.0208* 0.0019 -0.0612*
0.2996* 0.1377* 0.1569* 0.0663*
-0.0494* -0.0699* -0.1152* -0.0281*
0.0768* 0.1360* 0.2536* 0.0659*
10 23
employed ^0. selfempl 21. logarea 22. living numchild su'3*lea*t 25. pension 26. partyclo
-0.2963* I
-0.2117* 0.0458* 1
0.0976* 0.0875* 0.0264* I
0.1501* 0.0913* -0.0310* 0.3756* 1
0.2186* 0.0578* -0.1968* -0.0135* 0.0636* 1
-0.4675* -0.1396* 0.3208* -0.0353* -0.2744* -0.3141* 1
-0.0143* 0.0362* 0.0251* 0.0763* -0.0165* 0.0039 0.0737*
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11.3 Models o f  voting participation: 21 single country regressions (chapter 6)
Table 11-3: Models of voting participation, single countries, 2002
GB AT BE CH cz DE DK. ES FI FR GR HU IE IT LU NL NO PL PT SE SI
Pseudo R 2 0.266 0.276 0.159 0.303 0.273 0.304 0.280 0.271 0.254 0.268 0.201 0.245 0.258 0.264 0.214 0.235 0.279 0.156 0.278 0.256 0.196
Constant 3.50*** 4.24*** 2.39*** 6.72*** 5.02*** 5.10*** 3.56*** 4.62*** 3.97*** 5.83*** 3.10*** 4.19*** 4.53*** 3.79*** 3.98*** 4.09*** 7.38*** 4.47*** 5.56*** 4.26*** 3.34***
18-29 Basline
30-39 0.39 0.15 0.88** 0.76** -0.79* 0.25 0.35 1.19*** 0.26 0.08 0.62** 0.54 1.16*** 0.05 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.76** 0.24 0.52* 0 0.4
40-49 0.63** 0.39 0.81** 1.22*** -0.06 0.50* 0.53 1.26*** 0.67** 0.39 0.76** 0.65* 1.25*** 0.28 1.04*** 0.81** 0.63* 0.87*** 0.96*** 0.11 0.11
50-59 0.65** 0 1.73*** 1.26*** -0.63 0.36 1.57** 1.36*** 0.60* 0.99** 0.57 0.87** 1.58*** 0.97 1.55*** 1.04*** 1.09*** 1.02*** 2.08*** 0.42 0.83**
60-69 0.86** 0.21 1.80*** 1.37*** -1.17** -0.58 1.80* 1.62*** 1.42*** 0.47 0.96* 1.22** 2.18*** 0.79 1.38*** 1.12** 1.18** 1.16*** 1.78*** 1.03* 0.87*
70-79 0.37 -0.43 1.48** 1.67*** -0.96* -0.03 1.27 1.87*** 1.29** 0.64 0.61 0.82* 1.65*** 0.47 1.34** 1.17** 2.07*** 1.36*** 1.67*** 1.17* 1.18**
80+
0.33 -1.32* 1.46* 1.41** 2.09*** -0.5 1.07 0.52 1 -0.5 -0.65 0.37 1.20* 0.07 0.42 1.59*** 1.23* 0.85* 2.11** 0.28 2.65*
Education 0.09 0.24** 0.17* 0.06 0.31** 0.49*** 0.1 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.47** 0.13* 0.23** 0.21** 0.26*** 0.24** 0.18** 0.37***
Religiosity 0.05* 0.03 -0.02 0 0.05 -0.01 -0.15** -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.09** 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04
Female -0.18 -0.51** -0.32 0.05 0 -0.47** -0.23 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.23 -0.16 -0.07 0.3 -0.1 0.02 0.13 0.26* 0.03 -0.17 -0.11
Political interest 0.27** 0.61*** 0.38** 0.67*** 0.27* 0.34*** -0.06 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.26* 0.21* -0.05 0.01 0.39*** 0.24 0.29*** 0.31** 0.34** 0.38***
sense o f duty to vote 0.35*** 0.23*** 0.03 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.11*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.16*** 0.33*** 0.43*** 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.21***
Income -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11** 0.01 0.08* 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.09* 0.01 0.10* 0.05 0.03
Party identification 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.17* 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.18** 0.30** 0.45*** 0.18** 0.09 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.07 0.50*** 0.05 0.23*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.42*** 0.24*** 0.23**
Trade union and 
party membership 0.27 0.41* 0.47* 0.35 0.21 -0.02 0.23 -0.03 0.32 1.28* 0.49** -0.21 0.61** 0.2 0.01 0.42 0.46 0.22 0.44*
duration o f 
residence, logged 0.25*** 0.42*** 0.11 0.30*** 0.37* 0.04 0.03 0.42*** 0.13 0.39*** 0.72*** 0.08 0.42*** 0.67*** 0.61*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.22* 0.14
External political 
efficacy, logged -0.01 0.1 0.17* 0.04 0.08 0.04 0 -0.03 0.02 -0.14* 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.1 0.17 0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.02
Internal political 
efficacy, logged -0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.19* 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.11 -0.01 0.1 0.07 0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.13 0.05 0.24** 0.06 0.03 0.11 0
Pension main source 
o f income 0.16 0.65* 0.22 0.29 0.86** 1.01*** 0.28 0.38 -0.57 0.81* 0.19 0.12 0.09 -1.02** -0.03 -0.01 0.19 -0.15 0.07 -0.36 0.28
Living with partner 0.34* 0.59** 0.83*** 0.40* 0.39* 0.31 0.52 0.60** 0.2 0.52** 0.80*** 0.54** 0.52** 0.5 0.44* 0.22 0.48** 0.04 0.36* 0.57** 0.51*
Subjective 
evaluation ofhealth 0 0.15 0.37** 0.13 0.19 0.18* 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.2 0.1 0.05 -0.09 0.08 0.1 0.16* 0.22* 0.16 0.02
Friends in non­
political networks, 
logged 0.18 -0.01 0.26 0.29* 0.09 0.18 0.54*** 0.70*** 0.74* -0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.33* 0.19 0.35* 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.32
Number of minor 
children in 
household 0.02 0.05 0 0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.45* -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.26 -0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.11 0.12 -0.08 0.21
***, **, * significant at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, Data: ESS.
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11.4 Graphs o f political generations and party choice in Britain and West
Germany: the Liberals, Greens and other parties (chapter 6)
Figure 11-1: Proportion of political generations who voted Liberal in British elections 1964-2001
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Source: own calculation according to British election studies 1964 to 2001, data defective for Feb 1974. 
Figure 11-2: Proportion of political generations who voted for the FDP in German elections
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Source: own calculation according to German election studies 1961 to 1998 and Politbarometer 2002.
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Figure 11-3: Proportion of political generations who voted for the Greens in German elections
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Source: own calculation according to German election studies 1961 to 1998 and Politbarometer 2002.
Figure ll-4: Proportion of political generations who voted for other parties in British elections 1964-2001
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Source: own calculation according to British election studies 1964 to 2001.
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Figure 11-5: Proportion of political generations who voted for other parties in German elections 1949-2002
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11.5 Variables in pooled cross-sectional time series analysis (chapter 7)
Table 11-4: Descriptives of variables used for party choice models: mean, minimum, maximum, standard 
deviation and description
Variable Name Survey question Answer categories Min Max Mean Std.
Deviat
ion
Politbarometer
Age (age Derived from v55 and v56
categories)
Education
incumbent
Religiosity 
(if respondent go to church? 
expressed 
denominational 
membership)
Sex
Smalvotefdp
From 1988 respondents 
indicated age in 5 year 
categories
Derived variable from V59 no school diploma or still at
and V60 school, 1 at least basic diploma
(Hauptschule), at least advanced 
diploma (Realschule), A Levels, 
University degree
Respondent voted for the 
party in power
How often to you generally Never, rarely, once a year, every
now and then, almost every 
Sunday, every Sunday
Vote
Coded by the interviewer Male, female
Respondent voted for the 
Greens or another small party 
(not FDP)
(if there was a national SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, Greens,
(if respondent election on Sunday) Which Other 
expressed 
intention to vote)
Year of birth
party would you vote for? 
Derived from age
17
1881
97
1983
46.08 16.77
2.63
0.47
2.31
1.52
0.11
1943.8
1
0.83
0.50
1.49
0.50
0.31
18.44
British Election 
Studies
Age, Year of Various formulation like
birth Would you say which year
you are bom in?
18
(if respondent 
voted)
Liberals/Liberaldemocrats, 
Other
99 47.05 17.61
Inpower Respondent voted for the 
patty in power
0 1 0.40 0.49
Sex Coded by the interviewer 1 2 1.53 0.50
Smalvote Respondent voted for the 
Liberals or a small party
0 1 0.19 0.39
Vote Which party did you vote for? Labour, Conservatives, 1 4
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11.6 Alternative party models for Britain with control variables (chapter 7)
Table 11-5: Logistic regressions, models of party choice in Britain 1964-1979 and 1979 -  2001 with more controls
Dependent Variable: Voted in last parliamentary election for one party versus voted for another
Period 1: Period 2:
1964-1979 1979-2001
Labour Cons Liberal Other Labour Cons Liberal Other
Valid N 8,424 8,424 6,749 8,424 13,519 13,519 13,519 13,519
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.100 0.037 0.083 0.08 0.074 0.032 0.074
Constant -0.17 -0.43** -1.86*** -4.19*** -0.71*** 0.22** -2.09*** -4.20***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.45) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.25)
Young (18-29) 0.17 -0.17 -0.03 0.21 0.06 -0.24*** 0.24* 026
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.30) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15)
Middle-aged (30-59) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Old (60+) 0.18 -0.06 -0.34* 0.69 -0.02 0.12* -0.13 -0.06
(0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.60) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12)
Victorian -0.71** 0.91*** -0.24 -1.62
(0.23) (0.22) (0.37) (0.97)
Inter-War Cohort -0.56*** 0.74*** -0.18 -1.32
(0.17) (0.17) (0.24) (0.73)
1945 Cohort -0.31* 0.46*** -0.13 -0.65 -0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.52***
(0.13 (0.13) (0.18) (0.37) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.16)
1951-66 Cohort -0.17 0.30** -0.22 -0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.11 -0.09
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.31) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12)
1966-79 Cohort 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thatcher’s Children 0.19** 0.08 -0.40*** -0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13)
Blair’s Children 0.23 0.05 -0.24 -0.44
(0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.32)
Controls
Education -0.49*** 0.32*** 0.14*** 0.16 -0.13*** 0.02 0.17*** -0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Religiosity -0.05** 0.03 0.05* 0.00 -0.06*** 0.03** 0.01 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
Female -0.18*** 0.08 0.03 0.71*** -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.30***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Trade union member 1.04*** -0.98*** -0.23* 0.11 0.44*** -0.54*** 0.16** 0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10)
Council housing 1.09*** -1.09*** -0.42*** 0.64*** 1.28*** -1.32*** -0.34*** 0.58***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12)
All models control for gender (male baseline) and election year (1977 baseline), standard errors in brackets, ***, **, * 
significant at 0.001,0.01, 0.05, weighting according to sample size per election. Data: BES.
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Table 11-6: Additional controls for British models of party choice 
Variable Name Survey question Answer categories Min Max Mean Std.
Deviat
ion
Education Age at which resp. finished 
school or full-time education
1=<16, 2= 16, 3 = 17, 4 = 18, 
5>18, mean replaces missing 
values
1 5 1.94 1.19
Religiosity How often respondent 
attended service
0 = never, 1= once a year, 2 = 
more than once a year, 3 = , 4= 
once a month 5 = several times 
a month, 6= more than once a 
week mean replaces missing 
values if  no data in survey years
0 6 2.80 1.64
Council housing Whether resp. lives in rented 
council house or flat
Mean replaces missing values 0 1 0.25 0.41
Trade union 
member
Whether resp. is currently 
member of trade union
0 1 0.25 0.40
Source: BES 1964-2001, some years do not have all items, replaced by mean. Question wording changed, for example, 
for education.
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11.7 Models of participation outside of political organisations (chapter 8, mode 3 — petition and badge): various sub­
samples
Table 11-7: Random-intercept logistic regressions, models of signing a petition or wearing a badge
Old democracies Post45 Post75 
Belgium. Britain, Democracies Democracies 
Denmark, Finland, Austria, Italy, West Greece, Portugal, 
France, Ireland, Germany Spain 
Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland
Post90
Democracies
Czech Republic, East 
Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia
Low average 
part
Greece, Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia
Medium average 
part
Belgium, Czech Rep., 
Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain,
High aver, part
Austria, Britain, 
Denmark, East 
Germany, Finland, 
France, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, West 
Germany,
C o n s t a n t -0.78*** -0.84*** -1.13*** -1.23*** -2.96* -1.04 -0.3
A g e -0.01** -0.003 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02* -0.02*** -0.01**
P o l .  i n t e r e s t 0.05 0.12* 0.02 0.08* 0.03 0.14*** 0.05
E d u c a t i o n -0.08*** -0.19*** 0 0.04 0.03 -0.07** -0.09***
L e f t - r i g h t  s c a l e 0.07 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12* 0.09 0.14** 0.07
S i z e  o f  t o w n 0.13** 0.17*** 0.3 0.16 0.16 0.32*** 0.12**
P o s t m a t e r i a l i s m 0.01 0.03*** -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02*
R e l i g i o s i t y 0.30*** 0.28* 0.39*** 0.46*** 0.04 0.38 -0.55
P o l i t i c a l  m e m b e r s h i p 0.15*** 0.41* 0.90** 0.42 0.54*** 0.40*** 0.28***
P o l i t i c a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.62 0.24 0.18**
P o l i t i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  l o g g e d 0.05 0.57*** 0.29 0.19 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
H o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.29 -0.13 0.15
G e n e r a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.02 0 -0.03 0.03
S o c i a l  n e t w o r k s ,  l o g g e d 0.66*** 0.74*** 0.71*** 0.64*** -0.04 0 -0.01
I n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  e f f i c a c y 0.21*** 0.09*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.64*** 0.73*** 0.65***
F e m a l e -0.48*** -0.32* -0.38*** -0.33* 0.39*** 0.19*** 0.20***
E m p l o y e d 0.06 -0.13*** 0.1 -0.45 -0.37** -0.36*** -0.45***
S e l f - e m p l o y e d 0.22 0.11 0.34 -0.4 -0.26 -0.15 0.06
D u r a t i o n  o f  r e s i d e n c e ,  l o g g e d -0.02 -0.20** 0.01 -0.02 -0.34 -0.02 0.27**
L i v i n g  w i t h  p a r t n e r -0.05 0.13 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
#  o f  m i n o r  c h i l d r e n  i n  h o u s e h o l d -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 0.12 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03
H e a l t h -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.11 -0.03 0.11* -0.04
P e n s i o n  a s  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  i n c o m e -0.1 -0.61*** 0.06 -0.08 0.15* -0.05 -0.03
***, **, * significant at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05. Data: ESS. All models have been weighted with dweight (individual) and pweight (country level).
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11.8 Models ofparticipation outside ofpolitical organisations (chapter 8, mode 4 -  protest): various sub-samples
Table 11-8: Random-intercept logistic regressions, models of protest
Old democracies
Belgium, Britain, 
Denmark, Finland, 
France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland
Post45
Democracies
Austria, Italy, West 
Germany
Post75
Democracies
Greece, Portugal, 
Spain
Post90
Democracies
Czech Republic, East 
Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia
Low average 
part
Greece, Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia
Medium average 
part
Belgium, Czech Rep., 
Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain
High average 
part
Austria, Britain, 
Denmark, East 
Germany, Finland, 
France, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, West 
Germany
C o n s t a n t -1.60** -1.81 -1.64 -6.18*** -5.23*** -2.07** -7.56***
A g e -0.02*** -0.02* -0.05*** -0.02* -0.02 -0.02* -0.02***
P o l .  i n t e r e s t -0.05 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0 0.11*** -0.06
E ducation -0.23*** -0.27* -0.1 0.08 0.04 -0.1 -0.26***
L e f t - r i g h t  s c a l e 0.20** 0.36*** 0.08 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.18*** 0.25***
S i z e  o f  t o w n 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.45 0.33 0.3 0.25*** 0.30***
P o s t m a t e r i a l i s m -0.03** -0.03*** -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03**
R e l i g i o s i t y 0.53*** 0.50** 0.71 0.36* 0.34 0.16 5.91***
P o l i t i c a l  m e m b e r s h i p 0.27* 0.66*** 0.9 0.97*** 0.44*** 0.36* 0.54***
P o l i t i c a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n -0.06** -0.02 -0.05*** -0.11*** 1.01*** 0.53** 0.33**
P o l i t i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  l o g g e d 0.19 -0.23 0.67 0.48 -0.10*** -0.04 -0.05**
H o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e -0.01 -0.07 -0.1 -0.01 0.36 -0.15 0.11
G e n e r a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n 0 0 0 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02
S o c i a l  n e t w o r k s ,  l o g g e d 0.88*** 0.65*** 0.57*** 0.88*** 0.02 0 0
I n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  e f f i c a c y 0.08* 0.04 0.23 0.28* 0.76*** 0.62*** 0.83***
F e m a l e 0 -0.09*** -0.18 0.22 0.27* 0.37** 0.06**
E m p l o y e d -0.28 -0.49*** -0.46** 0.41 0 -0.1 -0.02
S e l f - e m p l o y e d -0.38* -0.26 0.09 0.21 0 -0.26 -0.42**
D u r a t i o n  o f  r e s i d e n c e ,  l o g g e d 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 -0.19 -0.68 -0.34*
L i v i n g  w i t h  p a r t n e r -0.37*** -0.12 0.47 -0.11 -0.01 0.16*** 0.01
#  o f  m i n o r  c h i l d r e n  i n  h o u s e h o l d -0.06 -0.12*** -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.28 -0.28**
H e a l t h -0.07 0.32*** 0.11 0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08
P e n s i o n  a s  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  i n c o m e -0.52* -0.60*** 0.36 0.32 0.03 0.03 0.04
***, **, * significant at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05. Data: ESS. All models have been weighted with dweight (individual) and pweight (country level). Models 4 and 5 did not converge 
with the STATA GLLAMM procedure (version September 2006). They are weighted with pweight only under the XTLOGIT command.
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11.9 Models o f  participation outside o f poL organisations (chapter 8, mode 3 petition/badge): 22 single-country
regressions
Table 11-9: Single-country logistic regressions, models of signing a petition or wearing a badge
AT BE CH CZ DE(W) DE(E) DK ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT LU NL NO PL PT SE SI
Pseudo R1 0.088 0.131 0.077 0.131 0.119 0.062 0.080 0.213 0.122 0.149 0.086 0.183 0.190 0.120 0.223 0.102 0.109 0.065 0.136 0.269 0.101 0.151
Constant -1.62** -0.15 -1.13* 0.47 -1.87** -0.16 -0.30 0.32 -1.45** -0.17 -1.09* -1.70 -8.35*“ 0.42 -2 .7 2 " -0.48 -2 .41*" 0.25 -2.65** -2.84* 0.83 -2.20*
Age -0.01 -0.01* 0.00 -0.02* -0.00 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02** -0.03*“ -0.01* -0.02* -0.01 -0.02*“ -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0 .02*" -0.01 0.00 -0.02*“ -0 .0 3 "
Pol. interest 0.21** 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.49*** 0.25** 0.34** 0.08 0.48*** 0.24** 0.28“ 0.36“ * 0.35“ 0.26 0.36“ * 0 .71*" 0.14 0.15 0.27*“ 0.38“ 0.30* 0.35“ * 0 .59"*
Education 0.12* 0.12* -0.01 0.21* 0.08 0.14 0.24*** 0.09 0.01 0.11“ 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.18*“ 0.05 0.15* 0 .2 4 " -0.05 -0.05
Left-right scale -0.10** -0.05 -0 .17*" •0.04 -0.18*** -0.12** -0.09** -0.08 -0.06 -0.12*“ -0.06 •0.05 0.17“ -0.01 0.01 -0.09* -0 .15*" -0.08*** 0.09* -0.05 -0.04 -0.10
Size o f town 0.02 0.18** 0.22*** -0.03 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.13* 0.18*** 0.14* 0.06 -0.03 0.22 0.04 0.09 -0 .2 3 " 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.13 -0.07 0.20*
Postmaterialism 0.15 0.36** 0.28** 0.24 0.15 -0.12 -0.01 0.32* 0.30* 0.30“ 0.18 0.17 0.03 0.04 0 .39*" 0.05 0.29 0.39 0.06 -0.15
Religiosity 0.03 -0.04 0.06** 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0 .0 8 " -0.05 0.00 0 .0 7 " -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.02 0.02
Political
membership
0.18 0.11 0.55*** 0.28 0.22 0.53* 0.21* 0.49* 0.10 1.05*“ -0.21 0.37“ 1.11*“ 0.30* 0 .40*" 0.00 0.37 1.45“ * 0.28“ 0.83“ *
Political satisfaction -0.04* -0.01 0.02 -0.07* 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.00 -0 .11*" -0.06* 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.04
Political
information, logged
0.48* -0.09 -0.05 -0.23 0.50* -0.38 0.16 0.11 -0.15 0.12 0.50“ * 0.43 1.38“ * -0.01 0.46 0.37 0.48* -0.00 -0.08 -0.37 0.01 0.28
Household income 0.05 -0.03 0.07** 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09* -0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.06* -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.07
General satisfaction 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.09* -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 ■0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06* -0.01 -0.04 0.01
Social networks, 
logged
0.62*“ 0.78*** 0.72*** 0.37** 0.33** 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.71“ * 0.63“ * 1.08*“ 0.90*“ 0.71*“ 0.81*“ 0 .4 5 " 0 .61"* 0.60*“ 1.20“ * 0.37 0.71“ * 0 .5 2 "
Internal political 
efficacy
0.10 0.24** 0.23** 0.36** 0.11 0.11 0.26*** 0.27** 0.33*** 0.04 0.15* 0.12 0.58“ 0.24“ 0.13 0 .3 0 " 0.23“ 0.18“ 0 .3 1 " 0.63*“ 0 .2 8 "* 0.20
Female -0.14 -0.38** -0.21 -0.56** -0.34** -0.15 -0.33* -0.42* -0.79*“ ■0.15 -0.47*“ -0.32 -0.27 -0.36** -0.41* -0.37* -0.45*“ -0.31“ -0.38* -0.38 -0.50*“ -0.41
Employed -0.04 -0.23 0.02 0.17 -0.12 0.01 0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 •0.25 0.30 -0.12 -0.07 0.36 -0.08 -0.22 -0.15 0.13 -0.00 -0 .8 6 "
Self-employed 0.24 -0.17 0.31 0.82* 0.25 0.05 -0.15 -0.38 0.06 0.61 -0.07 ■0.05 -0.15 -0.42 -0.21 0.31 -0.06 •0.27 -0.81* -0.01 0.65“ -2.17“
Duration o f 
residence, logged
-0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.40* -0.24*** -0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.24 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.35* -0.00 -0.13
Living with partner -0.29* 0.04 -0.17 -0.09 0.23 -0.04 -0.32 -0.06 0.26 0.23 0.16 -0.04 -0.67* 0.19 -0.37 0.01 0.25 -0.01 -0.21 -0.14 -0.11 0.38
# o f minor children 
in household
-0.07 0.12 0.04 0.16 -0.09 0.16 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 0.05 0.07 ■0.10 0.19 0.02 0 .3 5 " -0.02 0.03 ■0.07 0.13 -0.10 -0.12* -0.09
Health -0.11 -0.09 0.03 -0.21 0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.18 -0.01 -0.19* -0.05 -0.05 0.23 -0.15 0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.13 -0.04 0.22
Pension as main 
source of income
-0.31 -0.19 -0.26 -0.16 -0.56* -0.13 0.12 -0.32 0.18 0.90“ * 0.03 0.26 0.83 0.00 0.02 -0.27 -0.35 -0.10 0.16 -0.16 -0.20 -0.56
***, **, * significant at 0.001,0.01, 0.05. Data: ESS.
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11.10 Models o f participation outside o f political organisations (chapter 8, mode 4 protest): 22 single-country regressions
Table 11-10: Single-country logistic regressions, models of protest
AT BE CH CZ DE(W) DE(E) DK ES FI FR GB GR HU IE r r LU NL NO PL PT SE SI
Pseudo R1 0.240 0.137 0.121 0.168 0.1667 0.131 0.178 0.224 0.198 0.248 0.248 0.190 0.286 0.167 0.2947 0.128 0.093 0.109 0.155 0.279 0.1898 0.1644
Constant -0.88 -1.77 -0.24 -2.85 -3.09*** -1.60 -0.60 -2.29** -1.05 -0.89 -2.96** 0.01
10.09**
*
-0.56 -1.01 -0.35 -3.51* -1.25 -5.54** -4.73** -3.06** -4.46**
Age -0.03** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03*** -0.03* -0.02* -0.03 -0.02** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.03** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Pol. interest 0.21 0.23 0.39** 0.38 0.52*** 0.33* 0.43* 0.46*** 0.61* 0.37** 0.68*** 0.42** 0.78** 0.28 0.78*** 0.23* 0.77** 0.30* 0.18 0.51* 0.93*** 0.73**
Education 0.20** 0.11 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 0.16 -0.12 0.16* 0.03 0.08 0.12 -0.03 0.15 -0.10 0.22 -0.06 -0.13 0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.09 -0.05
Left-right scale -0.32*** -0.16** -0.22*** -0.05 -0.31*** -0.13* -0.19*** -0.12* -0.15 -0.24*** -0.03 -0.18*** 0.22** -0.18*** -0.07 -0.14** -0.14* -0.26*** 0.09 0.04 -0.19*** 0.05
Size o f town 
Postmaterialism
0.27***
0.26
0.26**
0.25
0.18*
0.30*
0.29
0.56
0.34***
0.20
0.36***
0.21
0.18
0.12
0.13
0.55**
0.28
0.22
0.21**
0.35*
-0.01
0.46*
0.16
0.22
0.54***
0.14
0.19*
0.13
0.19 -0.01 -0.05
0.39
0.22**
0.10
0.29
0.15
0.56***
1.22**
0.48***
0.17
0.34
0.14
Religiosity
Political
membership
-0.06*
0.47**
-0.03
0.56**
0.01 0.04 -0.01
0.71***
-0.07
0.44
-0.02
-0.02
0.00
0.63**
-0.15*
-0.13
-0.07*
0.62**
-0.02
0.58*
-0.06
0.94***
0.06
-0.27
-0.06
0.12
-0.01
1.60***
0.01
0.32
0.07
0.31
-0.03
0.28
0.01
1.43***
-0.11
1.16***
-0.03
0.45*
-0.04
-0.12
Political satisfaction -0.02 -0.05 -0.06* -0.06 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -0.07* -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.15** -0.03 -0.11** -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05
Political
information, logged
0.03 -0.50 -0.22 0.01 0.08 -0.39 0.30 0.09 -0.32 -0.16 0.05 0.25 1.16* -0.31 -0.18 0.42 -0.15 0.20 0.62 -0.39 -0.35 -0.64
Household income 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.04
General satisfaction
Social networks, 
logged
-0.06*
0.52***
-0.01
0.80***
0.02 0.07 0.01
0.64***
-0.00
0.43*
0.06
0.75***
0.05
0.54***
-0.03
0.85**
-0.03
0.97***
-0.03
0.79***
-0.00
0.68**
0.08
0.50
-0.06
0.48**
0.02
0.31
0.04
0.62***
0.04
0.60*
0.03
0.30*
0.02
1.21***
-0.10
0.09
-0.03
0.81***
-0.04
1.06**
Internal political 
efficacy
0.18 0.32* 0.29* 0.49* -0.07 0.30* 0.06 0.43*** 0.44 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.25 0.53*** 0.33* 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.63** 0.10 0.05
Female -0.17 0.03 -0.10 0.46 -0.08 -0.13 -0.48* 0.21 -0.67 0.18 -0.54* -0.08 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.39* 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.29 0.54
Employed -0.55* 0.04 -0.24 0.90 -0.31 -0.49* -0.45 -0.59** -0.18 0.05 -0.40 -0.08 0.28 -0.05 -0.54 -0.51* -0.27 0.16 0.33 -0.52 -0.14 -0.74
Self-employed -0.25 0.01 -0.08 1.08 0.05 -0.61 -0.91 -0.82* -0.93 -0.00 -0.30 0.10 -0.23 0.23 -0.59 -0.02 -1.26 0.11 -0.35 -1.19 -0.10 -0.23
Duration o f 
residence, logged
-0.14 0.22 -0.12 -0.39 0.01 0.08 -0.00 0.18 -0.17 -0.08 0.10 -0.08 0.21 0.05 -0.15 0.12 -0.04 0.02 -0.23 0.42* 0.19 0.37
Living with partner -0.05 -0.16 -0.54* -0.24 -0.12 -0.05 -0.54 -0.12 -0.04 -0.17 0.43 -0.15 -0.27 -0.36 -0.26 0.05 0.58 -0.09 0.07 0.21 -0.00 -0.13
# of minor children 
in household
-0.24* -0.06 0.11 -0.00 -0.12 -0.07 0.10 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.15 0.03 0.19 -0.23* -0.12 0.08 -0.05 -0.28 -0.18 0.15
Heal ft] 0.14 -0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.39** 0.04 -0.19 0.13 -0.34 -0.00 -0.11 -0.15 -0.04 0.13 0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.10 0.28 -0.30* 0.05
Pension as main -0.82* 0.36 -0.48 -0.20 -0.68 -0.28 -1.69** -0.22 -0.65 -0.15 -0.54 0.08 0.78 -0.41 0.15 -0.12 -0.15 -0.44 0.37 -0.11 -0.25 -1.66
source o f income
***, **, * significant at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05. Data: ESS.
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11.11 Interview guide (chapter 9)
Contacting procedure
Once a telephone number was obtained (see text), I phoned the person up. I 
explained who I was, where I got the number from and the academic, non­
commercial nature of my project. Only one recommended person broke off the 
conversation at this point. I asked whether the information that the person was 60 or 
older and had been involved in the protest activities around Council Tax was correct. 
I further gave her my landline contact number and full name in order to allow that 
person to verify who I was. I pointed out the nature of the interview (per phone, at a 
time most convenient to the person, duration 30-45 minutes) and that all details 
would be kept secret, so that no one could track back where the information had 
come from. Some respondents were suspicious and wanted to check my phone 
number and homepage to see whether I was telling the truth. If no one answered the 
phone, I left a message with my number, name and the reason for the call asking for 
a call back. All respondents agreed to give an interview. I then made an appointment 
for the actual interview by phone.
When leading the actual interview, I always started by pointing out that
• All information was to be treated with confidentiality and that no names 
would be used in the research report;
• The purpose of the interview was to understand the personal experience 
of the Council Tax protest and that there was ‘no right or wrong’ in the 
answers. This should make the respondents at ease and not to worry about 
giving correct ‘facts’;
• The respondent could always choose not to answer a question if she felt 
uneasy about it;
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• I was taking notes and that the interview would take about 30-45 minutes;
• The interviewee could always call me if she had further questions after 
the interview;
• She could ask questions before we would start.
Interview questions
The following list of questions gives an idea of the approximate order and type of 
questions that I asked. If a respondent started to talk about a certain topic that I 
intended to cover later, I would ask those questions immediately.
Warming Up
• What is the town or city called you live in?
• Which part of England is that?
• Where did you take part in the protests?
• One or several?
• To what extent are you involved with Is it Fair? or the local pensioners group?
• How did you hear about the protests? Were you asked by a friend or an 
organisation? Is it Fair?
• What is your personal position towards Council Tax?
• Did people that you knew beforehand join you in protesting? Were they 60 and 
older?
• How did you get to the protests?
• Did you do anything else besides protesting e.g. writing a letter to your councillor 
or MP?
• Did you sign a petition?
• Are you a supporter of any of the pensioners’ organisations e.g. National 
Pensioners Convention?
• Have you been to any protests since, either against Council Tax or anything else?
Main part
• At the Council Tax protests, why did you want to protest at the time? PROBE
o Personally affected 
o Anger about local politicians 
o Satisfaction with political parties
• Why did you want to express your views on the streets?
• The people you marched alongside in the protest -  were they 60 or older as well?
• Do you think it was kind of nice to be with people of the same age group or was 
it not important to you?
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• When you read the newspaper articles about the protests, the press often 
highlighted the higher age of protesters and seemed to be surprised. For instance 
they wrote about the ‘grey army that is marching’. Can you understand why they 
should be surprised?
• Do you think it is unusual to protest at your age?
• How did your own friends, neighbours or family react when you protested? Were 
they surprised as well?
• What did younger people that you know say?
• (FOR FIRST TIME PROTESTERS) When you were at the protests, did you feel 
awkward in any way because of your age?
• Were there people who let you understand that you should not have marched in 
the street because you are too old? IF YES, Why -  do you think -  do some 
people say things like that?
• There are people at your age who are not able to march in the streets because 
they are ill, for instance. Do you have any feelings for them when you are 
protesting?
Political past
• Now I would like to ask you a few questions about your past. Have you protested 
before?
• When was the last time that you protested before those Council Tax protests?
• What was the occasion?
• Do you remember how old you were when you first protested?
• When you were younger, were you also active in politics in other ways? Did you 
ever contact your MP or councillor?
• Do you think it is now easier, more difficult or the same for you to be active in 
politics? Why?
• I would now like to ask you a few questions about your parents. Did you grow up 
with your parents? Were your parents political people, e.g. apart from voting, 
were they active in a party or in the trade union?
• Do you remember whether they ever protested in the streets or told you about it?
• When your parents were your age, do you remember whether they ever 
protested?
• Do you think it is more common among older people to protest now than it was 
30 years ago? Why do you think that is?
• To what extent has retirement made a difference for you in terms of your political 
interest and activities?
Winding down -  socio-economic background and voting
• Which year were you bom in?
• Are you a member of a political party? Which one? IF NO, have you ever been? 
If YES, when did you join them
• Did you vote in the last elections?
• Which party did you vote for?
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• Generally speaking, some people tend to prefer one party over another. Have you 
always supported that party?
• IF LIBDEM VOTER : What was the main reason why you voted for the Lib 
Dems? Was the suggested abolishment of the Council Tax a reason why you 
voted for the Lib Dems?
• If NO LIBDEM VOTER: the Liberal Democrats proposed to abolish Council 
Tax, why didn’t you vote for them?
• How old were you when you left school?
• Did you go to university?
• Are you still working?
• What was the last job that you had?
• Do you receive a pension or pension credit? What kind of pensions do you 
receive?
Concluding
• Is there anything that you have not told me that you might want to add?
• Do you know anybody else who is 60 or older, took part in the demonstrations 
and who might be willing to be interviewed?
I have sent drafts of the chapter to all participants with the opportunity for them to 
ask for their individual capital letter, so that they can identify themselves.
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